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pHAPI'ER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
A· Background on the· Persian. Gulf' Area.* 
1. Definition of' the Area. 
~e11Persian Gulf' Area'' is a term covering the states and 
Skaikhd.oms lying iri or bordering the Persian Gulf'. Strateg:lcally and. 
economically speaking7 the Area forms the most important part of the well 
known Middle East region. It comprises the States of Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and the Shaikhdoms of Kuvait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial 
Oman. The Shaikhdoms of' Qatar ~:md the Tru.cial Oman will not be treated 
in this study owing to the minor developments occurred there. Iran, 
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are modern sovereign nations while Kuwait, Bahrain 
and the rest ~f the Shaikhdcims a~e protectorates having special political 
and economic agreements with Britain. In the following sections of' this 
chapter, a .brief backgroUnd on each of the five major countries of the. 
Area will be given. 
2. Iran. 
Iran is a high plateau jutting down. from the Caucasian funnel 
of the U.S.S.R. and spreading wide and barren toward the south Asian Sub-
continent. It is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea and the U.S.S.R., 
*Most of the facts in this section are based on: 2. 
on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf. of Oman, on the east by 
the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan and Buluchistan (Pakistan), and on the west by 
. . 
Iraq and Turkey. It has an area of some 6281 000 square miles, about a 
fifth of the size of the United States. 
It can be said that Iran has the longest self-government his-
tory in the Persian Gulf .Area. Her existence as a national state in this 
modern sense of the term goes back to the sixteenth century, but her 
modern form of government as a constitutional monarchy dates back only to 
the year 1906. The present Shah is Mohammed Riza of the Pahlevi dynasty. 
He came to the throne in 1941. In 1925, his. father Riza Khan, an army 
officer, forced the abdication of .Ahinad Shah, the last of the Qahar 
rulers, and proclaimed himself Shah-in-shah (king of kings). During his 
reign Riza Khan initiated a number of administrative, social and economic 
reforms. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the country's economy was 
the construction o:f the trans-Iranian railroad, completed in 1937. 
According to the 1956 census, the total population o:f Iran 
was found to be 18,944,820 persons. Most o:f them are derived from the 
early Aryan mass movements into the region, 1n the second millennium 
B.C., and :from some o:f the Arab groups who ep.tered the country during and 
after the seventh century A~D., and settled 1n the north-eastern and 
eastern parts o:f the countcy. ·. Also from the tenth to the fourteenth 
centuries, it is the belief that Turkish or Turanian Tribes moved in in 
considerable numbers. 
The majority of the Iranians speak Persian with an admixture 
o:f Arabic. However, there are an influential Turki-speaking minority 
concentrated in Azerbaijan, in the north-west corner of the country. 
8. 
The people of Iran are predominantly Moslems of the Shii Sect 
of Islam which is also the official religion of the country. Christi-
anity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism are·also officially recognized. 
Economically speaking, Iran is predominantly an agricultural 
country. About 85 per cent of the population being directly dependent 
'On farming and stock-raising for its livelihood. It is estimated ~hat 
out of the total area only 10-15 per cent is under cultivation; 30-35 
per cent is desert and waste land; 15 per cent is grazing land; 10-15 per 
cent is forest and the remaining 20-30 per cent is considered potentially 
productive. 
Manufacturing industries are not ye~ large in Iran. In fact, 
Riza Khan made the start in this field~ His Government not only encour-. 
aged the buildi~g of many factories, but itself built a sizable number, 
principally for sugar refining and textile ma*ufacturing. But petroleum 
industry is the mo.st important in Iran, and the dependence on revenues 
derived from it is very great. There are some other mineral resources 
in Iran, .such as coal, copper, lead and chrome, but petroleum represents 
the only developed national resource. Production of crude oil in Iran 
ranked·the.highest among the Persian Gulf AreS: countries before the 
closing down of the industry after nationalization. Now Iran ranks the 
third in the Persian Gulf crude reserves and production. 
Table I shows selected major agricultural, mineral and manu-
facturing products together with the annual output from each. 
~ABLE I 
]RAN: OUTPUT OF SELECTED MAJOR PRODUCTS 
(Thousands of metric tons1 except as indicated) 
Category and Product f953 '1954 1:222 1956 .1257 
Agric~ture 
Wheat 2240 2100 2313 2700 2800 
Barley 820 k)820 I::88o 1000 1000 
Rice 499 526 322 350 340 
Cotton 50 6o . 6o 62 61 
Sugar-:-b~~ts .. 531 !:!.45 522 562 
Tobacco 18 l2 ll 14 17 
Oil seeds ll4 134 134 
Citrus fruits 45 35 4o 45 
Dates 125 141 100 132 104 
Raisins 49 50 60 62 63 
Mining 
Crude Petroleum 1489 3500 17070 26481 35300 
Coal 155 252· l8o 330 
Copper ore l 4 4 5 
Lead ore 8 18 18 32 
Chrome ore 3 18 18 33 
Manufacturing 
Sugar 71 70 76 82 
Ciga~ettes (millions) 5772. 6681 6813 ! ,· 
Tobacco 5167 5295 4762 
Refined petroleum 
(major products) 1235 2810 7274 11030 
Cement 65 62 So 156 
Cotton (used in manufac-
turing) 15 15 17 20 
Soprce: . United Nations1 Economic Developments in the Middle East 1956-
19 57, })age 22, 
~o .. 
3. The Republic of Irag. 
Iraq is located in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers between the plateau of Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf. In 
ancient·:,times, it was known as Mesopotamia (the land between rivers). It 
forms roughly a tri~ngular area of.l68,050 square miles with the ~pex 
terminating at the north of the .Persian Gulf. Topographically 1 the 
country is divided into three distinct-sections: The Mesopotamian plain, 
the U~lands and the Folded Mountain Belt. It has common frontiers with 
Iran, TurkeY., Syria, Jordon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. 
According to the 1947 census, Iraq's total population was put 
at 4,80o,ooo persons, including an estimate of 300,000 to cover nomads. 
In the 1957 census, a preliminary figure put the total population at 
6,ooo,ooo persons.* It has been estimat~d that out of the total popula-
tion, l,4oo,oo persons are settled on agricultural holdings, l4,ooo 
persons in the petroleum industry, 99,000 in manufacturing industries, 
and 160,000 in government emploYment and services.** 
Although 46.9 per cent of-the total area of the country is 
officially classified as'desert, Iraq's main resources, apart from oil, 
are its fertile soi.l and abundant water. In the two major rivers,· 
Euphrates and Tigris, I~q possesses a huge source of water of an excellent 
quality for irrigation •. The control and use of those two rivers has 
always been the main key to Iraq's economic progress. Two large dams on 
tributaries of the Tigris, and other ~lanned works, Will result in 
** Ibid. 
c~
ll. 
approximately 1.5 million hectares of new cultivated land - 600~000 \ . . 
hectares in the Euphrates basin and 900,000 hectares in. the Tigris 
basin.* 
According to a U.N. study made in the year 1952, only about 
. I . 
I . 
36 per cent of the total cultivable area is under cultivation. In 1956~ 
agriculture represented 24 per cent of gross national product~ the 
largest sector apart from oil which represented 27 per cent.** 
Major agricultural crops of the country are wheat, barley, 
rice and dates. The area and y~eld for each are as shown in Table II. 
* 4~. 
** Ibid. 
12. 
'J].ABLE II 
1 IRAC,: AGRICULTURAL AREA, PRODUCTION .AND YIELOO 
(Thousands of .:tons, except as indicated) 
Crop and Item ]j952/53 63/54 •54/55 
Wheat 
Production 762 ll6o 453 
Area (hectares) 1182 1390 1425 
Yield (kilogrammes 
per hectare) 64o 830 310 
Barley 
Production ,llll 1239 757 
Area (hectares) 1096 1122 1205 
Yield (kilogrammes 
per hectare) 1010 1100 620 
Rice 
Production 163 180 83 
Area (hectares) 95 120 54 
Yield (kilogrammes per 
hectare) :1710 1500 1530 
Cotton 3 3 7 
Dates 371 365 421 
.55/56 
776 
1314 
590 
1066 
1171 
910 
110 
70 
1570 
9 
300 
Spurce: Economic Developments in the Middle East 1956-1957, United 
Nations, 1958. 
13. 
2_6/57 
llOO 
1456 
750 
1305 
1240 
1050 
The mineral resources in Iraq, other than oil, are sparse. 
However, a recent geological survey reports the existence of glass sand, 
sulphurJ lead, copper, salt and some other ores. Manufacturing industry 
is not yet large and much of it is of the small-scale type. The .larger 
industries generally either produce construction materials o~ process 
agricultural products. 
Petroleum in Iraq is the main economic resource of the country. 
In petroleum, Iraq possesses not only a source of foreign exchange but 
also a cheap source of power and raw mate~ials essential to the develop-
ment of industry, agriculture and. transportation. Today Iraq rai:lks the 
fourth in the Persian Gulf petroleum proved reserves and production. 
~Prior to July 14, 1958 Iraq used to be a constitutional monar;_ 
chy. On July 14, however, the e:x:isting government and monarchy were 
I 
overthrown by an army revolt, andthe present, republic was immediately 
proclaimed.. 
4. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia comprises about nine-tenths of the entire Arabian 
peninsula and is formed of four administrative areas: the Hejaz, Nejd, 
Asir and Rasa.· It has an area of approxi~tely 865,000 square miles 
and is bounded on the north by Jordon, Iraq, and Kuwait, on the east by 
the Persian Gulf, on the south by Qatar, Trucial Coast, Muscat and Oman, 
Aden Protectorate and Yemen and on the west by the Red Sea. 
Population estimates vary widely, but perhaps the best is 
6,ooo,ooo persons. The overwhelming majority 'of inhabitants are Arabic-
speaking Sunnite Moslems. 
The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is created and welded 
14. 
together by the late King Abdul-Aziz.ibn Saud~ The present king is his 
son, Saud .ibn Abdul Aziz. In March 1958 more power was given by king 
Saud to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal who is also the Prime Minister 
and the Foreigr1$ On l4aY 12 a royal decree gave the Cabinet full exec-
utive powers and direct responsibility for administration and control of 
fincance. 
The land of Saudi Arabia is not all desert but there are no 
permanent rivers and raii:ifall does not excee!i lOn a year.. The main 
centers of agriculture are the coastal highlands -of Asir in the south,_ 
west and. the great Hafuf oasis in Rasa on the east.· Dates, especially 
at Medina and in Rasa is the most important agricultural product. Other 
crops includewheat, millet, coffee, alfalfa, rice and some fruit and 
vegetables. 
Manufacturing industries are not yet developed and at the 
. -. ' 
present time there are no mineral industries apart from oil Wl:iich 
represents, to a very large extent, the· government's chief source of 
income. Saudi Arabia ranks the second after Kuwait in the. Persian Gulf' 
oil proved reserves and production • 
. 2~ The Shaikhdom of Kuwait. 
Kuwait is located at the head of the Persian Gulf.. It is 
bounded on the north and west by Iraq, on the east by the Persian Gulf' 
and on the south by Saudi Arabia. The country occupies about 6, 000 
square miles and except f'b.r Kuwait's oil company camp, the entire area 
is -waterless .and barren desert with an occasional small oasis. 
The first census iri Kuwait vas made in 1957. It put the total 
population at just over 200,000 persons. Apart from a f'ew small villages 
the majority of the population are concentrated in Kuwait city and the 
oil town of Ahmadi. It is estimated that about 18o,OOO persons live in 
Kuwait city alone. 
The language in Kuwait is Arabic and the indigenous population 
is predominantly Mos~em Sunnite Arabs, though some Persians and a few 
Indians have long been resident in Kuwait city. 
The ruler of Kuwait is elected ~rom the ruling family, the 
Subah. Kuwait has a special treat relations With Britain'(tre~ty of 
1899) according to which its foreign relations are cond~cted by the 
British Government through its political agent in Kuwait city .. 
The economy of Kuwait used to depend on transit trade, sea-
faring, boat building and pear~-fishing. Having no water, the country 
has no agriculture~ This type of economy has been completely changed 
since the discovery of oil in the country. KUwait now ranks the. highest 
among the countries of the Persian Gulf Area in petroleum proved reserves 
and production. Oi~reyenue is directed roughly one-third to current 
expenditures; one-third to reserve investment overseas, mainly in 
British securities through an investment board in London, and one-third 
to development. 
6. The Shaikhdom of Bahrain. 
Bahrain is a group of Islands in the Persian Gulf off the 
Arabian coast. It has a total area of about 200 square miles and a 
total population of about 120,000 persons, of which at least 45,000 
live in Manama, the capital, and 20,000 ~ive fn near-by Muharraq. 
The present ruling family of Bahrain is the Khalifa of the 
Utub tribe which first entered into treaty relations with Britain in 
~6 .. 
i820. 
The majority of the population are Moslem Arabs divided into 
Sunnis and Shiis. Most of the villages are inhabited by Ba.harinah of 
the Shii faith. Muharraq Island is almost entirely Sunni Arabs, but 
the population of Manamah is very mixed and includes many Persians and · 
Indians. 
The main Is.land of Bahrain, Manamah, is well watered by 
springs, and dates; ci:brus fruit, lucerne and vegetables are grown. 
Among the traditional industries of the Islands are boat-building, 
fishing, and pearling. Such industries are now declining after the 
discovery of oil in 1932, but are still important on the Gulf. Manamah 
port is now a free trade' zone. 
The principal petroleum industry in ~ahrain is not of the 
extractive type. The oil field is small, but the oil company operates 
a large refinery, for which the bulk of the oil refined comes from 
Saudi Arabia. 
B. Statement of the problem 
1. The meaning of concession. 
Concession is a term which covers a wide range of meanings 
and comes in a broad variety of forms. In law, concession refers to-the 
act of conceding or to the thing to be condeded. ·But for the most part 
the term amy refer to a grant, franchise, licsnse, permit, patent, char-
ter or monopoly given gy a government to a national or a national cor-
poration or to a foreign individual, corporation or state. 
Governments may grant concessions for different purposes and 
over certain spheres of business or public service. They may grant 
concessions for the use of land, exploitation of resources or conduct . 
of an enterprise within their t~rritories~ There are, for instance, 
banking concessions and concessions for impr0vement of communications 
or for building railroads. There are also concessions in the form of 
business contracts in which governments offer inducements to capital, 
usually foreign, for the development of industries or national resources, 
such ~e the petroleumconcessions. It is this type of concession 
Which is the most ancient, the most numerous and the most widely dis-
tributed of all. 
Petroleum concessions history dates back to the year. 1400 
and since that time they have increased in number and undergone a lot 
of changes and modifications. 
Generally speaking, all petroleum concessions are basically 
alike in character. Some differences, however, may ~xist according 
to the prevailing legal systems, types of societies or governments 
concerned. 
2. Concessionary arrangements in the petroleum industry.* 
It can be said that world petroleum exploration and/ or 
exploitation activities are governed by four different legal systems. 
The first of these systems is the one found in the United States and 
Canada. Among the major features of such system are: the extensive 
rights to the suboil (this applies only to the ~nited States, since in 
* 39, World's section. 
18 .. 
Canada such rights are primarily the property of the government); the 
distinctive method o~.financial encouragement in the form of the deple-
tion allowance and use of conservation and prorationing. Other features 
include the lasting of the exploitation phase so long as production in 
commercial quantities continues, the concession area being relatively 
small and the more highly developed regulations governing drilling and 
production technizues. 
The second system stands for complete or partial nationalization 
of the industry. It is found in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the 
communist countries and in some other countries in less complete form. 
The third system is found where general petroleum la~s exist 
to reserve the suboil rights to the nation and to govern and define the 
terms upon which petroleum exploration and/or exploitation rights may be 
granted and the liabilities and privileges of the parties to the conces-
1 
sion contract. This system is prevailing in the majority of South Amer-
ican countries and in recent years, it has be~n adopted by an increasing 
number of countries. 
The fourth system is the one prevailing in the countries of 
the Persian Gulf Area. Major characteristics of such system include 
consideration of the resources of the suboil as a national property (in 
some cases they belong to the king or to the ruler) and the absence of 
any petroleum legislation, with the exception of Iran which on July 1957 
developed the first general petroleum law within the Area. It follows 
that the concession contract is the only institutional arrangement 
between the oil companies and the governments of the Area. 
Though~concession contract within the Area are basically alike, 
some important differences may exist and this is because some of the 
'. 
countries provide ~or division o~ pro~its be~ore ~oreign taxes and some 
after. In addition, there are substantial di~ferences in the method o~ 
calculation of the value of production. These differences have tended, 
however, in recent years to iron themselves out, since all current con~ 
cessions contain a clause .stating that any more favorable conditions 
given to another Middle Eastern country must also be extended to the con-
cessionary country. Furthermore, most of the countries of the Area have 
concluded agreements between themselves for the exchange of information 
on the details of concession arrangements. 
In fact, in most of the casesj the concession contract alone 
does not always suffice to describe the sum-total of governing rules 
and conditions under which petroleum operations are to be conducted. It 
is quite ~amiliar to obserVe intercompany arrangements between the oil 
companies operating within the Area. There are, for instance, an 
intercompany agreement be:t~en :the·::.twcr:partne:ts\~cff::.th.e·-;Ituwait_··o:ri Company. 
defining their rights and liabilities vis-a~vis one another. Treaties 
and political agreements between the countries of the Area on the one 
hand and between them and a major power on the other hand are also com-
mon. The treaties between the Shaikb.s of Kuwait and Bahrain and the 
British Government, the agreement between the Kuwait Oil Company and the 
British Government and the political agreement governing the status o~ 
the Kuwait·-Saudi neutral zone are some of the cases that can be cited in 
this connection.* 
* The Neutral Zone is an area on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia frontier. In 
December, 1922, an agreement was reached between Kuwait and Saudi Arabaa 
which resulted in the formation of the so•called Neutral Zone in which 
the two· countries would have equal and undivided rights. 
20. 
3. Major elements of' petroleum concessions in the Persian Gulf' Area .. 
Petroleum concessions within the Area have the :following major 
elements in common: 
a - Definition of the area of concession* 
b - Duration of concession. 
c - Minimum period and magnitude ;for initial drilling. 
d. - A group of' :financial obligations in the form of lump payment sums, 
annual dead rent payments, royalties or share in prof'its~ 
.. 
e - Provision for delivery of a specific amount or a certain percentage 
of' annual production either as a part of royalty or to be paid :for.by 
the concessionary governments at a special price. 
:f - Provision :for certain extra-territorial rights such as installation 
rights, :freedom from future taxes and the right of' eminent domain. 
g - ProYision :for surrender of concession. 
Some other concession elements, less common and. mostly recent, 
are provisions for currency stipulations, stock participation, employment, 
concession transfer, arbitration, nomillation of directors and partial 
participation in management. 
4. The changing pattern of the Persian Gulf' Petroleum ConcessionsQ 
We have noticed :from above how concessionary arrangements 
in the Persian Gulf' Area differ, in someway or anothe:r, :from those 
prevailing in other oil-producing countries of' the world. We have also 
been aware of' the nature of' and major components of concessions within the 
Area~ In fact, such concessionary arrangements have never.been the same 
during all the life history of' the Persian Gulf petroleum industry. Spec-
tacular and dynamic change has.hit almost every aspect of concessions and 
.2L 
in addition, new and more liberal elements b.ave been introduced into the 
majority of recent concession contracts. Furthermore, change took place 
in different forms and at various degrees. At some time it was concen-
trated mainly on the financial aspects disregarding all other consider-
ations. That was the kind of early develo:pments. At other times, mostly 
recent, change has emphasized, beside the financial matters, other econo-
mic, technical, managerial and commer~ial aspects. It is true that 
financial considerations still are the prime motive for change, but even 
though, the way they ar~ changing now is different. In some instances 
also the change took place in a violent way as when it ended by the 
unsuccessful unilateral nationalization of the petroleum industry in Iran 
in 1952. At other instances it took place in a smooth manner and with 
a mutual understanding and agreement between the parties concerned. 
There is no doubt that several national and international 
factors were forcing and affecting the pattern of such developments. 
Such factors include the rising pressures and needs for increased reve-
nues, the rise of national aspirations within the Area, competition 
between old.concessionaires and newcomers attracted by the immenseness 
of the Area 1 s deposits and competition between the countries of the Area 
themselves .. 
It is the theme of this study to trace up and investigate 
such developments and to explore the reasons behind each. 
C. Si~ificance of Studl 
The significance of this study stems from three fundamental 
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factors. First is the growing international importance of petroleum. 
This came as a result of the constantly increased usage of petroleum 
products that places oil and its derivatives among the principal factors 
in international trade. The second factor is the great geographic, 
strategic and economic significance of the Area. Strategically and 
economically speaking, the great prize of the Area is oiL In 1937, the 
Area produced 15.9 million tons of oil - little more than 5 per cent of 
world supplies. ·In 1947, it· produced 42.2 million tons, and in 1957 
about l8o million tons - nearly a quarter of the world output.* The 
fields of the Area.contain almost three-quarters of. the known oil 
reserves o:f the free world.** The whole of Europe became, as these 
supplies and reserves:.:grew, almost exclusively dependent on these 
sources tor oil. Some of the countries of Europe rely on oil to a greater 
extent than others. In i955, for instance, oil supplied only 14 per cent 
of the total energy consumed in Britain and 22 per cent of the total in 
France. ·But Sweden relies on oil for 44 per cent of·the total energy 
requirements and Denmark for 37 per cent.*** It is this Western Europe 1 s 
access to oil which makes the Persian Gulf Area of vital importance 
for Western Europe's welfare and for the U.S. and the free world defense. 
Indeed, the West would face a crisis of a far -different order if it were 
deprived of all Persian Gulf oil. It is true that a program On an emer-
gency basis could be supported, but the costs would be staggering if 
* 45. 
** 46. 
*** 46. 
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long continued and would constitute an unbearable drain on the dollar 
reserves o:f the European allies. 
The third :factor is the economic and social significance of 
the petroleum industry to the Area i tsel:f ~ The impact _of the industry 
on the countries of the Area isthree fold. One is the increasing depen= 
dence o:f the Areanon the revenues derived :from oil. In the Shaik.hdom o:f 
Kuwait the dependence is lOCY/o. In Saudi Arabia it is as high as 7CY{o. 
It is a less percentage in Iraq and Iran which are agriculturally rich. 
Such revenues, i:f wisely used, for the common lSood.. within the Area, would 
offer the possibility of. economic and social advance at a pace which .few 
areas in the world have ever enjoyed. Second is the employment created 
within the oil companies themselves,and third is the impact made by some 
oil companies as members of the business and c~mmercial communities as 
in the case of the Basra Petroleum Company in Iraq. 
. . . I . 
It is because of all these :factors I :found it very useful to 
study the developments of petroleum concessions within the Area, since 
they are the basis and the core o:f all petroleum operations and activities 
in the region. 
D. Method o:f ·Approach 
This study will proceed by ~irst surveying the international as-
pects o:f the supply, demand and pricing o:f crude petroleum. Then presen-
ting a historical bac~ground on concessions within the Area. This is to 
be followed by a presentation of concession developments that ~ook place 
in the five major countries of the Area, country by country. An attempt 
,;.;_ 
i 
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will be made to discuss, trace up and investigate all such developments, 
their causes and the problems arising thereafter. A concluding chapter 
also will provide the reader with a complete summary of study together 
with the future prospects for concession developments. 
CHAPTER II. 
A SURVEY OF THE INTERNAT:tONAL~·BUPPLY, DEMAND, AND PRICING PATTERNS 
·CRUDE OIL 
A. Origin1 occurrence and exploration of petroleum. 
Literally speaking, petroleum means nrock oil. n This meaning 
is derived from the Greek words petro and oleum which mean rock and oil 
· respectively. In general terms, petroleum refers to all natural hydro--
carbons with the exception of coal. 
Crude oil is the liquid form of petroleum and is composed of 
hydrocarbon molecules made up of varying numbers of !cydrogen and carbon 
atoms~ In its natural occurrence, crude oil is usually associated with 
natural gas either as a n gas cap 11 overlying the crude oil underground 
reservoir, o.r as a gas dissolved in the crude oil by the effect of the 
reservoir pressure. 
For a long time the origin of petroleum was disputed by 
scientists, the dispute being between the inorganic and the organic 
theories. The former claims that petroleum originates from chemical re-
actions from gases deeply buried in the earth which, when cooled at the 
surface result in petroleum. The latter postulates marine vegetables and 
animal materials as the origin of petroleum. However, it is now generally 
believed that petroleum is of organic origin, although the possible 
existence of inorganic petroleum is not categorically denied. 
Petroleum is found in porous rocks, usually of sedimentary 
origin, which act as reservoirs for gases and liquids if their escape 
is preYented by some geological structures that act as a seal. Such 
structures are of different types and vary widely in size. They are 
usually widely scattered and may be deeply embedded within the earth or 
located close to the surface. However, only three types of these 
. . 
structures are particularly favorable to the accumUlation of petroleum. 
These are: the anticline, the fault, and the stratigraphic traps.* 
The anticline trap is, in its~simplest form, a dome caused 
by upfolding of rock strata. Oil and gas are trapped in porous structures. 
at the tops of these domes, With impervious strata above and below the 
porous rock layer. The anticline exists in many varied forms' but all 
are the result of folding. 
The fault trap is a place where the s.trata have broken and slipped 
past one another, bringing the broken edge of the reservoir bed against 
an impervious shale or limestone. There the traveling oil rests, accu-
mulating a commercial pool against the fault. 
The stratigraphic trap is formed as .a result of a discon-
tinuance of the stratum in which oil is traveling. Such a discontinuance 
will result in the stoppage of the migra~ing oil causing its accumulation 
in commercial quantities. 
Petroleum exploration consists essentially of locating these 
traps. Various techniques and equipments have been developed for this 
purpose, but the fact still remai~s that no technique other than drilling 
* 24, pp. ll-15. 
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has yet been devised for determining the actual presence of oil in the 
ground. 
The first step in·petroleum eXploration consists of mapping 
surface and subsurface formations to determine the occurrence of the 
porous sedimentary rocks in Which petroleum is usually ~ound. This can 
be achieved through the use of aerial photography, core drilling, and 
some other methods. This to be folloived by further confd:rmation of the 
structure using certain geophysical tools such as the torsion balance, 
gravity meters, refraction and reflection. seismographs, electrical and 
radiological well logging and some others. However, the main devices 
in use today are (l) the seismograph, (2) the gravity meter, and (3) 
the magnetometer.* 
The seismograph, originally devised to record earthquakes, 
is now the foremost scientific instrument in use for the location of hidden 
structures Which may contain oil or natural gas~ In oil prospecting, a 
dynamite blast is set off Which sends shock waves down into the earth. 
As they strike rock formations, the waves are reflected back to sensitive 
detectors in the seismograph. · Soft formations reflect weakly on the 
. . 
recording film whereas hard formations make larger jogs~ The elapsed 
time between the blast and the return of the shdck waves to •1q.~~t-~ a·::tor s 
measures depth. 
The gravity meter is an extremely sensitive spring scale that 
measures the vertical force or pull of gravity with ~inute accuracy. Geo~ 
logical struct.ures such as anticl!imes and faults . cause slight variations· 
* 24, pp. 17-19. 
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in the fbrce of, gravity. The gravity meter detects these minute vari-
ations and therefore discloses the presence of possible oil-bearing 
structu~es. The latest models can detect variations as small as one 
one-hundred-millionth of' the total force of gravity. 
The magnetometer is the simplest geophysical instrument* It 
measures the relative magnetic attractions of rocks and thus gives cfuues 
tb subterranian structures. However, this device must be operated by 
men of skill and care and its results must be interpreted in the light 
of all other available geologic data. 
B. General Characteristics'of Crude~ 
Crude oil is a greasy liquid of;variable viscosity, density, 
and color and with a unique and characteristic odbur. It is not a 
uniform commodity. Different crudes from adjoining fields, and even 
from wells in the same field, may differ appreciably, and thE! difference,· 
between the crude oil· of different districts or provinces may be much ·. 
greater.. Some er.udes consist almost entirely of gasoline while others 
contain no gasoline at all. Some are practically valuable for the manu-
facture of lubricants while others are a valuab'llie source of the heavier 
residual fractions. Furthermore, certain.crudes are known to produce 
higher quality gasoline while others produce a low quality gasoline which 
has to be fortified by further processing or blend;ing With; higher grade 
stocks. 
In general terms crude oils are.classified into three major 
groups. Group one includes 11paraffin base11 ·crudes which contain chiefly 
para£fin hydrocarbons and yield on evaporation a residue o£ paraffin wax. 
The second group includes 11asphaltic ba~e 11 crudes which are characterized 
by the presence o£ asphaltic bodies and yield on evaporation a residue 
·consisting essentially of asphalt. The third group is referred to as 
'·'naphthene base" crudes Which contain a high percentage of the heavier 
hydrocarbons called naphthene. This group is chAracterised by being higher 
in sulphur content than the other groups. · However, the most common 
varieties of crudes are combinations of the three groups. 
Specific gravity is an important characteristic of crude oils. 
Specific gravity of an oil may be defined as the ratio: .. of the weight 
o£ a unit volume of material at 60 degrees F. to the weight of an equal 
volume of "Water at the same temperature. It is measured by an arbitrary 
scale of gravity numbers established by the American Petroleum Institute 
(API). These numbers range from 5 degrees at the heavy end to 65 degrees 
at the light end. Thus under the API scale, water has a designation of 
10 API and crude oils which are lighter than water have API gravity 
n:umbers greater than 10 API. It follows also that heavy crudes are indi-
cated by lower degrees. 
Specific gravity is of essentia~ economic importance in the oil 
business because it indicates the volatility and the gasoline yield of 
crudes. It varies from crude to , crude according to the proportions in 
which the heavier and the lighter hydrocarbons are present. Heavy 
crude~; such as found in Venezuala, are non-volatile and yield less 
gasoline than lighter crudes, such as found in the Gulf coastal region 
of the United States. It has been customary for such variations in the 
specific gravity to be reflected in the pricing of crude by allowing two 
cents a barrel per degree of difference in the API gravity. 
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C. Reserves and Production 
In considering the source of the present and future sup:ply of 
crude oil on the earth, distinction must be made between the terms 11re-
serves," 11 resources,n 11proved reserves, 11 a:iJ.d. nindicated reserves." 
The term 1'reser"Vesn ref'ers to the crude oil actually found by 
drilling. Crude "resources,n on the other hand, refer to the entire 
present and potential crude reserves. 
' The 11proved reserves 11 of crude, as defined by the .API, are 
those reserves "known to be recoverable under existing economic and 
operating conditions,"* 
In recent years, the term 11 indicated reserves" came into use 
and it applies to the "virtually proved reserves. 1t** 
It can be said that crude oil is found in practically every 
country of the world in varying degrees. However, the bulk of the de-
posits is concentrated in five principle regions. As will be shown later, 
these regions are fundamental determinants .in the supply and flow of 
crude in the international trade. It is also in these regions that most 
of' the future crude is likely to be found~ 
The first of these regions is the. Mid-Continent-Gulf coast basin. 
In includes the mid-continental and Gulf coastal and sub-coastal-areas 
of the United States and the Eastern coastal sections of Mexico and cen-
tral America. 
* 32a, pp. 506-10 
** Ibid. 
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The second region covers the Andean basin and consists of' an 
irregular and narrow strip extending along the coastal f'ringe of' South 
America, f'rom T~inidad in the north into Argentina in the south. The 
major crude producing sectors in this basin are concentrated in Vene-
zuela, Colombia, and Trinidad. 
The third region is named the Persian Gulf' basin and covers 
the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Kuwait, the Iranian oil f'ields close to the 
head of' the Persian Gulf', Bahrain, Qate.r,and the eastern sections of' the 
Arabian Peninsula including the Trucial Coast Sha.ikhdoms. Although not 
yet tested, f'avorable oil-bearing regions are believed to extend f'ur-
ther south in the Arabian Peninsula and f'urther south-east into Iran. 
The f'ourth region embraces the Caspian basin and consists of' 
southern Russia adjacent to the Black and Caspian Seas, and also northern 
Iran. 
. The f'if'th region includes the Far East bas~n and extends f'rom 
southeast Asia to Australia.. It principally consists of' the islands of' 
Sumatra, Java, British New Guinea, and Borneo. Map No~ I clearly shows 
the concentration of' the occurrence of' petroleum in these f'ive regions. 
Of' all the five basins, the Mid-Continent-Gulf coast basin 
has been the·most thoroughly explored and developed and to date has 
accounted for most of' the cumulative crude production throughout the 
world. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf' basin to date contains the 
most prolific crude reserves in the world. 
The proved crude rese.rtv;es of' the world are presently estimated 
at 254,393,100,000 barrels~ Table ;!:II clearly shows the unequal con.-
centration of' such reserves in the Persian Gulf' Area. The f'ive major 
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countries of the Area alone account for 149,000,000,000 barrels, about 
56.4 per cent of the world's total. The North America region (u.s., 
Canada, and Mexico) accounts for 38,661,000,000 barrels, about 14,6 per 
cent of the total proved reserves of the world. Less than 14 per cent is 
distributed among the rest of the world including the Far East basin •. 
Table I.II also strikingly indicates that the magnitude of the 
proved crude reserves iS not necessarily related to the currentrates·of 
crude production. In 1958, the United States, with 12.6 per cent of the 
world's proved crude reserves, accounted for 37 per cent of the total 
world production; Venezuela With about 6.2 per cent of proved crude 
reserves was pesponsible for 14.4 per cent of the total world production 
of crude; Russia with 9 per cent of proved crude reserves accounted for 
12.6 of world production, whereas the Persian Gulf ~rea with 56.4 per cerit 
·'. 
of the world's proved crude reserves accounted for only 22.1 per cent of 
the world production. 
World crude productio~ for 1958 was put at 18,158,940 barrels 
per day. Production figures for the principle producing countries of 
the world are shown in table III. 
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TABLE III 
WORLD MAJOR PETROLEUM DATA FOR TEE YEAR 1958 
Country Proved Reserves Production · Consuni.ption 
(millions · of' (U~S. b/d) 1958 1959 
barrels) Estimates 
United States 33.,300.00 6,707]000 9:,027,000 
U.S.S.R. 24,000.00 2:,26o:,ooo 2,460,000 
Venezuela 16,500 .. 00 2:,609,000 149:,000 
Kuwait 58,000.00 1}399,385 72,000 
Saudi Arabia 35~000.00 1,015,000 59,000 
Iran 31,000.00 822:,000 114:,000 
Iraq 25,000.00 725,000 36,000 
Canada 2,861.40 45i;425 765,000 
Mexico 2,500.00 264,940 276,ooo 
Total world 264,393.10 18,158,940 l9,o84,ooo 
Source: World Petroleum Report1 1959 (Mona. Palmer 
publishing Co., Inc. New York, p~ 25. 
TABLE IV 
The Persian Gulf' Area: Crude Oil Production 
(Thousands of barrels daily) 
Country 1958 1957 
"Bahrain 39.8 .32.0 
Iran 825.2 714:4 
Iraq 736.3 445.4 
Kuwait 11393.2 . 1,139-9 
Neutral Zone 86.2 62.7 
Qatar 169.8 139.8 
Saudi .Arabia 1,013.1 992.1 
Source: World Petroleum, January 1959, p .. 34. 
9,4o8,ooo 
2,693,000 
165,000 
82,000 
62,000 
130,000 
4o,ooo 
8o5,000 
289,000 
20,298,000 
1956 
30.0 
547.5 
641.8 
1,075.2 
37.5 
127.5 
985.3 
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TABLE V 
Shif'ts in Middle Ea.st.CrU.de Oil Output 
Year 
1958 
1957 
1956 
1955 
1954 
Barrels daily 
756,ooo 
88,000 
209j000 
496:,000 
313;000 
Source! World Petroleum, ~anuary, 1959, .p. 34a 
Table VI clearly indicates the relative shifts in the 
distribution of world production between the principle producing 
areas and countries of the world during the past three years. It is 
quite clear from this table that the United Sta.tes'position in world 
crude production is still predominant, although declining. The Persian 
. 
Gulf Area output, on the other hand, is increasing. Table IV shows the 
daily production for each country of the Area over the past three years. 
During 1958, the Area 1 s crude production rose to almost 16 per cent over 
that of 1957, while world rate of increase was only 2.4 per cent over 
the previous year. In 1957, the world rate of increase was only 2.4 
per cent over the previous year. In 1957, .the world ·rate of increase 
was 6.8 per cent over 1956. However, the p~spects are good for 19?9 
where a .large:z;- incre~?ose is, ant:i,.cip~t~d. Table V shows the shifts in the 
Middle East crude oil output during the past five years. 
D. The Demand for Crude Oil 
Looking at the world energy supply picture during the past 
fifty years, it is quite evident that it ~s undergone some significant 
changes, particularly in the United States. Fifty years ago 1 petroleum 
used to be an insignificant factor in the world energy output. Coal 
was, and still is in some countries, the major factor and the predominant 
source of energy. Table VII clearly shows its predominance over other 
sources of energy for the period 1913 through 1958. 
However, since the·end of World War II, significant shifts 
have taken place and are still taking place. In the United States, as 
Table VIII reveals, coal's share of the over-all energy market, 'Which 
was 55 per cent at the end of 19471 has shrunk to 32 per cent at the end 
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TABLE VI 
Percentage Distribution o£ World Crude Production 
Principle Areas 1958 '1957 
North America 40.9 . 44.6 
South America 17.0 18.1 
57-9 62.7 
.. 
Western Hemisphere 
Europe (including 
U.S.S.R.) 13.8 14.5 
Middle East 23.8 20.0 
Asia and Australia 2.9 2.8 
Princi~le Countries 
us. 37.0 4o.4 
Venezuela 14 .. 4 15 .. 8 
U.S.S.R. 12~6 13~2 
Kuwait 7.6 ~;6;5 
Saudi Arabia 5~6 5. 7 
·Iran. 4.7 4.0 
Iraq 4.0 2.3 
Canada 2.5 2.9 
Indonesia 1.8 1.8 
Mexico 1.4 1 .. 4 
Rumania 1.3 h2 
Borneo 0.7 0.7 
Source: World Pe.troleum Report, 1959 (Mona Palmer 
Publishing Co., New York (1959, p.25) 
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12.2£. 
47.5 
17.0 
64.5 
12.5 
20.5 
2.5 
43 .. 2 
14.7 
9-5 
6~5 
6.0 
3.3 
3.9 
2.8 
1.5 
1.5 
1.3 
0.7 
TABLE VII 
Relative Importance of Sources of.Heat and Energy in the World (percent) 
Year 
1913 
1935 
.1948 
1958 
Coal and Oil Natural Firewood Water 
Lignite .. gas Power 
74.1 4~5 L4 17.6 
6o:3 16~5 . 3.8 12.8 
54.8 24:6 7~3 7.2 
49.0 37 .. 0 12.0 
* This figure includes water po~e~ and othe~ sources. 
Source: Erich W~ Zimmermann: World Resources and. Industries. 
Rar]?er.and. B:t:"others,; New·York, 1951, I' ... 454. The New 
York Times, May 31, 1959+ .• Section 11, P. 13. 
2.4 
6.6 
6.1 
2.0* 
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of 1957 and to 24.4 per cent at the end of 1958~ It has also been 
predicted, as', indicated in Table IX, that for the coming decade the 
percentage growth in the demand for coal would be only 22. 3 over that 
of 1957. This percentage compares with 63.3 for petroleum during the 
same period. 
In Europe, the growth in the use of oil is climbing steadily, 
though not so intensely as in the United States. A major factor 
responsible for Europe's shift to petroleum as an energy source is 
the availability of low cost oil in the Persian Gulf Area, which is 
competitive with European coal from British and German mines:' and also 
' . 
imported coal from ·the United States. Consumption percentages of oil 
and natural gas in Western Europe in 1955 were 25 per cent and 49 per. 
cent respectively. This balance is esti'lll!3,:ted to change by 1960 so that 
' ~etroleum fuels will represent almost 30 ~er cent and solid fuels 40 
~er cent~ By 1975, industry ~stimates place coal at 50 per cent and oil 
at 32 ~er cent of Western Europe 1 s energy needs.* 
On a world-wide basis, the demand for crcide has been 
constantly increasing, although the rate of increase is declining in 
recent years. It has been reported that world crUde demand rose to 
l9,084,ooo barrels per day, an increase of 6.1 per cent, during 1958~ 
In 1957, demand rose about 6.8 per cent, while in 1956 it rose 8.2 per 
cent. 
In the Western Hemisphere the rise in crude demand in 1958 was 
only 2.6 per cen~ over the previous year. This was attributed to the 
4o. 
TABLE VIII 
Percent Distribution o:r Energy in the United..Stait;es 
Year Coal · Oil & Natural Gas Water Power 
1937 64 30 6 
1947 55 40 5 
1957 37 58 5 
1958. . 24.4 71.8 3.8 (including others) 
Source: Future Growth o'£ the World Petroleum Industry~ The 
Chase Manhattan Be.nk, New York,· 195.8, The New York 
Times, May 31, 1959, Section 11, p. 13. 
Source 
Petroleum 
'Natural gas 
Coal 
"Hydro-
electricity 
Total Energy 
TABLE IX 
United States Sources o'£ Energy Suppl;y· 
1957 1967 
Thousands b/d qil eguivelant 
8,817 14,400 
4,922 7,940 
5,373 6,570 
767 ·1.090 
19.879 30_,000 
Source: Future Growth of the World Petroleum Industry, 
The Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, 1958. 
·' 
Change 
Percent 
}63.3 
;t61.3 
f22$3 
t42$1 
t50.9 
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Area 
U*S. 
Free World Outside 
u.s. 
Total Free World 
TABLE X 
Free World Petroleum Demand 
1956 1961 
(thousands of barrels daily) 
8)'757 
6,793 
15,550 
11;;>200 
9,825 
21,025 
Source: World Petroleum Report, 1959, Mona PalnJ.er 
Publishing Company, New York, 1959. 
1966 
14,300 
14,200 
28,500 
unsatisfactory demand in the United States caused b~ warm.weather and 
slow recovery from the 1957 recession~ 
In the Eastern Hemisphere, the rise was much inore rapid, about 
12.1 per cent, as has been the case most of the time since World War II. 
By the end of 1959, industry expects the demand for crude to 
resume its active upward climb~* The increase in the United States 
demand is estimated "!;o.be in the neighborhood of 4 per cent or better. 
In the remainder of the Free World, it i~ estimated to increase by 
approximately 11 per cent. Table ·III shows world consumption figures 
for i958 and estimates for 1959. Table X on the other hand shows 
free world demand figures for 1956compare9- with estimates for the 
. period 1961 through 1966. 
E. International movements of cruae oil and 'refined products. 
It is a point of fact that international oil movements have 
alvays been the result of regional imbalances between the supply of and. 
the demand for both crude oil and finished. products. A major charac-
teristic of such m~ements is that their size, composition, and direc= 
tion have experienced many· significant changes with the time~ In fact, the 
year 1938 marked the beginning of a new pattern in international oil 
mbvements When Venezuela displaced the United States as·the major oil 
. . 
exporter.** In that year, Venezuela exports totaled approximately 
* 41, p. 25. 
b 
** 32 ' pp. 29-30. 
543,000 barrels per day compared with 506,000 barrels per day eXpOrted 
from the United States. Furthermore, United States refined products 
exports declined from 335,000 barrels per day in 1930 to 297,000 bar-
rels per day in 1938, and crude exports increased from 65,000 barrels 
per day in 1930 to 209,000 barrels per day in 1938. Also in 1938 
United States crude exports were equally apportioned between Europe, 
the Far East, and other countries in the Western Hemisphere Whereas 
in.the early 1930 1 s they moved almost entirely within the Western 
Bemisphere4 At the same time about 50 per cent of Venezuela's total 
finished products were exported to Europe, less than 10 per cent to 
the far East, and the balance was equally divided between the United 
States and other countries within the Western Hemisphere. Also in 
1938, over one-half of Venezuela's crude eXports flowed to the United 
States, about 34 per cent to Europe, and the rest, with the exception 
of some scattered marginal shipments to the Far East, was exported to 
other countries in North and South America. 
Another significant change occurred in 1938 was the more than 
doubled increase in the Persian Gulf Area production accounting to 
about 17 per cent of the total international oil movements at that 
time. Approximately 60 per cent of those exports flowed to Europe, almost 
equally divided between products and crude. 
During the World War II period, movements of both crude oil 
and finished products were largely determined by the strategic needs of 
military operations.* After the war and bY 1949, the Persian Gulf Area 
b 
* 32 ' p. 31.. 
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displaced Venezuela as the major exporter of crude and products. About 
60 per cent of the Area's exports iri crude and. products were :flowed to 
Europe, 30 per_ cent to the Far East, and. approximately 10 per cent to 
the United Statese At this time, the major portion of Venezuela exports 
was flowing to the United States, about 44 per cent by volume, compared 
with 25 per cent by volume in 1938. On the other hand., Venezuela crude 
and. product exports to Europe had -declineO. from -52 per c.ent by volume 
in 1938 to about 27 per cent in 1949. 
In:recent years, the general pattern of oil movements was still 
dominated by the. two major importing area~: the United States, 
drawing supplies mainlY from the Caribbean, and Europe obtaining the 
bulk of its supplies ·:from the Persian Gul;f Area.. Maps No. ,t., 3 and If. 
. . -~ 
clearly show the size and the direction of such movements :for the years 
1946, 1954 and 1958 respectively. Table Xl also indicates the size 
of imports and exports into and from the principle consuming and 
producing areas during 1957. 
However, it is the expectation that by the end of 1959 the 
United States oil imports Will be reduced sharply from last year's 
record rate as ,a result of the import quota restrictions program which 
started on.a voluntary basis. in the latter part of 1957 and became 
compulsory by March1 ,1959. * 
F •. The Pricing of. crude .. 
Crude oils are usually traded a(!cording to the posted pricing 
u.s. 
SOUTH AMERICA 
TO-
l====~~~~~~~~~~~r~~~~~~==~~~~~~~ OTHER SOUTH AMERICA 'C;GA,JUR!IEAN FAR EAST AFRICA u.s. 
-+---====--=---· WESTERN EUROPE 
1,000 2.000 3,000 THOUSANDS OF BBLS. DAILY 
Map No. 3 
World Petroleum Movement 
.-
) 
Petroleum Flow Between Major Areas 
FROM- TO-
1,000 2,000 3,000 THOUSANDS OF BBLS. DAILY 
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Source: Middle East Oil Development, 1956. Arabian American 
Oil Company, 1956 
48. 
Map No. 4 
Source: The New York Times, [;May 31, 1959; Section 11. 
Table :xi 
World Imports and Exports - Crude Oil 1957 
(thousands of barrels) 
Area 
North .America 
Canada 
Cuba 
Mex;i.co 
u.s. 
Total 
Daily Averag~ 
South America and Caribbean 
Total 
Daily Average 
western Europe 
Total 
Daily Average 
Middle East 
Total 
Daily: Average 
Other Asian Countries 
Total 
Daily Average 
Other African Countries 
Total 
Daily Average 
Oceania Total 
Daily Average 
u·.s~S .R. and Eastern Eu~o_p~ ·. 
Other Eastern Europe 
World Total 
Imports 
lll,905 
-1~)111 
. - 1• 434 
- ) ' 373,255 
50l,6o5 
1,375 
393:,299 
. 1,078 
757,362 
2,075 
112,511 
308 
130,173 
357 
. 26,328 
72 
94,965 
26o 
2l,lb0# 
2,037,443 
*Estimated #Partly est~ted • · 
Exports 
55,674 
4,037 
~-5<))24:3 
109,954 
301 
794,695 
2,177 
7,889 
22 
l,06o,l72 
.- 2,905 
996 
3 
80,921 
222 
33,000# 
Source: World Petroleum Statistics, 1957, Mineral Industry 
Surveys, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau 
of Mines. 
system under which each buyer posts his price and stands ready to take all 
the oil that is offered and can be legally produced at a particular field. 
This system of pricing originated in the United States very early in 
the industry when crude buyers were few and crude sellers were numerous 
and scattered and none of them enjoyed enough volume of output to 
establish a price Which others would. necessarily follow. 
The posted pricing system in the United States differs appre-
ciably from that employed by the major foreign producing centers, chief 
among them: the Caribbean and the Persian Gulf Area. In the United 
States, posted prices are set by buyers orthe crude and correspond to 
prices virtually at the wellhead and hence do not include the cost of 
gathering and transporting to the loading terminals. This compares with 
the Caribbean and the Persian Gulf Area posted prices which are set by 
the sellers of the crud.e and correspond to f.o.b. at the designated 
loading ports which may be located upwards of more than a thousand miles 
from the oil fields. This aifference between the two systems of pricing 
is partially due to the fact that crude production in foreign producing 
centers is dominated by the seven Internatiqnal Oil Companies who also 
own and operate the connecting pipelines and thus do not sell crude at 
the oil fields, but at the designated loading ports.* The difference 
also arises from the fact that these International Companies are buyers 
of crude in the United States, but are principally sellers of crude in 
the foreign producing centers. 
* The Seven International companies are:,-t Standard of New Jersey, Royal 
Dutch-Shell, Gulf Oil, Texas Company, Standard of California, Scony 
Vacuum, and the British Petroleum Company. 
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Generally speaking, crude posted prices at a particular field 
tend to be indentical except f'or gravity and guality price differen-
tials.* Price nif'f'erences, however, may expst but only f'or a short 
period since if' a change in price occurs, it will generally occur 
uniformly ana there can be no doubt of' its direction.. The firm 
initiating the price change either retires to its former position, or 
brings the others up or down to the new. level. 
Price leadership is a notable aspect of' petroleum pricing. 
There are two forms of' price leadership in the petroleum industry.** 
The first is the one in Which changing prices may be undertaken by 
. . 
a f'irm occupying a dominant position in the market. This form of' 
leadership may have existed in the earlier years of' the industry, but 
is no longer in existence since World War II either in the United 
States 6r in foreign producing centers. The second f'orm of' price 
leadership, which is c~ently in practice in the petroleum industry is 
the one under Which a f'irm formally recognized a change in market 
conditions and establishes a new p1'ice. This firm is eitb,er followed 
by other firms or will be forced to revert or suffer a ·substantial loss. 
Price discrimination isanother aspect of' theiinternational 
petroleum pricing. It may take a number of forms such as origin 
differentials, discounts from the published ~osted prices, freight 
absorptions ana the like.*** Origin dif'ferentials.are generally found 
* 
3, pp. ll7-9 
b 32 ' p. 433. 
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when producers at a particular crude source sell to different markets 
realizing varying netback prices at the point of production, depending 
upon the geographical location o:f the buyers. Discounts from the pub-
lished posted price are usually connected with a long-term contract 
under which the discounted price is accepted by the seller in return 
for a firm commitment from the buyer to purchase his crude for a 
specified period of time~ Freight absorptions are usually employed as 
a measure to rectify temporary imbalanqes in supply and demand or to 
capture,- retain or penetrate outlets in more distant markets~ 
Prior to the second world war, the· "gulf'plus" was the 
prevailing pricing system throughout the world with few exceptions. 
The essence of this system was that the prices of both crude and 
refined products throughout the world were based on the posted prices 
at the United States Gulf coast plus the transportation costs from 
the United States Gul:f to destination regardless of the source of 
oil. In other words, it can be said that at that time oil delivered 
:from Venezuela, the Middle East, or the Far East was laid down in the 
importing country at price equivelant to the laid-down price for oil 
from the United States Gulf. Thus during that period delivered prices 
at any given point of delivery were always identical regardless. of the 
differing production or transportation costs actually incurred. 
The prevalence of the 11 gulf-plus" pricing system was attri-
buted to the fact that by that time the United States Gulf coast 
represented the main exporting market in the whole world.. Besides, oil 
sources outside the United States were mostly controlled by the major 
international companies who were also controlling production inside the 
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United States. It was, therefore, to the advantage of the international 
companies that only one pricing system prevailed throughout the world. 
One of the exceptions to this pattern of pricing occurred in 
the early 1930's when Rumania developed an exportable surplus and 
accordingly a F.O.B. price Constanta, Rumania was established :for the 
pricing of these exports.* It can be said that this exception took 
place because oil production at Rumania was only partly controlled by the 
international companies.** :Ho.wever, because the exportable surplus 
developed by Rumania was minor to the United States exports, this price 
was only of significance to a small fringe of markets tributary to the 
Rumanian oilfields4 
A second exception occurred in the late 1930's when the 
·United States imposed the specific import tax of lei cents per barrel 
on crude imports from Venezuela. The reason for the imposition of the 
tax was because by that time Venezuela emerged as a major oil source 
and consequently its oil was competitive with that from the United States 
Gulf in the markets on the East coast. :However Venezuelan exporters 
absorbed the import tax and at that time the F .O.B. price obtained by 
them on shipments to the United .States repres,ented the posted price at 
the United States Gulf minus the import tax and the slight difference 
.- . 
in the transportation rates between the east coast of the qnited States 
and the United States Gulf on the one had, and the Venezuelan ports on· 
the other hand. In fact Venezuelan exporters also absorbed the loi 
. * 6, p. 354. 
** Ibid. 
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cents in their prices for crude and refined products to all world 
destinations. Thus, for instance, the Venezuelan price for exports 
to Canada, Europe or elsewhere was the Pnited.States Gulf price for 
crude of' similar quality, less the United States import tax of' 1~ cents 
per barrel.* 
During the second world war, the international price structure 
experienced the first major change in its history. As a result of' the 
war, the international movements in oil were drastically altered. As 
large shipments of the Area's oil to the western Mediterranean and 
western Europe were stopped. At the same time, shipments from the area 
to nearby Eastern Hemisphere markets were greatly increased. During 
this period the major source of' oil within the Area was the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. The major buyer was the British government. The 
Anglo-Iranian continued to use the gulf-plus system and that let the 
British government, since it became at that time the major purchaser 
of oil, to question the application of the gulf~plus prices to the 
Persian Gulf .Area oil. Eventually, after lengthy discussions between 
the British government and the oil interests, .a second basing point of 
pricing was established at the Persian Gulf Area with the gulf-plus 
base price as the base price to this new price basing poing. 
Following the second world war several modifications took 
place in these two basing points and currently there are a multiple-
point F.O.B. system under Which each of the major exporting centers 
has its own base point of price, more or less, in accordance With the 
* 6, p. 354. 
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prevailing cost structure.* 
The writer tried to obtain, for comparison purposes, sample 
prices for the Persian Gulf Area crudes during the prewar and the 
immediate postwar years but none was published or posted until 1950 
and in some cases until l953·** Most of the sales during that period 
were on contract basis or announced privately to customers. However, 
Table XII represents a very recent representation of world crude posted 
prices and clearly indicates the "·existence and the prevalence of' the 
mult+ple-point F.O.B. pricing system. 
* For a complete coverage of' the subj~ct see: 32b, Part :Jt 
** Socony was the first oil COII1Pa.ny.which published official posted prices 
· for the Persian Gulf Area crudes. The Anglo-Iranan Oil Company, on the 
other hand, did publish its posted prices until _1953. 
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Table XII 
World Crude Oil Prices 
(As of' February 13, 1959) 
United States 
East Texas) 
Canada 
·Red Water (Alberta) 
Venezuela 
Tia Juana (Creole) 
Quiriquire (Creole) 
Saudi Arabia** 
Saudi Arabia*** 
G.atar (Ex Umm. Said)**** 
Iran (Ex Abadan) 
* Canadian dollars 
** Ex Ras Tanura. 
*** Ex Sidon. 
Gravity. 
(Deg.API) 
39 
31'-3l.9 
16~16~4 
34-34e9 
36-36~9 
40-40~9 
34-34.9 . 
U.S. $/Bbl 
3.05 
2,.65 
2~15 
2.08 
2 .. 49 
2.03 
1.81 
**** ·British Petroleum prices (Kuwait and Iran are also BP) 
·Source: World Petroleum Report, 1959. Mona Palmer Publishing 
Company, 1959, p. 29. 
CHAPTER III. 
' 
Historical Background of Petroleum concessions in the 
Persian Gulf Area 
A. From De Reuter to D 'Arcy in Iran 
It is a reality that the presence of petroleum in Iran is an 
ancient history. However, it was not until July 25, 1872 that the first 
attempt at development was made. On that date, Shah Nasr ed-Din granted 
Baron Julius De Reuter, a British national, the firs~ and one of the most 
sweeping concessiOns of all times. The concession was to cover the entire 
country and to last for a duration of seventy years. The concession with 
the resultant terms,. however, was cancelled by the Shah in the autumn of 
1873 as a result of Russia's opposition and England's lack of support. 
The second attempt for the development of petroleum resources 
in Iran was made in 1884 by a firm called Hortz and Co. of the port of 
Bashire. But in this case· failure to find oil and not political factors 
put an end to the attem:pt.' 
In the meantime, England was ref~ing recognition of the 
unilateral. cancellation of the De Reuter concession, and it was this 
refusal which caused the Bhah1 five years later, to grant De Reuter a new 
concession for a duration of 6o years. The new concession again gave 
De Reuter the privilege and the monopoly to establish a note-issuing 
bank and the exclusive right to exploit and develop minerals, including 
petroleum.* 
* 2, pp. 14-15. 
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After two years of search and drilling, failure to find oil 
caused the Persian Government in·l899 to declare the concession no 
longer valid. That was the ultimate end of Baron De Reuter's ambitions. 
However, the hope for finding oil in Persia was not abandoned 
. . 
completely. A new and more serious· attempt began when Jacques de Morgan, 
head of a French archeological·· eXpedition ·in. Persia, first published 
hiS report claiming the eXiStence Of: petroleum in the IQaST=i...Shirin regio~ 
It was this report which first attracted the attention of 
William Knox D'Arch, a wealthy Englishman, to the Persian oiL But 
D•_fiTcy did not show serious interest Ul:ltil he sent a geologist of his own 
'Who made an investigation on the possibilities of the existence of oil •. · 
D1Arcy then sent his representative to Teheran to negotiate with the Per-
sian Government for an oil concession. Some Russian opposition was re-
ported, but finally, on May 28, 19011 D1Arcy succeeded and was granted 
a concession covering the entire country, With the exception of the five 
northern provinces. This was to last.for a duration of siXty years. 
Indeed, it was the first concession devoted primarily to the search·and 
exploitation of petroleum. This initiated the growth and development 
of the present petroleUm industry in Iran. 
B. Concession Hunting in Iraq. 
Petroleum history in the present state of Iraq is also very 
ancient. Centuries ago Mesopotamia contail1ed the great bitumen deposits 
at Hit and elsewhere on the Euphrates. Seepages and other indications of 
oil also existed long ago at Kirkuk., G.aiyara, Tuz Khormatu, and in the 
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Mandali district.* But no one ever thought of the commercial exploitation. 
and development of that preciou~ resource until the latter part of the 
19th century. At that time, the Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra vilayets 
(provinces), which constitute thepresent ,state of Iraq, were a mere 
segment of the vast ottoman Empi~e which included almost the entire 
Middle East. 
Despite sporadic· attempts beginning in the 188o1 s the capri-
cious and corrupt government of Sultan Abdul Ramid made concession 
' hunting in that part of the Empire an uncertain and precarious endeavor 
up to the outbreak of World War I. 
By the early 1900's, German, Dutch, British and other conces-
sion h~ters were.crowding each other. There were applications from 
the Shell and Royal Dutch groups, from D 'Arcy, and from an American 
Admiral called Colbly Chester. D 'Arcy' s. ;representative claimed, in 1907, 
to have obtained from the Sultan a promise for a concession. Chester 
also claimed that he was offered a variety'of concessions, including an 
oil and minerals development concession in all part~ of the Empire.* 
The Anatolian Railway Company, supported .by the German govermnent; 
insisted on the validity of a prior option dating from 1888. 
Meanwhile, after a military coup d'etat (July, 1908) which 
saw the Young Turks come to power, Sultan Abdul Ramid himself was de ... 
posed. When negotiations were revived and the applicants had resubmitted 
their offers, negotiations were conducted on the government rather than 
the personal level. This involved the following major rival groups: 
1. German - Acting for the Deutsche Bank. 
2. British - Acting for the newly-formed Anglo Persian Oil 
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Company wl.th which D 'Arcy combined. 
3. British and Dutch - Acting for the Anglo-saxon Oil Company, a 
subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell group. 
4. American - Supporting Admiral Chester. 
The revolution provided for a brief period of popularity for 
the British who formed the National Bank of Turkey· in 1910 and in 1911 
the African and Eastern concession Ltd. Britain, however, was still 
ambitious for more British participation and for the inclusion of the 
all-British Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In· 1913, the British Foreign 
Office contacted both the National Bank of Turkey and Gulbenkian noti-
fying them their shares should be made available for re-allotment. The 
subsequent negotiations resUlted in the so-called Foreign Office Agreement 
of 1914. 
Chester, an earlier claimant to oil concession, succeeded in 
1909, in obtaining some oil, mineral, and railway rights. The conces-
sion granted him the right to construct a :pOrt and three railway lines, 
and to exploit oil in twenty kilometers on both sides of the line. Ches-
ter deposited in the name of the Turkish Government the equivelant of 
20,000 Turkish poinds as ucaution" money •. In 1911, his concession was 
presented to the Turkish Parliament for ratification, but owing to the 
outbreak of the Turco-Italian war and Balkan Wars at that time, and World 
War I in 1914, it vas never ratified.* 
Now, after the interests of the British and the Germans were 
reconciled through the Foreign Office Agreement, they combined their 
* 29, p. 198. 
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efforts, and only five days following the signing of' the agreement, 
their ambassadors requested from the GranAVizier, on behalf of' the 
Tur~ish Petroleum Company, a concession f'or the search and development 
of' oil in the Mosul and Basra vilayets. On June 28, 1914, the Grand 
Vizier, replied by the following letter to the German ambassador: 
Mr. .Ambassador: 
In response to the note No. 985 which your excel-
lency had the kindness to address to me under the 
date of' the 19th instant, I have the honor to in-
. form you as follows: 
The Ministry of' Finance being substituted for 
the Civil List with respect to petroleum resources 
discovered and to be discovered in the vilayets of' 
Mosul and Baghdad, consents to lease these to the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, and reserves to itself' 
the right to determine hereafter its participation 
as well as the general conditions of the contract. 
It goes with saying that the society must undertake 
to indemnify, in case of' necessity, third persons 
who may be interested in petroleum resources loca-
ted in these two vilayets.* · 
However, five weeks later the .First World War started and no 
actual concession was granted. But, in fact, it was that letter which, 
ten years later, formed the basis of' the Turkish Petroleum Company's 
approach to the government of' the newly-formed state of' Iraq. 
c. The Beginning in the Arabian Peninsula 
Unlike Iran and Iraq, petroleum history in the Arabian Penin-
sula is relatively recent. It dates back to the year 1920 when Major 
Frank Holmes, a New Zealander, was brought to the Bahrain Islands to 
* 29, p. 196. 
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assist in developing the Islarutts water resoui-ces. That same year, 
Holmes, attracted by some small oil seepages, organized the Eastern and 
General Syndicate by means of' -which he intended to acquire petroleum 
concessions throughout the entire Arabian Peninsula.* He started With 
Saudi Arabia, it being the mainland o~ the peninsula, and, in May 1923, 
. . 
he succeeded in obtaining an oil exploration license covering the Rasa 
province, as well as an option for a future concession valid \for two 
years. In return, he was committed to pay the government a small 
annual payment. 
Holmes, then, turned to Kuwait and approached its ruler Shaikh 
Ahmad Al-8ubah ~or a similar .license and option. This time his efforts 
were not successful owing to the rival interest o~ the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company and to the suspicious attitude of the Shaikh. However, in May 
' 
1924, he was able to acquire.anooption for a r.uture concession over the 
Neutral Zone from both the Shaikh of Kuwait a¢ the King of Saudi Arabi~·** 
Following that, Holmes directed his attention back to Bahrain 
where he obtained, late in.l925, an exclusive exploration license and 
option covering all of the Bahrain Islands. · 
Regarding the exPloration licenses and options on Hasa and the 
Neutral Zone, Holmes and his group, being unable to face the costs o~ 
exploration and development, tried to interest some British concerns in 
the options, but without success. Finally, in the late 1920t s, the 
* The Eastern and General Syndicate composed o~ an English group with 
Which Ho~es was associated. The aim of the Syndicate was to interest 
English concerns in whatever oil rights th~y could obtain. 
i, ' 
**See above, P·t·g,. 
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options were destined to lapse, and that was the end of Holmes' ventures 
in Saudi Arabia and the Neutral Zone. 
Hofunes failed again to attract British interests, including · 
Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, to the Bahrain Islands options. 
At last, he turned to the United States of America where he succeeded to 
arouse the interests of the Gulf Corporation who bought the option only 
one week before it must lapse. 
Gulf Corporation, being a. member of the American group in the 
Turkish Petropeum Company and abidi~g with the Red Line Agreement, offered 
the option to the Turkish Petroleum Company Which deelined it and also 
denied Gulf to retain it for itself.* Gulf, then, sold_the option to 
the Standard Oil Company of California on December 21, 1928~ According 
to the sale contract, Holmes was to obtain fr.om the Shaikh a renewal 
of the concession· which would then be transfe:rred to Standard of Califor-
nia. 
However, this move was not welcomea,and in fact was opposed, by 
the British Government to whom the ruler of the Islands had been 
committed not to grant or transfer oil conpessions without the British 
Government consent~ It was natural that the British Government refused 
to permit the Shaikh to renew the concession,unless the proposed oper-
ating company be managed and controlled by British interests. Gulf and 
Standa~ of California alerted the State Department which brought some 
pressure on the British Government. This, after months of negotiations, 
* A detailed study of how America.l oil companies were allowed to parti~ 
cipate in the Turkish·Petroleum Company, which then became the Iraq 
·Petroleum Company, will be presented in the preceding chapter five. 
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resulted in a compromise according to which the Bahrain Petroleum Company 
was formed with British top management and was registered in Canada. It 
was also stated in the compromise that dealingi:> with the Sh~ikh should 
be conducted only through the British political agent. But, the fact 
remains that the Bahrain Petroleum ComJ?a.ny was and still. is wholly owned 
by American interests. 
Shortly after,the completion of those arrangements, the 
J3ahrain Petroleum Company applied for and was granted a prospecting·li-
cense. On May 31, oil in commercial quantities was discovered, a:nd on 
December 29, 1934, the company was granted the original concession cover= 
ing can area of 100,000 acres and valid :fbr 55 years •. 
In the case of Kuwait, it will be. recalled, that in 1927, 
Holmes transferred his option in the Kuwait share over the Neutral Zone 
to Gulf Corporation. ~t option finally lapsed after being kept valid 
for a time by renewals. However, Gulf's interest in the Shaikhdom stayed 
alive and was shown by the presence ·of Holmes, .representing Gulf, at 
Kuwait to negotiate with the Shaikh for an .oil concession. At the same 
time the rival.Anglo~Persia.n Oil Company entered the scene with competing 
proposals. As. in the case of Bahrain, the Shaikh of Kuwait was also 
committed not to.otransfer or grant oil cop.cessions with<;>ut the British 
Government's consent.· It was a,ccoroing to that commitment that the 
British Government prevented the Shaikh fropt granting Gulf any oil rights, 
though he was willing to do so. Gulf, ·again,· appealed to the State 
Department to intervene. It. was only after extensive diplomatic exchange· 
and dragging negotiations thai; , the . deadlock was broken and the parties 
involved reached a compromise. According to that compromise, Gulf and 
the Anglo-Persian were to organize, with equal' .stock ownership, the Kuwait 
Oil Company. On December 23, 1934, ~n exclusive oil concession was 
granted to that companv,. 
In Saudi Arabia the discovery o~ oil in the Bahrain Islands 
again attracted the attention of concession hunters to the mainland o~ 
the Arabian Peninsula. In March 1933 representatives from Standard 
Oil Company of Cali~ornia and Anglo-Persian Oil Company arrived at Jedda 
~or negotiations with the Saudi Government. After considering the com-
petitive o~fers, King Abdul~Aziz ibn Saud favored .the Standard Oil 
Company of California. On May 29, 1935 he granted that company the 
~irst and the original oil concession covering the Rasa province. 
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CHAPTER .rl •. 
CONCESSION DEVELOPMENIS IN IRAN 
A. The original D'Arclf. concession details.* 
The original D'ArcU. oil concession (mentioned before as a sig-
nificant figure in the introductory portion of chapter III.) was gained 
by D1 Arcy in the spring of 1901. This concession, written in French 
but granted by the Persian Government, was signed on D'Arcy's behalf 
by his attorney Alfred lrfa.rriot. Shah Mozaffar ed-Din signed for the.· 
Persian Government. 
l. Aim, A:fea and Duration of the concession. 
The Pl!li'.POSes and advantages of this concession of May 29, 
1901 can be clearly seen by Article I which granted, "a specific and 
exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, and render 
suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt 
and ozokerite, throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire. 11 The 
terms of.the concession were to last sixty years from the date of signing. 
There were, however, certain territorial restrictions. According to 
Article 6 of the agreement the provinces of Azerbadjan, Ghilan, Mazen-
dara.n, Asdrabad, and khorassan were excluded from the commitments of 
the concession. 
2. Fiscal obligations. 
• * The full text of the concession is to be found in 16, pp. 249-51. 
The advantages to be received from the concession by the Per-
sian Government as set forth in Article 10 of the. agreement were as 
follows: Within one month from the formation of the first exploitation 
company, the Persian Government was to receive the sum of 20,000 po'linds 
sterling in cash and an additional. sum of·20,000 pounds ·.st-erling in paia-
upi!shares of that company~ . In addition to this, the concessionaire was 
also to pay an annual sum equal to 16 per cent of' the annual net profits 
of' any company or companies that may be formed. .A further obligation· 
was the 1,000 pounds sterling yearly sa.ia.ry of the Imperial Commissioner, 
appointed by the Persian Government for purposes of consultation. Article 
1, on the other hand, obliged the Persian Government to .. exempt the 
concessionaire from the payments of' all taxes and custom duties onall 
lands granted to the concessionaire:,' ail products exported, and all 
material and apparatus necessary for the ~xploration, working and deve-
lopment of the deposits, and for the construction and development of 
pipe-lines. 
3. Provisions regarding employment, security, and arbitration. 
According to Article 12 of the agreement, the workmen employed 
by the company were to be under the rule of the Shah, with the exception 
of.the technical staf'f' such as the managers, engineers, borers, and 
.·· forement A notable dif'ference between this agreement and recent conces-
sions in regard to the labor f'orce was that this agreement made no stipu-
lation f'or the compulsory employment of' some percentage of' native labor.· 
Regarding the protection of the ~abor f'orce and of' the 
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concession facilities, the Persian Government: accepted responsibility 
for the safety of all representatives ~nd agepts of the company and the 
necessary security for the achievement of the project. (Article 14) 
Should disputes or differences arise, they were to be solved 
by means of arbitration. An arbitration trib;tmal was to be established 
at 1feheran for this pu:r]?Ose. It was to consi;st of two arbitrators, one 
for each party involved, and an umpire to be appointed by the arbitrators 
before the specific arbitration began. rrThe decision of the arbitrators 
or, ±n the event of the latter disagreeing, that of the umpire, shall 
be final." (Article 17) 
4. Miscellaneous Obligations. 
It is requisi:t>e to draw attention to several other important 
obligations of the agreement. They are as follows: 
l. The concessionaire must establish the first exploitation com-
pany within two years from the date of the concession. If he 
failed to do that the concession shall be null and void. 
(Articles 9 and 19) 
2. The concessionaire has the Imperial Persian Government's per-
mission to found one or several companies for the working of the 
'concession. Such company or companies are to enjoy all the 
rights and privileges granted to the concessionaire but at the 
same time must ass'ume all the responsibilit~es and obligations. 
(Article 9) 
3. Organization and :management of such company or companies was 
to be left ~o the concessionaire but he had to submit official 
notice on the formation, organization, and location of each 
company through the medium of the Imperial Commissioner. (Article 
9) 
4. The concessionaire wa8 to have the exclusive right of laying 
pipelines, constructing and maintaining all and any wells, 
reservoirs, stations, factories and other necessary work. 
(Article 2) 
5. All the materials and buildings used by the company or companies 
formed were to revert to the Persian Government on the expi-
ration of the terms of the concession. The company had no right 
to indemnity. 
E. The search for oil. 
1. The disappointing years. 
After his success in obtaining the concession from the Persian 
Government, D'Arcy formed his rirst: exploration team headed by George 
Reynolds, oilfields manager. A remote and arid spot near Qasri-i-Shirin 
on the Perso-Iraq frontier, Chiah Surkh, was chosen as the first drilling 
site.* This was the same spot originally favored by D'Morgan's report 
on the existence of oil in Iran.** 
An unmapped and inhospitable landscape, poor security, and 
* 19, p .. 19. 
** Thesis, p.S]. 
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J 
blackmailing demands from local chiefs were t~e obstacles faced by 
···• I 
Reynolds. With tremendous difficulty Reynold:s organized Persian guides 
and laborers and transported the d;dlling equipment to Chiah Surkh. 
Because of' these difficulties it was not until November 1902 that 
drilling was begun. Drilling operations continued unsuccessfully. In 
the summer of' 1903 some traces of hydrocarbon gas and oil were detected 
at 1665 f'eet. . By June 1904 a second well was drilled at a similar . 
depth. The results of these two first wells were an output of' 18o 
b/d which fell rapidly to 25. This proved to D'Arcy that commercial 
development was not feasible in this remote region far from the sea-
board. 
Reynolds then moved the equipment to another selected site · 
at Mamatain near Ram Hormuz f'ar in the southern section of' the country.* 
Here again he was faced with the same problems he had experienced at 
Chiah Surkh. Nevertheless, dril~ing operations for the first well 
began in 1906. 
D'Arcy, having been obliged in May af 1903 to· form the First 
Exploitation Company· in compliance with Articles 9 and 16 of the original 
concession_, soon found. that the capital of that cqmpany was nearly-ex-
hausted due to numerous setbacks.** Without success he attempted to 
gain British capital for the venture. 
* 19, p. 18. 
**According to Dr. Fatemi (8, p. 20) the capital of the First Exploi-
tation Company consisted of 600,000 pounds sterling, 10 per c'ent of 
Which belonged to the Persian Government aDd 2 per cent to Persian 
citizens. He also stated that by the time the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company took over the concession only 544,000 pounds sterling had 
been issued. 
At this juncture the British Admira~ty showed great interest in 
the matter and, fearing that the conces~ion ~ght fall into the hands 
of the American and Dutch oil trusts, asked D'Arcy to defer negotiations 
vith foreigners until British interests could be found to invest in his 
undertaking. The Admiralty advised the wealthy Scottish-Canadian 
financier, Lord Strathcona,and persuaded him to temporarily take over 
the concession, thus saving it for Great Britain~ Later, through preSSU,!t'e 
from the British Admiralty, Lord Strathcona and the Burmah Oil 
Company entered into negotiations with D'Arcy, and in May of 1905 the 
Concession Syndicate Ltd. was formed, with D'Arcy as a directore 
' ' . 
Concession Syndicate Ltd. took over the assets of the First 
Exploitation Company and provided financial resources for continuing 
operation.* However, these additional funds were almost exhausted by 
the summer of 1907. The two wells begun at Mamatain, having reached 
2,170 and 1,940 feet respectively, proved unproductive.** 
2. The Triumphant Turning Point. 
In a final.hopeful attempt, Reynolds and D!Arcy moved the rig 
to Maidun-i-Naftun, the site of an ancient fire-temple.*** Here two 
vells were drilled,. one in January of 1908 and the other in March of the 
same year. In mid-May traces of gas were observed and in the early 
' 
* 29, p. 19; 19, p. 18. 
*** This site was known after 1926 as Masjid-i-Sulaiman. 
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morning of the 26th of May1 1908, a strong flow of oil started from a 
depth of 118o feet. This welcome moment, seven years after the signing 
of the original concession with the resources of the Concessions 
Syndicate Ltd. exhausted and with orders to discontinue drilling 
already dispatched was in fact the triumphant turning point of the 
Whole venture. 
c. The Anglo-Persian Oil Comp~ 
l. Formation of the comp~ 
On April 14, 1909, following the disco.very of oil at Maidun-
i-Naf'tun, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed. Lord Strathcona, 
was Chairman of' the company; Charles Gree,nway was managing director; 
and D'Arcy was a director. While there is no. true and detailed 
account of just how this formation took place it is quite clear from 
the literature on the subject that the company was formed under pressure 
from the British Admiralty.* 
The initial capital of the company consisted of' 1,000,000 
pounds sterling, fully paid ordinary shares (all issued) and l,ooo,ooo 
pounds sterling cumulative six per cent participating preference shares 
of' which 900,000 h~been issued by 1914.** By this year also the 
British Government participated in the ownership of' the company and the 
* For details of' the contradictory versions on the establishment of 
the company see: 8, pp. 12-19. 
** 8, p. 20 and p. 21. 
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capital was raised to 4,ooo,oo6 pounds sterling~ In December 1919, 
3,000,000participating preference shares: and 4,500,000 o!'d.inary shares· 
vere authorized and issued, as well as 4,6oo,ooo pounds sterling of 
debenture stock.* 
By December 3, 1947, the authorized capital was 33,000,000 
pounds sterling composed of' 12,706,252 preferred shares and 20,137,500 
ordinary shares.** 
2'. British Government participation. 
By the year 1914, the British Government arrived on the scene 
demaD.ding enormous supplies of' oi~, if' possible drawn from purely 
British controlled petroleum fields.*** This demand could be met 
neither by the Burmah Oil Company nor the other companies operating in 
Imperial territories, for their output was much too limited. The only 
company able to meet the demand was the Anglo=Persian Oil Company, 
Whose capital was Wholly British~ 
The management of this company declared that it could not 
possibly meet such immense demands without doubling its capital. Row 
the needed additional capital could be raised was the problem confron-
ting them. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was a comparatively new com~ 
pany; the country where it operated was considered politically insecure; 
and very few people at that time thought of' its rich possibilities for 
* 29, P~ 155-
** Ibid, p. 157. 
*** 19, p. 21; 8, p. 11. 
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the future. In any case, it would take some time to get the shares sub-
scribed and no one could guarantee that the shares· would not be bought . 
up through representatives by American, German and other foreign inter-
ests. And if' this were to happen the company would lose its distinctly 
British charac~er. 
These serious objections could all be avoided if the British 
· Government itself' would furnish the requ:l;site two ·million. Indeed, 
this was the recommendation of a commission of experts whom the British 
Government had sent to the Persian Gulf' in the autumn of 1912 to 
examine the conditions on the spot~* Were the government to supply 
this capital it would acquire a decisive influence over the future oper-
ations of the company as well. 
Despite several. objections to the: government t s participation · 
in the financing of' the company,** an agreement between the company 
and the Admiralty and the Treasury was re'ached and signed. on May 20, 
1914, making the British GOvernment the ~jor and controlling partner 
in the company. The agreement provided:*** 
Ordinary. share 
Preferred 
First debentures 
2,ooo,ooo pounds sterling 
~,6oo pounds sterling 
199,000 pounds sterling 
The company was to increase its capital by 2,ooo,ooo pounds 
sterling giving the government a majority of' 2,000 sh~res. 
'* 19, p. 21; 29, p. 22j 8, pp. 24-25. 
** 29, p. 24; 8, P~ 29. 
*** 29, p. 22. 
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According to the agreement~ the ooard of directors would be 
increased by two members appointed by the government. These members 
were to take no active part in the ordinary daily management; their 
sole function being to veto any resolution calculated to alter 11 the 
purely :British character of the company. 11 
A few weeks after the agreement was signed.; the Admiralty 
and the company entered into a contract whereby the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company undertook to supply a specified quantity of petroleum and 
lubricating oil for a period of 30 years •. No details of' this contract 
are available since it has never been made public.* 
3. .The Anglo-Persian oil dispute dliring and after 'World War I. 
. . . 
A few weeks after the :British Government began its participation 
in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, World War I broke out. Relations 
between the company and the Persian Government had been cordial and cor-
rect before the outbreak of' the war. Differences, however, began to 
develop during the war period. It will be remeio.bered from section A of' 
this chapter that under the D'Arcy concession Article lO provided that 
' 
the company was to pay the Government of' Persia 16 per cent. of' the annual 
net profits of' any company or companies that might be formed. During the 
war period, the company refused to pay the government's share in profits 
of' some of' its subsidiaries claiming that those subsidiaries were not 
operating in Persia and not under the direct organization of' the D'Arcy 
* Dr. Fatemi (8, p. 28) stated that it is believed that the cost of the 
oil to the Admiralty during the past forty years has ranged between 30 
to 40 cents per barrel as against the market· prices fluctuating between 
90 cents and 2 to 3 dollars per barrel. 
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concession.* The Persian Government protested and maintained that the 
D'Arcy concession applies to all companies even those not operating 
in Persia. Another point o~ disagreement was caused by the decline o~ 
the pro~its o~ the company. Before 1920 the companyts stated net 
pro~its were small. This may have been partly the result o:f sharp 
·~ 
bookkeeping practice, as the Persian Government alleged.' **. The 
pro~its ~ere, indeed, a:f~ected by the reported very low special price 
paid by the British Government ~or oil~ The Persians saw large quan~ 
tities o~ oil being produced and exported with very little in royalties 
reaching the Persian Treasury.*** 
This situation was ~urther aggravated in 1919 when the com-
pany made the Persian Government responsible ~or the property damage 
made to the pipelinep by the Bakhtiari tribe caused in 1915.**** The 
company withheld royalties due to the Persian Government against payment 
:for the damage. The Persian Government contended that according to 
Article 14 o~ the concession it was not liable ~or loss or damage 
caused by acts beyon~ its control, and, in' accordance with Article 17, 
asked ~or arbitration o~ the dispute. ·The company refused to agree to 
this proposal and declined payment a~ royalties due. 
Another issue causing contention, between the company and 
the Persian Government was the amount of damage caused by the Bakhtiari 
* 
29,~ p. 33-
** 
Ibid. 
*** 
8, pp. 152-153. 
**** 
29, p. 34 
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tribe to the pipelines.* The company claimed 6oo,ooo pounds sterling. 
A statement in the British House o~ Commons on December ll, 1919 set 
the ~igure at between 300 and 4oo, 000 pounds sterling. The accountants 
appointed by the Persian Government estimated the damage at no more 
than 20,000 pounds sterling. 
4. The ..Armitage..Smith Agreement.** 
Unable to arrive at an amicable solution to any of the out-
standing disputes, the Undersecretary o~ .the Persian Ministry of Finance 
announced on August 29, 1920 the appointment of Sidney Armitage-8mith 
as the Persian Government 1 s representative in the dispute. His duties 
were "to finally adj"!J.st all the questions in dispute between the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and the Imperial GOvernment of Persia."*** 
After consulting several legai and technical advisers; 
Armitage-8mith began negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
~ter many weeks of negotiations an agreement was reached on December 
22, 1920. This agreement is commonly known as the Armitage-8mith 
Agreement. 
Major provisions o~ this agreement were as follows: 11Subsi-
diary Company" was defined as, "any company of 'Which the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company owned, whether directly or through some other subsidiary 
. . 
company, shares su~~icient to give it control, or any company more than 
* 8, pp. 153-154; 29, pp. 35-37-
** 8, p. 154. 
*** 29, p. 34. 
76. 
half of whose directors were appointed by ~he Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 
or any Company managed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. u 
Another major provision of the agreement provided that the 
Persian Government was to receive a 16 per cent of all annual nnet 
profits arising from the mining, refining, and marketing of Persian oil. u 
whether all the stages of the process were handled by the company itself 
or through subsidiary companies, whether inPersia or- outside. There 
was only one exception to this. The Persian Government was "not to 
receive royalty on the profits arising from the transportation of oil 
my means of ships."* 
The agreement also provided the procedure for calculating 
the future :Payments to the Persian Government. The net profits were 
to be taken as adjusted for income tax purposes. No deductions were 
to be made from ne~ profits for interest or dividends, and interest and 
divi,dends received were to be excluded from the profits on which 
royalties were. payable. These arrangements wpuld not apply to the period 
prior to March 31, 1919. 
In addition, the agreement provided for the careful exami-
nation of the company's royalty calculations by chartered accountants 
in London to be chosen by the Persian Governm~nt. AlSo according to 
this agreement, 11the Government undertakes.to use its best endeavor to 
facilitate the work of the company and its subsidiary companies, and 
the company agrees that it will not enter into any fictitious or arti-
ficial transaction which would have the effect of reducing the amount 
* This exception was for the Tanker Company, a subsidiary o:f the 
Anglo-Persian Oil. Company. 
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o:f royalty payable. 11* 
A collateral agreement was also.settled on the same day this 
agreement was signed.** Under this collater~l agreement .Armitage..Smith 
and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company agreed to the payment by the company 
o:f l,ooo,ooo pounds sterling in settlement.o:f all outstanding questions 
between the two parties. .This .included such royalties as were due up 
to March 31, 1919. 
It seemed as if the main issues o:f disagreement between the 
company and the Persian 'Government had been satisfactorily solved with 
the signing of this agreement. However, the Persian Government contended 
that this arr~ngement was an alteration o:f the n•Arcy concession rather 
than a settlement o:f the differences. It therefore required parlia-
mentary sanction~ The British Government contended that no parliamentary 
sanction was necessary for the agreement and the result was that the 
Armitage-Smith Agreement was never ratified and none of the issues were 
settled. 
D. Cancellation o:f D'Arcy Concession and Formation o:f Concession 
of 1933. 
1. Cancellation of D'Arcy concession~ 
Although the Armitage~mith Agreement was not ratified by the 
Persian parliament, it remained :for a number o:f years the only basis o:f 
* 29, P•, 36 and p. 37. 
** Ibid. 
relations between the Persian Government and the company.* In 1921 Shah 
Pahlevi appointed a London chartered accountant to study and examine 
the financial relations between the company and the Persian Government. 
On the grounds of the report submitted by the accountant, and on the 
basis of direct complaints from Persia's Oil Commissioner, the Shah 
decided to give his full attention to the oil question. Exchange of 
notes, discussions, and negotiations were initiated by December 22, 
1926 but all failed to bring about any sign of settlement to the out-
standing disputes.** 
To further aggravate the situation,· the company refused to 
comply with the first income tax law issued by the Persian Government 
in 1930. Added to that, the companyts profits declined sharply during 
the 1930's world depression, and consequently the royalty payments for 
1931 were only 306,872 pounds sterling compared with 1,288~312 pounds 
sterling the previous year. The Persian Government protested to the 
company's local representative and refused to accept the royalty. During 
1932, the Persian Government prepared its. last proposal and invited Sir 
John Cadman, Chairman of the company., to· !reheran. Sir John refused the 
invitation. 
It seemed that at this point the Persian Government lost its 
patience. The Shah also was very disappointed when, while visiting 
Khuzistan, he saw that the Arab and Indian workers were receiving three 
* 29, p. 37. 
** For details on notes exchanged and negotiations, see: 291 PP~ 41-42; 
8, pp. 155-158. 
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times as much in wages as the native workers~* The Shah then decided 
the cancellation. On November 27, l932.he ordered his Minister of 
Finance to inform the company that the D'Arcy concession was to be re-
garded as cancelled forthwith. He also instructed the Finance Minister 
to express the willingness of the Persian Government incconsidering a 
new concession. On the same dat a note in this effect was sent to the 
director of the company, and on December 1, the Persian parliament con-
firmed the cancellation. 
2. The British Government and the Anglo-Persian Reaction to cancellation. 
It was quite nat~l that the company would vigorously 
refuse to accept such a unilateral cancellation. On November 29, the 
Resident Director of the Company, on behalf of the Board of Directors, 
replied in a lengthy note deny.dmg the can~ellation and other charges 
alleged by the Persian Government. The British Government also reacted 
promptly threatening to use force if neces~ary to protect British lives 
and property. Finally after the exchange of a series of strongly worded 
~otes, the British Government, on December 3, threatened that if the 
Persian Government did not withdraw its cancellation within a week, the 
British Government would refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice at The Hague.** 
It seemed, however, that the Persian Government did not 
comply· with the British ultimatum, and on December 14, the Secretary 
* 8, p. 161. 
** For details on notes exchanged see: 29, pp. 43-46; 8, pp. 163-168 •. 
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General of the League of Nations was asked b¥ the British Government to 
insert in the agenda of the Council: 
Dispute which has arisen between His Majesty's Government 
in the United. Kingdom and the Imperial Government of Persia 
in consequence of the Persian Government 1 s action in purpor-
. ting to cancel the concession held by the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, a British company~ 
The Council informed the Persian Government that it decided 
to take up the case on January 23, 1932. The Persian Government refused 
to admit the competence of the Council on the grounds that the dispute 
was entirely a domestic matter between the Government of Persia and the 
Anglo-Persian Oil,Company. However, later on both governments stated 
their positions orally before the Council. Meanwhile it was announced 
by Mr. Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakd.a, appointed by the Council as 
rapporteur, that both Persia and Britain had agreed to a temporary 
withdrawal of the· case from the Council's consideration in hope of 
reaching direct agreement. The Council conceded. · Negotiations between 
company officials and the Persian Government began in February 4, 1933 
in Geneva and continued in Paris and then in April was transferred into 
Teheran. O:p. May 26, Mr~ Benes reported to the Council that the dispute 
was amicably settled with the conclusion of a new agreement. The 
agreement was .signed on April 19, and was· ~tified by the Persian parl-
iament and the Shah a month later. That was the new concession of 1933. 
3. The new concession Of 1933. 
The new concession of 1933 differed appreciably from the 
original D'Arcy concession. Indeed, it marked the first significant 
development in Persia's petroleum concessibn history. Major developments 
8l. 
occurred mainly in the area, duration,; and financial obligations as set 
forth by the terms of the concession~ This can be clearly seen from the 
following major provisions of the concession:* 
1. The .Anglo-Persian Oil Company was granted 11Tb.e exclusive right, 
within the territory of the concession, to search for and 
extract petroleUm as well as to refine or treat in any other 
manner and render suitable for commerce the petroleum obtained 
from it .. u It was also granted 11 the non-exclusive right to 
transport petroleum, to refine it 9r treat it in any other 
manner and to render it. suitable for commerc.e. as well as to 
sell it in :Persia and to export it.~ n Also the .Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company shall have the non-exc~usive right to construct, 
own, and operate pipe'-lines. 
2. The area of the company's activities was to be reduced from 
about 500,000 square miles to 100,000 square miles to be 
chosen not later than December 31, 1938 .. 
3. The company was granted the right to import, without special 
. ' 
license, the exclusive needs of it~ employees, the equipment, 
material, and "anything necessary exclusively for the operation 
of the company in Persia. 11 Imports for the needs of the 
employees of the company were to be subject to custom duties 
and other duties and taxes in force at the time of importation. 
Equipment, materials and other im~rts necessary for the oper-
ations of the company were, however, to be exempted from custom 
·. b 
* The full text of this concession is to be found in 16, pp .. 188-96. 
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duties and taxes. 
4. The royalty provisions were as follows: 
a- A levy of four shillings a ton on pet:r.-oleum sold inside the 
country or exported. 
b- The company was to pay a sum equal to 20 per cent of the 
distribution to the ordinary stockholders of the company, 
in excess of 671,250 pounds sterling ~ whether the distri-
bution was as dividends or related to reserves exceeding 
the reserves which existed on December 31, 1932. The an-
nual payments of (a) and (b) was guaranteed by the company 
at a minimum of 750,000 pounds sterling. 
c- The:: Persian Government was to receive an amount equivelant 
to 20 per cent of the surplus difference between the general 
reserve of the company from December 31, 1932 to the surrender 
or the expiration of the concession, as well as 20 per cent 
of the surplus difference of the balance of the company bet-
ween those two dates. 
d- The Persian Government was to have the right to check the 
returns on the production of oil. Special arrangements were 
also made to secure the Persian Government against any 
fUrther depreciation of the pound sterling. 
5. . The company was exempted from all taxes, present or future, of 
the state or local authorities. In return, the Persian Govern-
ment was to receive during the first fifteen years of the con-
cession 9d. per. ton on the first 6 million tons of oil sold or 
eXported, and 6d on each additional ton, subject to· a minimum 
_. 
:payment o:f 3oo,ooo :pounds sterling• It was also stated in the 
agreement that before 1963 new arrangements :for these payments 
in lieu o:f taxation were to be negotiated~ 
6. According to the agreement the Government o:f Persia was to 
appoint a 11Delega.te o:f the Imperial Governmentn who was to have 
the right to attend meetings o:f the Board o:f Directors o:f the 
company~ to have acces$ to information available to stockholders, 
to request that special meetings of' the Board o:f Directors be 
convened, and to supervise the education o:f Persian students in 
Britain who were :financed by the companyQ 
7.. The agreement provided :for the progressive reduction o:f the 
number o:f non..;Persian employees and their replacements by 
Persians. The unskilled sta:f:f was to be compo~~d exclusively 
of' Persian nationals. The agreement also provided that the com-
:pany was to spend 10,000 pounds sterling· a year in educating 
Persians in Britain. 
8. The agreement providea that oil prices in Rumania or the Gulf' 
o:f Mexico, whichever were the lower, were to be considered as 
the basic prices o:f oil and oil products sold in Persia. The 
Persian public waste be intitled to a lO per cent. discount, and 
the Persian Government to 25 per cent o:f this basic price. 
9. It was agreed upon that 11this concession shall not be annulled 
by the Persian Government and the terms therein contained shall 
not be aitered either by general o; special legislation in 
the future, or by administrative 'measures or any other acts 
whatever o:f the executive.authorities~tt . I 
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10. Clear and precise provisions regarding the submission to arbi= 
tration 6~ all di~~erences between the government and the com-
pany Were also prov.ided by the agreement. 
11. According to the agreement. also, the company was to pay the 
Persian Government 1,000,000 pounds sterling in settlement o~ 
all its claims~ It was· also provided that payments ~or the 
years 1931 and '1932 were to be made according to the new 
arrangements 
12. The term o~ the concession was to last until December 31, 
1993, and the company was to have the right to surrender the 
concession upon giving a two year notice. 
E. Developments Be~ore and ~ter Nationalization 
1. Developments be~ore and during World War II. 
Following the conclusion o~ the new concession o~ 1933 and up 
to 1939, relations between the company.and the government remained gene-
rally cordial and. satis~actory.* During this period the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, withput any inter~erence on the part o~ the Persian Govern-
ment, proceeded with its plans o~ expansion and development. 
During the first year of the war, the Anglo-Persian relations 
continued to be cordiaL. The Government of Iran maintained strict neut-
rality and tried to be on friendly relations with both Germany and Britain. 
Meanwhile, oil production dropped as a result of market disturbances 
and sea dangers ~nd consequently the government's revenues. In August, 
* 8, p. 184; 19, p. 124 •. 
l94o, the company, upon representations by the Persian Government, agreed 
to the payment of the sum of l,500,000 pounds sterling in lieu of the 
reduction of the 1939 payments.* It also agreed to secure by similar 
payments the guarantee that the government share should not fall below 
4,ooo,ooo pounds sterling in any year up to that of the Armistice.** 
In 1941, Iran was occupied by the British and the Russians. 
No damage was sustained to the oilfields during the occupation operations, 
although some casualities were reported. Two weeks following the occu-
pation, Riza Shah notified the Iranian Parliament that he had abdicated, 
and that his son, Muhammed Riza Pahleyi ha.d succeeded him. On tranuary · 
26, 1942, the Persian Parliament approved the Anglo-R\,lse§()-Pers·ian 
Treaty which placed the country on the side of the Allies.*** 
Late in the fall of 1943, a representative of the Shell group 
arrived in Teheran seeking ~n oil concession in the so~thern section of 
the country. In the spring of 1944,. another two· companies, the Socony-
Vacuum Oil Company and the. Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company, sent their 
representatives to negotiate for oil concessions for the same or neigh-
bouring sections. During the same year, the . Iranian Government employed 
two American consultants to advise her on the matter. Negotiations between 
the three representatives and the Iranian Government continued satis-
factorily throughout the summer of 1944. Late in September, 1944, a 
Soviet delegation, headed by Sergei Kavtar8dze, Assistant Commission for 
* 8, p. 186; 19, p. 124 .. 
** ibid. 
*** 29, PP· 60-61. · 
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Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., arrived in Teheran. It was declared 
i 
by the Soviet Embas;sy in Teh:eran that the pul'J?of!e of the visit of the 
Soviet delegation was to demand oil cpncession for the Soviet Union 
in the five northern provinces.* 
However, on October 16, 1944, the Iranian Prime Minister 
declared that his Cabinet decided not to grant new concessions to 
foreigners until after the war. This declaration precipitated a storm 
of protest and cxiticism from the Soviet mission and fro~ the communist 
press in Iran and in the Soviet Union which eventually led to the fall 
of the Iranian Government on November 8, 1944. On November 20 of the 
same year, a new-government was formed under the leadership of Mortaza 
Ghali Bayat. 
On December 2, 1944, the Persian Parliament passed the following 
law: 
1. No Prime Minister or Minister or Acting Minister or Undersec-
retary of State may undertake im.:Y official discussion or· dis-
~ . , 
cussions having a legal character, or sign any agreement, re-
garding a petroleum concession with the official or unofficial 
representatives of neighbouring or distant··_countries or with 
the representatives of oil companies or with any other person. 
2. The Prime Minister and the Ministers may, however, undertake 
negotiations regarding the sale of petroleum and the manner 
in which the Iranian Government is to exploit and administer 
its oii wells. The Majlis (Parliament) must, however, be 
informed of the progress of the negotiations. 
3. Any person or persons violating the provision of the first 
Article shall be sentenced to a term of solitary imprisonment 
from three to eight years and shall be permanently debarred 
from Government service.** · 
-* These· are: Azerbiajan, Kharasan, Gilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad. 
** 16, pp. 241-242. 
This law put an end to concession ~ivalry in Iran during the 
war period. 
2. Developments during the post-war period. 
By the end of the war, Iran demanded the withdrawal of the 
Allied troops from its soil.. The British conse~ted1 but the Russians re-
fused to leave until the deadline set after the cessation of ho~til~ties. 
However, they declined to withdraw, on March 2, 1946, the deadline time** 
Meanwhile a Russe-Azerbaijani coup d!..etat swamped the province of Azer-
baijan with communists, deposed the Iranian Governer, ~ proclaimed a 
Republic. 
The Iranian Government appealed to the United Nations char-
ging that the Soviet U~ion was interfering in its internal affairs. After 
~engthy debates, the Council adopted a resolution which requested both 
parties to negotiate for a solution of the dispute.** . 
In February, 1946, Iran entered into negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, and ,on April 4, 1946, an agreement was announced between 
, the two parties. According to this agreement the Iranian complaint to 
the United Nations would be withdrawn, Iranian territories would be 
evacuated complet~ly within st~ weeks of March 24, Azerbaijan to be 
considered an internal problem, and a Russian-Iranian Oil Company would 
be established for the exploitation of north Iranian oil. 
However, Russian troops were not completely withdrawn until 
June 1946. In August 1947, the oil agreement with Russia was presented 
* . 29, pp. 68-70: 
** Ibid, pp. 70-79. 
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to the Iranian :Parliament :for sanction. In the meantime, the Iranians began 
to realize the inadequacy o:f royalties :from the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company. Besides, labor troubles broke out throughout the oil:fields and 
installations. All these national :factors contributed greatly to the 
adoption of the one-Article oil law by the Iranian Parliament on 
October 22, 1947.* This law declared the Russian-Iranian oil agreement 
nUll and void. It also bade the government to make arrangements :for a 
technical and scienti:fic investigation of the oil wealth o:f the country 
so that the necessary laws could be en.acted. The law also forbade the 
government from granting any concession to foreigners • According to. the 
law, also, the government was nrequired to enter into such negotiations 
and take such measures as are necessary to regain the national rights, 
and inform the Majlis o:f the results. rr 
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company reacted promptly to the new law 
and o:f:f'ered, early in l94B, to discuss with the government methods o:f' 
adjusting its royalty income and other dif:ferences. A:f'ter prolonged nego-
tiations, began early in the summer of 1948, t~e Anglo-Iranian Oil com-
pany and the Iranian Government signed a new supplemental agreement on 
July 17, 1947. The new agreement provided "for the folloWing major 
provisions:** 
1. The royalty was to rise from 4 to 6 shillings per ton. 
2. The payment .in lieu of income tax was to be one shilling per ton. 
3. The government of Iran was to receive an immediate tax-:free payment 
* 29, pp. 80-81 
** 8, pp. 328~30. 
of 20 per cent of the general reserve, as well as an annual payment 
of 20 per cent of additions to the .general reserve during the 
preceding years~ 
4. The provision (in the concession of 1933) of a 20 per cent pay-
ment of dividends distributed to the stockholders in eKcess of 
671, 250 pounds . ·sterling remained unchanged. 
5. The company guaranteed a minimum payment of' 4,ooo,ooo pounds 
sterling annually should total payments d~op below this figure. 
6. The prices of oil sold to the Iranian population would be 25 per . 
cent below (instead of 10 per cent in the 1933 concession) the 
Mexican Gulf or the Rumanian prices, Whichever was the lower. 
7. The new agreement would be retroactive to January 1, 1948. 
8 .. Should dispute.s·~rise, the International Court of Justice would 
be the arbitrator. 
3. Nationalization and aftermath. 
As required by the Iranian conStitution, the Supplemental 
Agreement was presented to the Majlis for ratification. However,· on 
July 28, 1949, the Majlis was disso1ved without taking any action on the 
part of the agreement although some opposition was reported.* In Febru-
ary, 1950, a new Majlis was elected to which the agreement was resubmitted. 
Again, the agreement was attacked by opposition Deputies, led by Dr. 
Mussadiq and his National Front Party.** The Government of Premier Ali 
Razmara, being in favor of the new agreement and fearing its rejection 
* 8, pp. 334-335. 
** Mussadiq's National Front Party secored only 8 seats in the new Majlis, 
out of a total of 136 seats. . 
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by the new Majl.is, proposed the submission of the agreement, before its 
consideration by the Maj1is, to a special. committee for careful. investi-
gation. In June, 1.950, the agreement was passed to the Majl.is Special. 
Oil. Committee formed of 18 members under the chairmanship of Dr. Mussadiq., 
In December of that year, the committee rejected the agreement "on the 
grounds that it did not satisfactorily safeguard the Iranian rights and 
interests."* Consequently, the government Withdrew the agreement, _and 
on January 1.1., 1.951.,-the Majl.is approved the committee's decision-and 
requested the committee to report on the_ course of action which the 
government should fol.l.ow in its dispute with the company. 
On February 19, 1951, Dr~ Musaddiq proposed to the committee 
that.the oil. industry be nationalized~ The committee, however, asked 
the advice of Premier Razmara on the matter. Razmara_referred the 
question to a panel. of Iranian oil. experts who rejected natfonal.ization 
·as impracticable~ 
MeanWhile; new developments were taking place' in the Arab 
oil. producing countries neighbouring to Iran. In Saudi Arabia, the 
50/50 profit sharing practice was adopted as of December 31., 1.950. The 
Iraqi Government was also conducting negotiations with the Iraq Petro-
~ 
l.eum Company and demanding an increase in royalties. In fact, these 
developments contributed greatly to the attitude being taken by Dr. 
Mussadiq' s National Front Party, and later on by the Majl.is, although 
some critics believed that Dr.- Musaddiq 1 s proposal. of national.i~ation 
was merely a political. affair~ Those who believed that argued that during 
* 1.2, p. 50. 
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this })eriod the com]?any had asked the Iranian Government for reopening 
of negotiations on the basis of the 50/50 profit sharing plan as con-
cluded in Saudi Arabia or on any other reasonable basis,_ but the Iranian 
Government ignored everything.* 
However, events moved fast after Premier Razmara made public 
the decision of the oil. experts to whom the nationalization question 
was referred. On the following day, the Premier was assassinated. On 
March 9, the oil. committee approved the nationalization proposal. and 
asked for an extension of its life for two more months in order to 
study the means for the execution of nationalization. 
bill: 
On March 15, the Majl.is passed the following single-Article 
For the hap})iness and prosperity of the Iranian nation 
and for the })urpose of securing world peace, it is hereby 
resolved that the oil industry throughout al.l parts of the 
country, without exception, be nationalized, that is to 
say, all operations of exploration, extraction and exploi-
tation shall be carried out by the Government 9 ** 
Naturally this action on the part of the Persian Government vas 
greatly opposed and protested by both the British Government and the 
Anglo-Iranian oil Companyv On March 1.4, the British Government sent a 
note to the Iranian Government protesting actions being taken place in 
the Majlis and in the ,::oil committee. On .A'Pril 8, the Persian Government 
rejected the British protest. On April 25, another British note vas dis-
})atched with some suggestions for settlement,(***~ but the Iranian answer 
* 19, pp. 161-2 
** . 8, p. 347 
*** Ibid, pp. 241-2. 
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to it was the passage by the Majlis, on April 30, of a nine-Article 
law for the implementation of natio~lization. 
In the meantime, on April28, the Shah named Dr~ Musaddiq 
. . 
Prime M;i.nister at the request of the Majlis. Dr. Musaddiq went ahead 
With his plans for nationalization aided by the rising t:i,de of enthusiasm 
and nationalism. He rejected the requestof the companyto submit the 
dispute to arbitration according the l933 concession agreement. By 
October, 1951, oil operations were brought to a stand-still and the 
company withdrew: the last of its employees from Iran. On July 22, 1952, 
an Internatioruil Court judgement ruled that the· Court had no juris-
diction on petitions filed by both the British Government and the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; that the 1933 concession agreement was not 
a treaty' and that the British Government was not a party to the cont-
ract.* 
After that, several proposals and counter proposals by the 
company, by British and Americans, and by the International Bank were 
attempted, but all failed. to provide a solution~ Dr~ Mussadiq ';S ·, Govern-
ment was insisting on the interpretation of' the n~he-Article nationali-
zation law verbatim. 
Month by month Dr. Musaddiq grew stronger and stronger to the 
point that the Shah was about to lose his throne. When on August 13, 
1953, the Shah appointed General Zahedi Prime Minister, Dr. Musaddiq re-
jected the Shah's order. At first, General Zahedi failed in his attempt 
to establish himself' as Prime Minister, and, consequently, the Shah fled 
* 29, pp .. 134-5~ 
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to Rome. On August 19, however, Dr. Musaddiq' s supporters were defeated 
with the result that he was arrested and jailed and the Shah was returned. 
In December, 1953, General Zahedi's Government resumed diplo-
matic relations with Britain. Soon a:fterJnegotiations were initiated and 
conducted on various levels - intercompany, company-governmental and 
inter-governmental - and in widely scattered places - chiefly Washington, 
London, and Teheran. The result was the conclusion, on September 19, 
1954, of' the International Consortium Agreement between the Iranian 
Government and the Consortium group Which was composed of' the Anglo-
_Iranian Oil Company (renamed British Petroleum Company in December of' 
1954) holding a 40 per cent interest, Royal Dutch-8hell 14 per cent, 
California Standard, Gulf', New Jersey Standard, Socony-Vacuum (renamed 
Socony Mobil on April 29, 1955), and Texas companies, each company to 
hold 8 per cent interest. However,the interests of' the last :five 
American companies were reduced in April 1955 :from 8 per cent to 7- per 
cent each, by the sale of' the difference to Iricon Agency which is 
composed of' American independent oil :firms~* 
On the same day the International Consortium Agreement was 
signed, another agreement was reached between the Iranian Government and 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company covering compensation.:for the latter's 
properties. Both agreements were ratified by the Majlis on October 21, 
1954, and by the Senate ·a week later. On October 29, the two agreements 
were promulgated by the Shah. 
* The American independent-oil companies participating in Iricon Agency 
are: Richfield Oil Corp. 25~, Aminoil 162/ 3~ 1 Standard (Ohio) 1 Getty, 
Signal Oil and Gas Co., Atlantic Refining Co., Hancock Oil Co., Tide 
Water Associated Oil Co., and San Jacinta Petroleum Corp., 8 1/3 
each. 
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4. The International Consortium Agreement.* 
There is no doubt that the Consortium Agreement represents another 
significant development in the petroleum conoession history of Iran. 
In the first place, the agreement provided that petroleum deposits and 
oil installations shall remain the property of the government~owned 
National Iranian Oil Company •. This means, that nationalization of the 
oil industry is recognized, theoretically, and the terms of the agree-
ment are made accordingly. The companies set up·· .accoril.ing to the 
agreement merely run the installations and oil at the oilfields is 
purchased by the subsidiaries of these companies. Another achievement 
of this agreement is the adaptation of the 50/50 profit sharing for-
mula~ already in practice in the neighbouring countries. These and 
other achievements can be clearly seen from the following major pro-
visions of the agreement: 
~- Under the terms of the agreement, two operating companies, the 
Iranian Oil Exploration and production Company and the Iranian Oil 
Refining Company, are to be incorporated in the Netherlands and 
registered in Iran. The companies of the consortium group, men-
tioned earlier, are to be the participants in these two companies.** 
These two companies are to have direct charge of oil productio n 
and refining and other related operations under the authority 
and supervision of the National Iranian Oil Company. 
b- All installations left by the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
* The full text of this agreement is to be found in 16, pp. 
** Thesis p. 9¥ 
are to be delivered to the operating companies with the exception 
of items to be used for the distribution of domestic oil. 
c- All materials and eguipments necessary for operations are to be 
imported without licence and free from custom duties and.other 
charges or taxes. Also, all oil exports are to be free from taxes. 
d- The National Iranian Oil Company is ,to be in charge of non-basic 
operations such as maintenance; housing; medical and health; food 
supply system; etc. 
e- The operating companies to guarantee production: for 1955, 17,500, 
000 cubic meters; 1956, 27,500,000; 1957, 35,000,000. After that, 
the quantities produced has to be in line with production trends 
within the area. 
f- Oil income to Iran is expected. to begin with 31 million pqund.s 
sterling for the first full year of operation and rising to 67 
million pounds in the third year~ 
g- The agreement is to last for 25 years from the date of signing, 
with the option of three renewals of 5 years each. The area of 
the concession is practically the same as enjoyed by the former 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
h- The National Iranian Oil Company will distribute oil products in-
side Iran and will keep and operate the small Naft-i-shah oilfield 
and the Kermanshah refinery to supply part of internal needs. 
i- The Government of Iran shall pay the. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the 
amoung of 25 million pounds sterling nin full and final settlement 
of all claims and counter claims by Iran and the National Iranian 
Oil Company on the one had, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., 
on the. other hand. 11 
j- Subsidiaries of' the participating companies, a~ well as the National 
Iranian Oil Company, will purchase crude oii from the Eltploration 
and Production Company at cost, plus a fee of' one shilling per 
cubic meter of' crude oil delivered, anci refined oil from the Re;t:ining 
Company also at cost, plus one shilling per cubic meter refined. 
k- The agreement provided detailed and complicated arrangements for 
the division of' profits between the Government. of' Iran and the 
consortium group. It is anticipated, however, that through the 
royalty provisions and the application of' the Iranian income tax 
law, the division of' income will approximate the 50/50 formula. 
l- Disputes as to the execution or interpretation of' the agreement should 
be first negotiated between the two parties; if' that fails, they 
should beref'erred.~o a cbncilia.tiop. committee; and if' that fails, 
they have to be settled through arbitration. 
F. Recent DeveloJ1III:ents 
l.. The new oil law of 1957. 
Although nationalization of' the oil industry in Iran was not a 
complete success, it provided a. good background and an enhancement for a 
more gove-ntal p?-~icipation in ownership, in profits, in management, 
and in supervision of' the national oil industry. This was eventually 
achieved through a new oil law issued during July 1957. 
The new law authorizes the National Iranian Oil Company to con-
clude oil development contracts with private comp8.nies, either independently 
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or in a :form of a mixed organization or a joint structure in 'Which the 
National Iranian Oil Company must hold not less than 30 per cent interest. 
Such contracts must not interfere with the operations of the Consortium 
company and must be outside its area. Such contracts also must enjoy 
the approval of the Council of Ministers, and grantable only to companies 
or persons Whose home country provides s'im.ilar advantages~ 
The following is a sunnnary of the basic rules and provisions 
of the new law which defines obligations of operators and which regulates 
the relationship between such operators and the National Iranian Oil 
Company:* 
a- In cases wherein the National Iranian Oil Company has 50 per cent 
or· more interest in the ownership, the following conditions prevail: 
l. Area allowed is not more than 16,000 square kilometers in one 
district and at one time~ 
2. Terms of contracts are limited to a maximum period of 25 years 
from the date of commencement of commercial production. 
3. Operators may be granted,. on request, three extensions o:f 5 
years each. The granting of the last two extensions is subject 
to conditions in ef:fect at the time of extension~ 
4. Operators must drill first well within four years. The contract 
would dissolve if production is not obtained in 12 years. 
5. Operators must return to the National Iranian Oil Company with-
in 10 years half the total area granted. At the end of 12 
years, operators shall retain only producing areas. 
* 31, Iran's section; 4o, Iran's section; 51, p. 359* 
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b- In cases wherein the National Iranian Oil Company has less than 50 
per cent interest or in case an agreement is established with any 
person to operate independently of a mixed organization or joint 
structure, the conditions governing operations shall be as follows: 
1. Area limits is 9,000 square kilometers in one district and at 
one time. 
2. Maximum duration is 25 years from the date of commencement of 
commercial production. 
3. Renewals may be granted for no more than three terms of :f'i ve 
years each at the request of' operator, provided that he either 
accepts conditions in effect at the time of' such renewal or 
returns at the time of such renewal not less than 20 per cent 
of the area. 
4. Operators must drill at least one well within a maximum period 
.~~~.· 
/ : ~""' 
of five years from the date of each agreement,_-~~~~hef~~t~g> 
{~·~..;:_·:- ' "'"<~ ,4~;::-
one well each year. The contract would be c~I.ic:elled if~om-~- -o:--· 
----.:: -~ ~ _./. :..:..  ~-,... . -
merical production is not obtained in 12 yea~~ ~ .,_-;. = ~;:~ i ~· 
5. One the request of the National Iranian Oil ~~ny,~o~erat_q:i-s · 
. -- .. -'~>~;~-~~.... ~- .. _v; ~;,~---~ :~ 
must supply in kind. to the National Iranian Oil_.,..-Co#ipaiiy;'"'oiie._ / 
- .. :.::. ~- -
eighth of' the total production, the value of which, calculated 
at the posted price, shall be deductible from operator 1 S 
tax liability. 
6. Operators shall pay to the National Iranian Oil Company a lump 
sum as cash bonus i~;:Mdition to the annual rental. The amount 
of such bonus depends upon and compatible with area covered. 
c- The following conditions apply to all cases of (a) and (b): 
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1. Operators shall pay an .annual relitf2.1 to be determined by the 
National Iranian Oil Company in accordance with the extent of 
the area, the characteri~tics of the zones, the possibilit~es 
of discovery of petroleum and the facilities of marketing such 
petroleum in ·other countries. Special arrangements were 
provided for the payment of such rental. . 
2~ The National Iranian Oil Company may decline to permit any 
person to be engaged in petroleum operations in more than five 
districts at one time. 
3~ All materials required for operations may be imported without 
license and shall be exempt from import and other customs duuies. 
Materials for use or consumption by employees may be imported 
without license but subject to custom duties or other taxes 
generally applicable at tbe time o'f importation. 
' 4. Operators are exempted from all taxes except payments to the 
National Iranian Oil Com})&ny and the income tax. The income 
tax Act of 1956 applies. 
5. Payments to the National Iranian Oil Company or the Iranian 
Government on account of income tax, cash bonus and rental 
shall be made in U.S. dollars on·in sterling or in such other 
currency as may be specified by the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany. Any other payments may be :made in Iranian currency. 
6. Proceeds from exports of oil may be retained by the operator. 
7. The National Iranian Oil Company has the right to ask operators 
to provide. her with a proper quantity of petroleum as may be 
required for internal consumption at cost, plus reasonable 
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"opera.ting11 f'ee. ! ' 
8. No operator may transfer his rights to another party except after 
a prior agreement of' the National Iranian Oil Company and a 
con:f·irmation of' the Council of' Ministers and an approval of' the 
Majlis. 
2. Recent Concessions. 
Since the passage of the new oil law, the National Iranian Oil 
Company has concluded three concession agreements, in all of which it 
has fifty per cent interest in the ownership. These are: The SIRIP 
concession, the IPAC concession, and the IRC.AN concession. An outline 
of each of these concessions will be given below: 
a- The SIRIP concession.* 
This concession agreement was signed on August 12, 1957 bet-
ween the National Iranian Oil Company and an Italian concern known as 
the Agip Mineraria. The concession was approved by the Majlis and 
became effective on August 24, 1957. According to the concession contract, 
a joint operating company known as SIRIP (Iran-Italian Petroleum Company) 
was established for exploration, production, sale, and other operations. 
SIRIP may also undertake refining, petrochemical, etc. operations on 
mutual agreement between the National Iranian and Agip Mineraria. 
This concession provided for the following basic provis' o ns!: 
. .... ........ ~ ... ~ 
Area: The area covered-py the concession is 22,900 square kilometers 
contained in three locations! 
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1. In the northern part of the Persian \Gulf - 5,600 square kilometers. 
* 40, Irans section; 31, Iran's section. 
2. In the eastern sections of' Zogros mountains - 11,300 square 
kilometers. 
3. Offshore and onshore along the coast of' the Gulf' of' Oman ~ 6,000 
square kilometers. 
The total area is to be reduced by 25 per cent at the end of' the 
fifth year and by another 25 per cent of' the original area at the end of' 
the ninth year. At the end of' 12 years, only commercially exploitable 
fields may be retained by SIRIP. 
Duration : The operating com:Pany was granted a 12 years exploration 
term and another 25 years exploitation term. The latter is renewable 
for three times of' five years each. The second and the third··renewals 
must be in accordance with the then current conditions. 
Exploration and drilling obligations: Exploration must begin within six 
months and drilling within 4 years of' the effective date of' the concession. 
Minimum exploratory expenditures is 22 million dollars, of' which 6 
millions yearly for 8 years. 
Ca!lital: The initial capital of' SIRIP is 10 million Iranian rials con-
tributed equally by the National Iranian Oil Company and Agip-Mineraria. 
This capital may be gradually increased as required, either borrowed by 
SIRIP or subscribed equally. 
Management: It is agreed upon that the Chairman of' the Board of' Directors 
is to be appointed by the National Iranian Oil Company. The Vice Chair-
man, the Managing Director, and the technical mana~ement are, however, to 
be appointed by Agip-Mineraria. Both companies have equal rights with 
respect to formation of' the Board of' Directors. 
Cost: Exploration expenses are to be paid by Agip-Mineraria who is in 
charge of formulating and directing exploration. In case of unsuccessful 
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exploration, Agip-Mineraria bears the entire expenses. If exploration is 
a success, the National Iranian Oil Company bears 50 per cent of expenses. 
Sale: SIRIP handles all sales of oil producedo The National Iranian Oil 
Company has the right to buy 5 pe~ ?ent of production at cost, plus 
14 cents per cubic meter for internal consumption. Agip-Mineraria 
and the National Iranian Oil Company h':"ve the p.riority to purchase the 
remainder a"j; acceptable terms to SIRIP. SIRIP must conform to the 
prevailing posted prices ,within the Persian Gulf Area •. :Price reductions 
to other buyers for mo~e than 5 per cent must be approved by the 
Nat~onal Iranian Oil Company a~ Agip-Mineraria. 
Profits Division: Halt' of the net profits is to be paid to the Iranian 
Government as tax and government duties. The remaining half is equally 
divided between the National Iranian Oil Company and Agip-Mineraria. 
Money Transfer and Exchange rates: Agip-Mineraria may keep the proceeds 
from its share. of profits abroad. and, also; may transfer it without any 
restrictions. SIRIP has option to maintain accounts abroad and recon ... 
vert into original foreign exchange aU funds converted into Iranian 
rials for use in Iran. Employees of SIRIP and Agip-Mineraria are en-. 
titled to_ the same commercial eXchange rates as used by banks. Sales of 
oil by SIRIP may be made in foreign exchange a~deptable to only one of 
the parties, provided the other is paid for its half in an acceptable 
exchange. 
Import and Export Exemption: , All materials imported for operations are 
exempted from all import duties. If such materials are sold in Iran, 
the buyer thereof must pay the unpaid import duties. Oil e~orts do· 
not require export licenses and are exempted from export taocesv 
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Miscellaneous riggts: SIRIP has the right to various operations needed to 
carry out its functions. Agip-Mineraria may use and purchase oil necessary 
f'o.r exploration at cost price~ All or part of' the concession may be 
surrendered any time af'ter f'our years. SIRIP must train Iranian emplpyees 
and replace f'oreigners wit?- Iranians as soon as possible. 
Transfer of shares to other parties· than Agip ... Mineraria and 
the National Iranian Oil Company or their group companies is subject to 
approval of' the Iranian Government. 
Should disputes arise, they must be referred to a conciliation 
board. In case of differences concernin~ technical or accounting matters, 
they are to be settled by three experts. Disputes arising from the 
interpretation or the application of' the concession contract are to 
be settled through arbitration. 
b- The IPAC Concession.* 
This concession was signed in April, 1958, between Pan Amer= 
ican Petroleum Corporation and the National Jiranian Oil Company. In 
accordance with the concession contract, a joint exploitation company 
known as IPAC (Iran Pan American Oil Company) was set up and registered 
in Teheran. 
The following is a summary of the basic provisions of the 
concession: 
Area and duration: ·The concession area covers 16,000 square kilometers 
offshore the Persian Gulf. This area shall be reduced by 25 per cent at 
the end of the f'irst five years, plus another 25 per cent within the next 
* The f'ull text of this concession is to be f'ound in tr, pp. 92-99; 
See also 41, p. 37. 
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five year period. At the end of 12 years the concessionaire shall retain 
only commercially exploitable fields. 
The concessionaire is entitled to a 12 years exploration term 
.·' 
and a 25 years exploitation term from the date of commencement of com-
mercial production. Three renewals of 5 years each may be granted on 
request. The last two renewals must accept the prevailing conditions and 
circumstances. 
Capital: Initial capital of IPAC shall be 7,500,000 Iranian rials 
contributed equally by the Pan American Petroleum Corporation and the 
National Iranian Oi+ Company. This capital may be increased as necessary 
in the manner prescribed in the IPAC 1 s statutes. 
Annual rental and bonus: Pan American Petroleum Corporation shall pay 
the National Iranian Oil Company an annual rental of $400 per square 
kilometer from the 13th through the 17 years; $48o per square kilometer 
from the 18th through the 22nd years; and $600 per square kilometer of 
area retained from the 23rd. year and each succeeding year. Pan American 
shall also pay the National Iranian Oil Company an initial bonus of 
?5 million dollars. 
Exploration and drilling obligations: Exploration operations shall com-
mence within six months from the effective date of the concession. 
Drilling of at least one well shall be commenced within a maximum period 
of 18 months after the effective date, otherwise, Pan American shall 
pay $350,000 penalty for each month of delay after 18 months. The 
contract shall be cancelled after 12 years from the effective date if no 
commercial production is obtained. 
Pan American shall spend at least 82 million dollars on 
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exploration operations~ It also shall bear the entire cost of unsuc-
cessful exploration. The National Iranian Oil Company, however, will 
share 50 per cent of the cost of all successful work. 
Ownership of Oil: Oil at the well head is owned equally by Pan American 
arid the National Iranian Oil Company. 
Oil in Kind; Either party has the right to take its share of oil in kind. 
Oil for internal consumption: Maximum amount of oil allowed for internal 
consumption is lOper cent of total production at cost, plus 14 cents 
per. cubic meter. 
Management: The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall be appointed by 
the National Iranian Oil Company while the Vi.ce Chairman, the Managing 
Director, and the Technical Management shall be appointed by Pan Amer-
ican. Both parties have equal rights with respect to formation .of the 
Board of Directors. 
Money Transfer and Foreign Exchang~: Special detailed arrangements are 
made to secure the free transfer of the Pan American share from oil 
export proceeds into and from Iran without any discrimination in exchange 
rates. 
Marketing: Sales of oil produced may be handled by Pan American or the 
National Iranian .Oil Company separately, or by.IPAC as an agent. 
Import and Export exemptions: These are generally the same as those 
granted to Agip-Mineraria in the SIRIP concession. 
Transfer right: Pan American may transfer at any time and from time to 
time all or any part of its interest in the concession to any company or 
companies controlling or controlled by the National Iranian Oil Co~pany. 
Settlement of dispute: Disputes shall be referred to a mixed conciliation 
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committe or to a single expert or to a body of three experts. If these 
fail, dispute is to be referred to arbitration. 
Profit's division: This is essentially the same as the SIRIP concession. 
c- The IRAC.AN concession.* 
This concession vas concluded between the National Iranian 
Oil Company and the Canadian concern, the Sapphire Petroleum Ltd. on 
June 16, 1958. According to the concession contract, the joint o~erating 
company, IRCAN, came into being. 
Terms of IBCAN concession are identical with those of the Pan 
American agreement, with the following major exce~tions: 
1. No cash bonus is ~ayable. 
2. Maximum exploration expenditures is 18 million dollars which 
must be spent during the first four years. During the fifth 
and each succeeding year, a minimum expenditure of 1.25 million 
dollars must be spent. 
3. No provision is made for assigning the agreement to any sub-
s id,iary company. 
4. The Supphire Petroleum Ltd. shall pay only a single penalty of 
350,000 dollars in case of failure to car~ out drilling obli-
gations. 
5. The concession cove~s about 386.0 square miles. 
* 41' ) p. 37. 
CHAPTER V. 
Concession Developments in Iraq 
A. The Period 1914~1925 
l. The Sykes-Picot and San Remo Agreements. 
Prior to the conclusion of World War r; and as early as 1916, 
Britain and France began discussion and negotiations on the future. of the 
Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. On May 16, 1916, negotiations 
were concluded by the signin~ of .the Sykes-Pi6ot Agreement*. which 
divided these territories into internationaJ_, French,. and British 
zones. The Mosul province was to be included in the French dominated 
zone. However, Britain seemed not to be too happy about the transaction 
and, later, showed great interest and desire in the inclusion of the 
Mosul p~vince in the British zone and in making certain modifications 
in the boundaries of the international zone. At the end of 1918, France 
promised to surrender the Mosul and to make concessions ... on the boun-
daries of the international zone as desired. by Britain in lieu of the 
British support of French demands in the Ruhr. ** The British also 
promised the French a share in the Mosul oil. Later on, these promises 
* So named after Sir Mark Sykes of the British Foreign Office, and 
Charles Francois. George Picot of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, who conducted the negotiations which eventually led to 
the agreement• 
** 29, p. 200. 
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were formalized in the Franco-British Oil Agreement of April 25, 1920, 
at San Remo, which awarded the 25 per cent Genna.n share in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company to Franc-e.* ·.In return, France relinquished its 
rights to Mosul, and conceded to construct a pipeline and $o fa~ilitate 
the passag~.of Mosul oil through Syria to the Mediterraneane This 
agreement also provided for the granting of a 20 per cent interest to 
the future local government of Mesopotamia (now Iraq) in any private 
company that might be established for the exploitation of oil resources 
of the country. At the .same time, at the San Remo Conference, a 
draft Peace Treaty with Turkey awarded Mesopotamia and Palestine to 
Britain as Mandates while Syria and Lebanon were made French Mandates .. 
2. The American Demand for the n open doorn policy.. . , 
The signing of the Franco-British Oil Agreement of 1920 led to 
an immediate propest from the United States, which, at that time, was 
alarmed by a possible oil shortage. It also precipitated a heated and 
prolonged diplomatic cont~ov.ersy between the United States and the 
British Government which was not settled until the late 1920's. The 
United States protested the exclusion of American oil firms from parti-
.cipation in the Mesopotamian oil. It also asserted the application of 
the "open door11 policy to ~ich the Allies were committed. The essence 
of this policy was as follows:** 
1. Equal treatment before the law ~bali be guaranteed in all 
* 19, p. 44; 43, pp. 50-51. 
**43, p. 51 .. 
].09. 
Mandated territories to nationals of all nations. 
2 •. Economic concessions in any Mandated region shall not be so 
large.as to be exclusive. 
3. No monopolistic concession relating to any commodity be granted. 
Furthermore, :tfhe United States d.eclared that she considered 
. . 
the TurkishPetroleum Company concession as no longer valid.* Meanwhile , 
the .American oil firms succeeded in organizing a group of seven repu-"-
table-American oil companies who were willi~g to acquire oil rights in 
Mesopotamia.** The group approached the State Department for support 
and permission to. send geologists and engineers to Mesopotamia for a 
reconnaissance survey ... :rhe State Department replied that tras soo~ as 
this Department learns that permission for prospecting in Mesopotamia is 
being or may be granted by the authorities in tpat territory, you will be 
promptly informed."*** 
The British Government's answer to the United States' protests 
was that she considered the Turkish Petroleum Company concession as 
legally valid and that the resourses of' Mesopotamia would belong not to 
her but to the future state to be·f6rmed there. The controversy along 
these· lines continued between the two.goyernments until June, 1922, when 
Sir Charles Greenway, chairman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, cabled 
A.C. Bedford of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), proposing that a 
* 43, p. 51. 
**·.: The American oil firms which first indicated an interest in Mesopota-
mian oil were: Mexican Petroleum Co., The Texas Co., The Gulf Refining 
Co., the Atlantic Refining Co., Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corp., Stan-
dard Oil Co. (New York), and Standard Oil Co •. (New Jersey). 
*** 43, p. 52. . 
representative be sent as soon as possible to meet with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company~ Mr. Bedford sought the.State Department's advice 
.ori the matter and., on June 26, 1922, he cabled Sir Charles that in ac-
cordance with the State Department 1 s instructions, .American participa-
tion in the Turkish Petroleum Company should be based. on: 
l. The principle of the 11 0pen door1r policy in Mandated regions .. 
2. The invalidity of the Turkish Petroleum Company concession~ 
; 3. That any arrangements that might be reached. should be on a 
tentative basis aDd conditioned by the approval of the State . 
Department. 
It seemed that Sir Charles conceded since negotiations between 
the American group and the TurkiS\b. Petroleum Company began in July of' 
the same year.* On August 26, 1922, Mr. Bedford reported to the State 
Department that the Turkish Petroleum Company was willing to limit its 
operations to a specific area to be chosen within two years after the 
granting of the concession •. The balance of the area would, then, be sub-
leased at public auction to which the Tur~sh Petroleum Company was not 
to be a bidder.** Mr. Bedford alsO reported that the. Turkish Petroleum 
Company was willing to of'fer 20 per cent interest to the American group. 
The Sta~e Department favored the plan and saw that it did not contradict 
with the principles of the 11 open door11 policy. ..As regards the percentage 
share, the State Department advised the. group to decide the matter bet-
ween themselves and according to their respective interests~*** 
* 43, p. 52~ 
** Ibid,·. p. 53. 
*** Ibid., P .. 55; 5, p. 212. 
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However, this plan was upset by the advent of the Lausanne 
conference where the fate of Mosul was to be decided.* 
On December 12, 1922, ~he American group reported to the 
State Department that the ~kish Petroleum Company offered them 24 per 
cent of the company's share in lieu of the U.S. recognition of the 
validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company concession and full support to 
this agreement, to the exclusion of any other interests, American or 
otherwise.** The group also reported that the Turkish Petroleum Com-
pany further conditioned its offer by allowing the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company to recieve free of charge 10 per cent of the oil to_be produced 
by the company. 
In reply to this plan, the State Department refused recogni-
tion of the Turkish Petroleum Company as legally valid and contended 
that she "can never take the position that :i..t will support at any time 
any arrangement to the exclusion of American interests .. 11*** Another 
factor which further.contributed to the failure of this plan was the 
insistence of the Turkish Petroleum Company that the American group 
should recognize the 11 self-d.enial clause" restrictions to which the 
partners of the company were committed in accordance with the Foreign 
Office Agreement of 1914.~ The members of the American group refused 
* As early as 1920, New Turkey Wa.s violently protesting the arbitrary 
disposal of her territory and claiming Mosul as a part of Turkey. 
** The reference here was to the exclusion of the u.s. support to Ad-
miral Chester in his attempts with the Turkish Government for a re-
newal of his old concession. 
*** 29, p. 216 .. 
**** Thesis, P~ 5 '/ 
.· 
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recognition of the clause; particularly when they disco¥ered that the res-
trictions also extended to the marketing of the oil produced~ Other pro-
posals were made by the owners of the Turkish Petroleum Company as regards 
such restrictions, but all ~ere rejected.* 
While discussions and negotiations were going on, Admiral 
Chester was approaching the Turkish Government in ·an attempt to get a 
renewal for his old concession.** On April 29, 1923, Chester succeeded 
in signing an agreement with the Turkish Government for mineral and oil 
rights over a twenty-four mile strip. The concession was to last for 
99 years. Chester, however, failed to begin work, due to the lack of 
funds and interest in his project, and eventually his concession was can-
celled by the Turkish Governm~nt on December 19, 1923.*** 
At the Lausanne conference, it was decided that the Mosul 
province remain under British-Iraq control for at least one year in hope 
that the dispute over it between Turkey and ~ritain might be settled 
amicably. After about one year, however, negotiations between Britain 
and Turkey end~d with no agreement and the dispute was referred (by 
~ritain) to the Council of the League of Nations for a decision. On 
March 11, 1925, the Council of the League declared that the Mosul was 
to be allocated to Iraq under the British Mandate.**** 
* 43, pp. 56-7. 
** Thesis, P·S''l: 
*** 19, p. 46; 5, pp.' 154-5; 29, pp .. 222-3. 
****For details on this point see: 29, pp. 228-32~ 
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By this time.., the new government of' Iraq was formed to which ·:, · 
the Turkish Petroleum Compa:ny had .applied., as early as 1923., f'or an oi].. 
concession based on the old promise granted to her by the Grand Vizier, 
Said Halim_, in 1914.* On: March 14, 1925, the Iraq Government granted the 
Turkish Petroleum Company an oil concession to last f'or 75 years~ 
B. Developments Duri~ the Late 1920's 
l. The Basic provisions of'the Turkish Petroleum Company concession of' 
1925.** 
Area! The Turkish Teproleum Company was to have exclusive oil rights in the 
whole of' Iraq witJ;_l the exception of' the Basra province and the "trans-
f'erred territories.n*** The company, however, was to select f'or her own 
·operations, within 32 months fro1ll the date of signing, 24 rectangular 
plots of' 8 square miles each. As regards the rest of the area of' the 
concession, "the government shall, not later than four years after the 
date of' this Convention, and annually thereafter, select not less than 
24 rectangular plots, each of' an area of' 8 square miles, and the govern-
ment shall of'f'~r the same f'or competition, by sealed tender, betWeen all 
responsible corporations, firms and individuals, without distinction of 
na:~ionall:ty, who desire leases. 11**** 
Royalty: The concession provided for a royalty of' four shillings (gold) 
* 
Thesis, p •. 
b The full text of this concession.:ts to be found in 16, pp. 131-42. 
*** Thesis,; p. }/ r 
**** Article 6 of' ·the concession contract •. 
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f'or every ton of' crude oil produced f'or 20 years af'ter-:~the completion of' 
its pipeline. Af'ter that, royalty nshall be increased (maximum 6 shil-
. . 
lings) or decreased (minimum 2 shillings) by the percentage by which the 
profit or loss shall be greater or less during the five years immediately 
preceding such period than during the first f'if'teen of' the aforesaid 
twenty years9 n* The ·company was also to pay a royalty of' two pence per 
1000 cubic feet of· all natural gas it sells. 
Miscellaneous rights: 
l. Drilling was to begin within 3 years f'rom the date of' signing~ 
2. At the expiration of the concession, all the company's property 
·was to revert to the government of' Iraq f'ree of charge. 
. · 3. The company was to supply the country's requirements in re-
fined products at specified disco~ts. 
2. The Red Line Agreement. · 
It is appareu,t.from the foregoing Turkish Petrole~ Concession 
that the partners o:f the company had included in the terms of the conces-
sion a modified form of' the 11 open door11 policy which was once again 
greatly opposed by the .American group.** However, tnere was no doubt 
that the· signing of' the concession had weakened the bargaining position 
of' the American group since now they lost the chance of' applying f'or a 
separate concession and had no alternative except to come into agreement 
* ·Article 10 of' the concession contract. 
· ** The basic modifications introduced in the 11 open door11 policy were: 
115 •. 
(1) competition f'or the rest of' the area of' the concession was to be 
through sealed tender rather than through open bidding, and (2) the 
provision that the company was not to 'be a bidder in the area was omitted. 
' 
with the Turkish Petroleum Company. These developments helped to make 
the .American group less opp~sed to the "self-denial clause11 restrictions 
and thus negotiations cant~nued with' hope f'or settlement in sight.* 
The. state Department, however, va,s still refusing recognition of the 
clause.· The French .and Gulbenkian, on the other hand were insisting 
that_ all_ partners, including the American group, shouid accept the .res-
trictions implied by the 1914 Foreign Office Agreement, not only in the 
remaining areas of' the Turkish l?ei;roleum Company concession but also 
in·ail other territories that were formerly~ the Ottoman Empire$ 
. Following that, several offers and counter offers -were made without 
any result. 
Meanwhile, on October 15, 1927, oil in prodigious quantities 
was discove:red by the Turkish Petroleum Company at Baba Gurgur just 
north of' Kirkuk il1 the Mosul Province. In.:fact, this discovery was 
a powerful incentive which made the groups reconc·ile their differences. 
Durin~ the same month; the French partners in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company proposed a map outlined, ~n red, the .area to which 
the 11 self'-denial cl,auseu should ap]!il.y~ This area includ~d the 
entire Arabian Peninsula, its_offshOre island~, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Cyprus, but excluding Kuwait and Egypt as 
shown in map no.~.** The American group accepted the French proposal 
reluctantly •.. The State Department also did not object to the plan, 
and on July 31, 1928, the groups signed what is known as the Red Line 
* · 43, p. 58, footnote 56. 
b 
** 16 ' p. 192. 
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Map No~ 5 
(The Defined .Area in the Red Line Agreement) 
Ankara • I ,, 
f 
T U R K 
~ G y 
ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO. 
A B I A 
Source: Arabian American Oil Co. 7 Middle East Oil Developments, l952:. 
Agreement.* 
According to.this agreement, ownership in the Turkish Petroleum 
Company was to be as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Anglo-PersianOil Company· 
Roy.al-Dutch-8hell 
Compagnie Francaise Des Petroles 
The Near East Development Corporation 
(representing the American group.(** 
5. ·s.c. Gulbenkian 
23 3/4.1o 
23 3/4% 
23 3/4% 
.23 3/4% 
5.00 1o . 
The agreement also confirmed the free of charge delivery of 
the 10 per cent of oil produced to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. as 
mentioned in the. previous plar:i. proposed·by.the Turkish Petroleum Com~ 
pany.*** 
Also according to the Red L~ne Agreement, neither the groups 
nor 11any of its associated COJ!lpanies either personally or through the 
intermediary of any person, firm, company, or corporation see& for or 
obtain or be inter,ested, directly or indirectly, in the production of 
* 
b .. 
16 ' p •. 162. 
** ~y this time, the American group composed :of: New Jersey Standard, 
New York Standard-, Gulf Corporation, ·Atlantic Refining Company, and 
Pan American Petroleum and Transport Corppration which replaced the 
Mexican Petroleum Company in 1927. Sinclair.and Texas Companies with-
drew early in the negotiations. In 1931_, · New York Standard merged with · 
Vacuum Oil Company and its name was changed to Socony-Vacuum Cor-
poration, and in 1934,· to Socony-Vacuum Oil Company. Around 1930, 
Socony-Yacuum and New Jersey Standard purchased the Pan-American and 
Atlantic Refining shares in the Near East Development Corporation 
In 1934, Gulf sold its share to. New .Jersey Standard and Socony-
Vacuum. p. 54 
*** Thesis,· p. II J. 
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oil within the defined area or in the purchase of any such oil otherwise. 
than through the Turkish Petroleum Company."* In short, the agreement 
"went a long way toward granting the Turkish Petroleum Company an ex-
' elusive mon6poly of the oil concession. and production rights in Iraq; 
it eliminated competition between the owners of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company for concessions in a much larger area; and in effect, it closed 
the (opendoor)."** 
3. The Khanaqin Oil Company Concession~ 
In the same year the Turkish Petroleum Company concession was 
concluded, the government of Iraq validated the concession rights of 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the "transferred territories.*** Thus, 
the Anglo-Persian Company was granted, on August 30, 1925, an oil 
concession for a duration of 35 years. The terms of this concession 
were similar to those of the D'Arcy concession of 1901.**** It was 
added in the concession, howeveF, ~hat the Anglo-Persian was to es-
tablish a subsidiary company to operate within Iraq and to build a 
refinery near Khanaqin for the supply of oil pruducts to be consumed 
in Iraq. 
* Article 10 of the Agreement, lob, p. 168. 
** 43, p. 67 
***" The.transferred territories consisted of what was known as the 
Khanaqin area which was transferred from Persia to Turkey by the 
decision of the International F ontier Commission of 1913~ From 
that date, the British Government obtained a formal undertaking 
from Turkey that the D'Arcy concession would recognized in that 
area~ In the divis.ion of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Em-
pire,. these territories became part of Ir~q~ 19, p. 25, 250; 29, 
p. 43. 
**** 29, p. 43; Thesis, p. 6 5 
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On May 24, 1926, this concession was revised. The new conces.-
sion was ~xtended ~or an additional. thirty ~ive years~ AccoXd~ng to the 
new conc_es.sion, the government o~ Iraq was'to recieve a·royalty o~ 4 
~hillings (gold) :per ton ·o~ oil :produced. Also, inaccordance with the 
new·agreement, the Khanaqin Oil Com:pany, a subsidiary o~ the Anglo-
Per~ian Oil _,Com:pany, was established to o:perate the concession. 
In March 1932, another subsidiary com;panyj. the Ra~idian Oil 
Company, was organized .:for the. distribution o:f oil and oil :products 
throughout Iraq. 
On DeG~mber 25, 1951, an agreement between both the Kha.naqin 
Oil Company and the Ra:fidain Oil Company and the Iraqi Government was 
· .. 
signed according to which the ,Iraqi Government took over, as o:r' January 
. . . 
·1, 1952, the re:finery:for the. account o:f.the government. It was also' 
ag~eed upon that this same com:panywas to continue distributing oil :pro-
ducts through Iraq until otherwise requestedand ~or the next.ten years 
from 1952~ . The most im:portant -:provision in this .:agreement was that the 
. . 
Khanaqin Oil Company was to conmi.ence, within seven years :from the date 
o:f the agreement, ·regular exports o:f crude _oil at a rate o:f not less than 
two million tons per •year, or it _'W-ould ,surrender the concession.~*·· 
In .November 1958, The· Kha.naqin Oil Company advised the Govern-
ment o:f Iraq that it would not be able to meet the, 1951 agreement and 
thus the concessaon was surrendered to the government.** 
* 25, :p. 130. 
** 49, :p. 32. 
\' 
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C. The Irag Petroleum. Company and its subsidiaries 
1. Revision of the 1925 concession. 
It will be remembered from the terms of the 1925 concession 
(page 6), that the Turkish Petroleum Company was to select7 within 32 
months, from the total area of the concession 24 plots of 8 square miles 
each, for its own operations, and that the Iraqi government was to 
select, not later than 4 years, 24 plots to be offered for competitive 
bidding. It seemed, howev~r, that the company was not quite satisfied 
with this arrangement. It may have feared the liability of competitive 
bidding or that other rich oil structures might be discovered and fall 
into_ other hands.. In any case, in August i927, the company requested 
and was granted a one year extension of the period of selection. 
By this time a British Oil Development Syndicate appeated 
upon the scene applying for an oi~ concession ~overing the 24 plots 
which the Iraqi government was to select and offer for competitive 
bidding. In return7 the Syndicate offerea to construct a tra.nsdesert 
railway from Baghdad to the Mediterranean~* It seemed that the Syndi-
cate's offer was too attractive to the Iraqi government which refused 
' 
the extension request of the Turkish Petroleum Company. As a counter 
move, the Turkish Petroleum Company made severa"l proposals in lieu of 
-the extension and/or modifications of the existing concession, but 8.11 
were rejected for the lack of definite guarantee to the construction of 
'* 43; p. 68; 19, pp. 73-4. 
12L 
the railway in which the government was greatly interested.* 
On ~rch 24, l931, a compromise, however, was reached between 
the government and the company ana a. new revised concession was 
si~ed.** According to the new concession the plot system was comp~ 
letely omitted, as well'as the subleasing and auction provisions, and 
the company was granted exclusive oil rights in the whole of the Mosul 
and Baghdad provinces, east of the Tigris River, an area of 32,000 square 
miles (compared with 192 s·qua.re ·miles area of the l925 concession.) The 
company was also relieved of all drillin~ obligations, present or :future 
and was not bound to build a railway. In return :for ~~l that, the com-
pany was to construct a pipeline with a capacity of not less than 3 
million tons of oil annually. The royalty provision of 4 shillings 
(gold) per ton of oil produced was unchanged~ However, the concession 
provided·tha.t a.nnu~L royalty received ty the government must not be 
less than 4oo, 000 pounds sterling (gold). Half of this amount was to 
be considered as a dead rent, while the other half was to be recovered 
by the company :from :future royalties in excess of 4oo,ooo pounds 
sterling (gold). The new concession also provided for the delivery of 
petroleum products to the government a.t specified prices. It also pro-
vided for the exemption of the company from taxes in lieu of an annual 
payment of 9. 000 pounds sterling (gold) until the commencement of com-
mercial exporting, and thereafter 60 1 000 pounds sterling (gold) on the 
first 4,ooo,ooo and 20,0QO gold pounds sterling on each additional million 
* 19, pp. 68-70. 
** On June 8, l929, the TUrkish Petroleum Company was renamed as the 
Iraq Petroleum CompanY". 
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metric ton produced. 
No other developments took place-in this concession until the 
year 1950. 
2. The Mosul Petroleum Companc * 
With 'the conclusion of the Iraq Petroleum Company revised con-
cession of 1931, and.the consequent release o:t large areas for free 
bidding, the British Oil Development Syndicate reappea:ted upon the scene 
applying for oil rights in the area ~est of the Tigris and north of the 
33-d.egree line, some 46,ooo square miles.. On April 20, 1932,:; thef Syn-
dicate was granted 'a concession covering the area it applied for. The 
concession was to last for 75 years~ According to the concession con~ 
tract, the Syndicate was to pay to the government, not until the commence-' 
ment of commerc~al production, a dead rent to begin with 100,000 
pounds sterling (gold) in 1933 and to increase by 25,000 gold pounds 
sterling annually up to 200,000 pounds. The concession also provided 
for the construction of a pipeline by the Syndicate with a minimum 
annual capacity of l,Ooo,ooo tons. It also provided that the govern-
ment of Iraq was to recieve free of charge up to 20 per cent of oil pro~ 
duced for domestic consumption requirements and, if it was in excess of 
local needs, for resale to the company. 
Rowalties were fixed at 4 shillings (gold) per ton with an 
annual minimum of 200,000 pounds sterling (gold.) 
As regards custom duties and taxes, the company was to be 
* 31, · lra'q 1 s section. 
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exempted f'rom all in lieu of' the payment of' 1_,000 pounds ste:I'ling (gold) 
to be paid annually until the.commencement of' commercial production af'ter 
which paym~nts ~ere to be identical with tho~e made by th~ Iraq petro• 
leum Company.* The concession also·provided that drilling was to begin 
in 18 months. Later in 1939, this was extended until af'ter the second 
world war. 
A i'.ew months following the signing of this agreement, Mosul 
oili'ields Ltd; .. was .organized for acquiring the share capital of' the 
British Oil Development Syndicate.** . On October 14, 19361 ·the Iraq 
Petroleum. Company established a subsidiary, Mosul Holdings Ltd., f'ar 
the purpose o:f acquiring the shares of Mos.ul Oil:fields Ltd. 'Which it 
. . 
did ip. 1937. By 1941, Mosul Holding Ltd. was renamed as Mosul Petro-
leum Company. To this company, the British Oil Development Syndicate 
transferred its concession o:f 1932. *** This company is still in operation 
as a subsidiary of' Iraq Petroleum Company .. 
3. The Basra Petroleum Compa!l,l. **** 
Af'ter. the granting of' the Iraq Petroleum Company concession 
. . 
and the Mosul Petroleum Company concession, the only area lef't in Iraq 
unl~s.ed was its southern section, the Basra province. 
During the early 1930's, no serious attempts were made :for 
acquiring oil rights in this area. Af'ter the discovery of'. important 
* Thesis, lt•l ~ 1 
** 19, pp. 79-Bo; .43, p. 85 
*** Ibid. 
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oilfields in the Bahrain Islands, however, the attention of the Iraq Petro-
leum Company was directed toward the area.· A;~ this time, Iraq Petroleum 
Compaey organized another subsidiary called :Basra Petroleum Company and 
applied, through~t, for an oil concession in all the area not included 
under previous concessions~ On July: 29, 1938, the Basra Petroleum Com-
pany was granted an oil ~ncession covering about 93.:;000 square kilO-
meters and for a period of 75 years. The terms of this concession were 
closely· similar to those of the Mosul Petroleum Company aoncession. 
D., The 1952 Ag~eement. 
l. Differences between the oil ~oinpanies and the government. 
It can be said that differences between the Iraq Petroleum 
Company and its affiliates and the Iraqi government began to dev:et:oP 
as early as 1932; At that ime the pound sterling 'Went off the gold sta.n= 
dard alld consequently the. company's payments to the government were· 
drastically reduced. However, this problem was settled amicably and 
it was agreed upon that future payments be mp.de in sterling at the 
current price of gold.* 
Following the second world war, another problem involving 
the interpretation of the 11 current price of gold11 was raised. · The Iraq 
Petroleum Company regarded the official London rate of exchange of 
gold as the ncurrent price o::f gold. 11 . The Iraqi government, on the other 
hand, maintai~d that the .current price should be the. market value, 
* 31, Iraq's section; 29, p. 258. 
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which was considerably higher .. 
Meanwhile, a further difference between the government and the 
oil companies vras dev~loping, This.time the rate of production vras in-
yolved. The Iraqi Government alleged that the rate of production was 
kept relatively low i~tentionally, while th~ companies argued that trans-
. portation difficulties were the responsible .factor for such a low rate 
. o:f pruduction. 
Negotiations and discussions between the government aM the 
oil comp&nies on these issues continued until. November 11, 1950 when 
I . 
it was announced by the government that an agreemen~ on raising the 
royalty from 4 gold shillings to 6 gold shillings per metric ton was 
·reached.. The gold evaluation issue was compromised by using the old 
official rate prevailing at the· time the concessions were drafted .. * 
While these developments· were happening, Saudi Arabia 
adopted the 50/50 profit sharing plan, and Iran nationalized her national 
oil industry. These new developments in Saudi .Arabia and Iran greatly 
encouraged the Iraqi government to take a firm attitude toward the oil 
companies. 
Two weeks following the nationalization of the Iranian oil 
industry, the Iraqi Premier threatened the operating oil companies in 
Iraq i;ihat unless they agreed to the 50/50 ;profit sharing plan similar 
to the one employed in Saudi Arabia they might lose their concession. 
The oil companies reacted promptly and agreed, in principle, 
to the government's demand and negotiations for a detailed agreement 
* 31, Iraq's section. 
** 29, p. 260. 
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were begun. On February 3, 1952, a new concession agreement was signed 
between the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosu.l Petroleum Company, the 
Basra Petroleum Company and the Government of Iraq.* 
2. The basic provisions of the 1952 agreement:** 
The basic provisions of this agreement are as follows: 
l. The agreement is retroactive to January 1, 1951. 
2. The Government of Iraq and the operating oil companies are to 
share the net profits equally before the deduction of foreign 
taxes. In addition, the oil companies are to pay 20,000 pounds 
sterling a year each in lieu of taxes. 
3. The government is entitled to take up to 12.5 per cent of the 
net production of each of the- companies as part of its share 
in the ::profits • The government may dispose of the oil in 
the open market or resell it to the companies at current world 
prices. 
4. The government is guaranteed that her income from oil not to be 
less than the value, at posted prices, of 25~ of the net pro-
duction of the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum 
Company, and 33 l/3 % of that of the Basra Petroleum Company. 
5- The Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates are to guarantee 
annual production minima as follbws: 
Iraq Petroleum Companj 
* 29, p. 260. 
** 29, pp. 260-2. 
20,75 million tons beginning 
January 1, 1954. 
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Mosul Petroleum Company 1. 25 million tons beginning 
· JanUa.ry 1, 1954. 
Basra. Petroleum Company 3.00 million tons beginning 
• January 1, 1956 .. 
6. In case oil production is discontinued, the oil companies are 
to pay to the Iraqi government a minimum of 5 million pounds 
sterling a year f'or two years~ 
7. Two Iraqis are to be appointed on the Board of' Directors of 
each of the oil companies. 
8. Payments are to be made in pounds sterling. 
9. The oil companies agreed jointly-. and severally to gUarantee 
that the government t s share of profits .will not be less than 
20 million potlnds sterling annually for the years 1953 and 
1954 and not less than 25 million for 1955 and each year there~ 
after~ 
10. The oil companies are to pay the government an annual sum of 
20,000 pounds sterling in lieu of exemption from all other 
taxes. This amount is to be deducted before calculation of 
the 5CY/o income tax. 
ll. The Iraqi government is entitled to ask the oil companies for 
increase in royalties whenever the neighbouring countries get 
such increases. 
Since the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates are a non-
profit organization, that is each parent company takes its share of oil_-
produced by the Iraq Petroleum and its affiliates at cost plus a nominal 
charge3 the conclusion of the 1952 agreement brought up the issue of 
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defining tbe profits to be shared between the government and the oil com-
panies. This issue was settied, however, by defining profits as the 
difference between the ttactual11 cost of oil and its "border value.11* Th~ 
actual cost to be the cost of production including company expenses 
(company oil used and foreign taxes are to be excluded) and overhead_, 
depreciation of physical assets in Iraq·at 10 per cent annually, and 
amortization of capital expenditure in Iraq at 5 per cent a year. The 
11border value 11 is to be determined by the oil company's average real-
ization from long-term and bulk sales, the oil company's geographical 
position, and. applicable posted F.O.B. prices. Prior to 1957, the oil 
companies considered a discount of 2% for .bulk sales~ This was reduced 
on January 1, 1957 to 1%. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
CONCESSION DEVELOPMENTS IN TEE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
A. The :Bahrain Islands 
I. The Bahrain PetroleUln· Company(P.ABCO) concession of' l934. 
- No inf'orrila.tion is available on the. details of'· this concession 
except that it covered 1001 000 acres of' land and vas to aast f'or 55 years. 
It is also reported that this concession had provided f'or a comprehensive 
custom ·duty and tax exemption and f'or a royalty of 3 rupees 8 annas* per 
long ton vi th a minimum afmual payment of' 75, 000 rupees .. ** · 
2.. The Texas Companz partic_i;pation in the concession .. 
Folluwing the conclusion of' this concession with the Ruler of' 
the Islands BAPCO proceeded with exPloratory drilling which was initiated 
on the Jebal 0ukhan structure in October l93l. By December l934, the 
first shipment of' Bahrain oil entered the world market and by l935 there 
were l6 producing wells .•. This increased rate in production, cop_pled 
with the anticipated output ·f'romSaudi Arabia, confronted BAPCO with the 
problem of' either finding additional marketing facilities or making 
price concessions in order to sell its oil.*** 
* The unit currency of Bahrain is the.Ind.ian rupee which is equivelant 
to one shilling and 6 pence of the pound sterling. 
** 29, p. 37l; l9:, p. 104.; 34, p.- 36. 
*** At that time, Standard of' CB.lifornia,. the parent company of BAPCO_, did 
not own any marketing facility outside the u .. s., 43, P• ll5. 
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The problem, however, was solved. by the merger of' B.APCO with the Texas 
Company. Negotiations for this merger Were· :opened early in 1:935, bet.., 
ween Standard oil of California and the· Texas Company.7 and on July 1, 
1936 an agreement was reached between·the two companie!3 whereby_Stan-
dard of California recieved 50 per cent interest in the Texas Company's 
marketing outlets east of the Suez and.the Texas Company acquired 50 
per cent interest·. in the Bahrain concession.* 
After the conclusion of this agreement, the California-Texas 
Oil Company (Cal tax) 1 registered in t}1e Bahamas; was organized for the 
purpose of conducting Bahrain 1 s marketing operations. 
3. The Supplementary Agreement of 1940. 
Following the discovery of oil in Bahrain by Standard of 
California, the Iraq Petroleum Company gl"oup were greatly disturbed and 
considered the Bahrain Oil development as a distinct.threat to their. 
. . 
intere·sts:;;** After lengthy negotiations between the members ·of the 
Iraq Petroleum Company group, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was premitted 
to conduct negotiations with the Ruler of the Bahrain .Islands for an oil 
concession to cover some 70,000 acres which was not included in the con-
cession held by Standard of California. However, the Anglo-Persian's 
efforts were not successfUl and in 1940 BAPCO signed with the Ruler a 
supplementary agreement "Which made .the following modifications in the 
* 
. ** 
The marketing outlets in which Standard of Cal. iforpia recieved 50 
per cent interest were: the Texas Co. (Australi~)) Ltd., the Texas 
Co~ (China), Ltd., the Texas Co. (India)1 Ltd., the Texas Co .. (South 
Africa), Ltd~, the ·Texas Co. (Philippine Islands) 1 Inc., 43, p. JJ.6; 
footnote 24. 
The I.P?O.C. was the most directly disturbed of all the group since 
at that time it controlled the only important source of crude oil in 
the area. 43, P~ 73. 
l3l. 
l934 concession: 
I -~ .. 
1~ The term of the concession was extended: 55 years from June 19, 
1944. 
· 2. The area of the conces.sion .covered all lands and other areas under 
the jurisdiction of the Ruler,·· an . area of some 1, 644, 000 
acres.* 
3. . The tonnage roya~ty remained unchanged, but the minimum annual 
royalty was raised to 1,250,000 rupees.** 
4. Recent Developments. 
Under pressures from the Ruler, the royalty rate ~s raised 'in 
.1950 to lO rupees.*** Again in 1951, payments to the ruler were increased 
by an annual lump sum. 
In December 1952, the 50/50 prof'it sharing f'ormula, as. in 
Saudi Arabia, ~s adopted •. In return for that the term of the concession 
was extended for another 25years making the expiration date 2024.**** 
No further developments in the concession were made since then. 
On February 22t 1958, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia reached an agree~ 
ment which defined their:t;"espective oil rights in the offshore area. 
lying between their territories. The niost::.important of'· the provisions 
of the agreement is the article· which states: 
This area cited and def'ined. above shall be. in part falling to 
* 29, p. 374. 
** 34J' p.. 36. 
*** 19:, p. 217. 
**** 41, p. 32. 
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the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with the .wish of 
R.R. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of R.M. the king 
of Saudi Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in 
. this area will be carr:ied out in the wa:y chosen by His Ma-
jesty on the: condition thB.the grants to the GOvernment of 
Bahrain ohe..,half of the net revenue accruing to the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia and arising :from the exploitation, and 
on the understanding that this does not inf'ringe the· right 
of sovereigntY- of the Government of Saudi Arabia nor the 
right of administration over this above-mentioned area.* 
B~. Kuwait' 
1~ The Kuwait Oil Company. concession. 
•'' .. 
This concession is 9wned in equa,::L parts by Gulf Kuwait Com-
pany ( subsidia,ry of Gulf Oil Corporation) and British Petroleum ·Kuwait 
Company, Ltd. ( subsidia:cy of British Petroleum Company')~ · As men-
tioned earlier (chapter III.), this concession was concluded on 
December 23, 1934, between the ShaiJb. of Ku'Wait and the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany. The basic provisions of the concession are as follows: 
. . . 
i. The concession covered all of Kuwait with the exception of 
the Neutral Zonet*and the islands of Kubr, G.aru, Umm al Maradim, · 
or the territorial waters of these islands~ 
2. Duration of the concession was 75 years. 
3. The company was obliged to complete drilling the total of 
30,000 feet by December 22, 1954. 
4. The concession privided for the payment to the Shaikh of Kuwait 
an initial lump sum of 470,000 rupees and annual rent of 
* 41, p. 32 
** Thesis, p. J. tJ · 
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95,000 rupees.* 
5. Royalty to be paid by the company was 3 rupees per ton. 
· 6. . All taxes were commuted f'or a payment of' 4 annas per ton. 
The amiual dead-rent payments.were provided.to cover the years 
. . . 
in which no exports wer.e made. It was .provided in the concession that 
. . 
after the commencement of' commercial exporting, annual dead-rent pay= 
ments were to be replaced by an annua.l minimum royalty of' 250,000 rupees 
per year4 (u.s. $83,250) ·** 
Following the year 1938, royalty amoUn.ted to 13 cents per 
barrel.. .Af'ter the ·devaluation of the pound sterling in 1949, royalty 
decreased to about $~09 per barrel.*** 
2~ Company operations. . 
Eighteen months following the conclusion of' the 1934 conces~ 
sion, drilling began near al.Bahra where the first well was spudded • 
.Af'ter some time, commercial productiop. proved to be unfeasible f'ro'lil this 
well and it was abandoned accordingly. Following that, the company made 
a geological survey which covered the whole country and led to the selec~ 
tion of' the s·econd drilling site known as the Bti.rghan area. In this 
second site, drilling began on October 161 1937, and by April 1938 oil 
in commercial quantities was discovered. Later, the Burghan field proved 
to be one of' the biggest oilf'ields in the world. By 1942, there were 9 
oil producing wells in Kuwait. During the period July, 1942 to August 
* 19, p. lll. 
** 39, p. 134. 
*** Ibid. 
-.---
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1946, the oilfields were shut down because of the war. After the war, pro-
duction was resumed and expanded tremendously. Kuwait now is the leading 
crude oil producer in the area. 
3. The revised concession of 1952.* 
Subsequent to the adoption of the 50/50 profit sharing plan 
by Saudi Arabia in December 1950, negotiations between the company and 
the Shaikh were initiated for the revision of the concession along these 
lines. Negotiations continued until December 3, 1952, when a revised 
concession was signed whereby the 50/50 profit sharing formula was 
adopted together with some other modifications in the original concession. 
The basic modifications in this new revised concession, Which is cur-
rently in practice are as follows: 
1. Through special income tax law, the Government of Kuwait is 
entitled to recieve 50 per cent of the net income of the com~ 
pany before the deduction of foreign taxes. Net income is 
arrived at by the deduction ofthe cost of production, inclu~ 
ding exploration, drilling and development costs, deprecia-
tion, depletion, and obsolescence, from the gross revenue of 
the company. The income tax is calculated as follows: the 50 
percent riet income minus all the previous financial arrange-
ments (that is royalty of 3 rupees per ton and plus the 4 
annas per ton in lieu of all taxes) which is to be continued. 
The difference between these two items. is to be the income tax. 
2. The terms of the concession is to be extended until December 
* 39, p. 134. 
135. 
22, 2026, an addition of 17 years to the original term. 
3. The concession provided for revision of the concession if more 
favorable terms were given to any of the other oil producing 
countries of the Middle East. 
4. The concession contained provisions regarding employment, 
training programs, payments for the education of Kuwaiti 
students abroad and the like along the lines of other conces-
sions in the area. 
Following this adoption of the profit sharing plan by this 
revised concession, some problems relative to the determination of the 
income tax came into being. As in Iraq~ Kuwait Oil Company is set up as 
a non-profit organization. The parent co~panies (Gulf and BPC) share 
equally all the oil produced at production cost plus a nominal charge 
(one shilling) per ton.*. Thus the real profits from the sale of oil 
pass to the parent companies. Indeed it is unrealistic to calculate the 
income tax on this basis. The problem, however, was comprised by the . 
establishment of a system of calculation of the cost of production and 
the F.O.B. export price of crude. No details of this system have been 
revealed as yet, but it is thought that it is similar to the system em-
ployed by the Iraq Petroleum Company.** 
* 31, Kuwait's section. 
** Ibid. 
C. Saudi :Arabia 
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1. The original California Standard concession.* 
As mentioned earlier ( Cb.a.pter III.), .this concession wa.s 
granted to the California Standard. on May 29, 1933. On December 29, 1933, 
the concession was assigned by the California Standard to its Wholly 
owned subsidiary, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company. (CASCO). 
The basic provisions of this concession were as follows: 
1. The company wa.s granted the exclusive right "to explore, pros-
pect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal . 
with,- carry away arid export 11 all oil found.Q 
2. The concession was to last for a duration of 60 years from May 
29, 1933. 
3. Operations were to start not later than September, 1933 and 
drilling within 3 years~ 
4. ~iscal provision9 were as follo~s: 
Dead-Rent: The company wa.s committed to pay an annual dead-
rent of 5,000 gold pounds sterling until the discovery of oil. 
Royalty: The company was to pay a royalty of four gold shil= 
lings .per ton or its equivelant. If the company wished to pay 
in u.s. dollars_, the royalty was to be one u .. s. dollar plus . 
>the amount by which the exchange rate for four gold shillings 
exceeds one dollar and ten cents.** 
. . 
Royalty wa.s to be calcul.ated on a net basis, that is, 
total production of crUde less water and foreign substances, 
oil used in company operations and oil delivered to the 
* 31, Saudi Arabia's section; 29,.pp. 291-3; 43, pp. 113-4. 
** For example, if the rate if exchange for four gold shillings is U.Se 
$1.14, then the royalty per ton would be U.S~. $1.04. 
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government. 
The company was also to pay a royalty of 1~ per cent 
on natural gas sales.. No royalty vas payable on gas used in 
company operations. 
Loans: The company vas to pay the government an initial loan 
of 30,000 gold pounds. If the concession was not ~erminated 
in 18 months from the effective date, the company was to 
made a second loan to th~ government in the sum of 20,000 
gold pounds sterling. These two loans were not repayable. 
They were to be deducted from royalties upon the discovery 
of oil. Upon the commencement of commercial production, 
the company was to pay the government 50, 000 gold pounds and · 
a similar amount was to be paid one year later. The last two 
payments were also to be deducted fromfuture royalties. 
5~ Area covered by the concession was of two types: 
a- .An "exclusive area11 which covered the whole eastern section 
of the country, some 36o,ooo squa:re miles.* The company fi.IC..S 
-::· .': committed to surrender a portion of this area beginning 90 
days .after drilling provided that it was to preserve the 
rights of transportation and communication over the surren-
dered areas. 
p-:-.A 11Preferential area"> roughly in central and western of Najid 
as indicated in map no. 6. In this area, the company was 
granted preferential rights for obtaining ::a:dd:ttaonal: :o:tJ:· 
* 20, p. 52; 43, p. 114. 
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concessions provided it would meet the terms of any other 
offers made to the government~ 
6. The company 'Was to be exempted from all direct and indirect 
' 
taxes 7 including import and. export duties on company materials. 
7. The com:Pany 'Was to build, after the commencement of commercial 
production, a refinery for the supply of the regular needs of 
the 'government, but not including resale in the local market 
or abroad. The government was to recieve free of charge 200, 
ooo gallons of gasoline and 100,000 gallons of kerosene 
·annually. 
8. Security measures such as soldiers and guards were to be pro-
'Vided by.the government at company expenses. 
9. Local labor should be used insofar as it is suitable. 
lO. The company was able to terminate the concession at any time by 
giving the government a 30 day notice. The government, on the 
other hand, could cancel the concession contract in case of 
non-payment of the loans specified in the concession, or in 
case of failure to commence drilling on time. 
ll. Should disputes arise, they were to be settled t.J:lrough arbitra-
tion. The decision of arbitrators was to be final. 
J.2. The company xna.y not assign its rights to another party (not a 
subsidiary) without the government consent~ 
2. Participation of the Texas Company. 
Almost immediately after the ass,ignment of the concession to 
the California Arabian S~ndard Oil Company, geological exploration ws 
commenced. The initial resul~s were discouraging, but, in March 1938, 
oil in commercial quantities was di$covered in_Dhahran. Meanwhile, and 
being confronted with the same marketing problem as in the case of Bahrain, 
the California Standard signed, in December 193~, another agreement with 
the Texas Company Whereby the Texas Company acquired a half interest in 
the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.* In return, the Texas Com-
pany agr~ed to pay the California Standard an initial sum of' 3 million 
dollars in cash and 18 million dollars in deffered payments paid out of' 
the oil to be· produced in Saudi Arabia.** Subsequently, on January 31, 
1944, tJ:le name of CASCO was changed to ARAMCO (Arabian .American Oil 
Company.)*** 
3. The supplemental Agreement of' 1939. **** 
Following the oil discovery ~t Dh~n, concession hunters from 
i 
I 
Germany, Italy, and Japan rushed into Saudi Arabia bidding for areas not 
included in the California Standard concession. The Iraq Petroleum Com-
pany and the California Standard were also Emong the bidders. The Cali= 
fornia Standard, however, was the successful bidder and on May 31, 1939, 
it signed a -supplemental agreement with the Saudi government. 
According to this agreement, the California Standard's 
* 
43, p. .114 
** 
43, p. ll6; -~ 29, p. 295. 
*** 34, p. 32. 
**** 29, p. 296; 43, p. 117. 
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concession area Wa.s. enlarged by approximately 80,000 square miles and 
the term of the concession extended for 6o years from 1939. In this 
~ditional area, Saudi Arabia's undivided half interests in the Saudi= 
Arabia-Kuwait and Saudi Arabia-Iraq neutral· zone ·were included as shown 
in map No.7 • _, In return, th,e California Standard agreed to the fol= 
lowing: 
..... 
0. -
Payment of 140,000 gold poUnds sterling or its equivelant at 
the time this agreement became effective~ . 
b - Payment of an amiual rental of 201 000 gold pounds sterling or 
its equivelant until the discovery of commercial oil in the 
additional area or until the company surrender the area. 
. . 
·c - Payment of 100,000 gold pounds sterling, or its equivelant, 
upon the discovery of oil _in the additional area~ 
d- Increase·the quantity of free gasoline to the government from 
200,000 gallons to 2,300,000 gallons. 
4. Developments during the war period. 
A few months following the conclusion of the. 193q Supplemental 
Agreement, the second world war broke out. Consequently, communications 
between Dhahran and the United States were ~~srupted and the markets for 
crude oil were disturbed and partially inaccessible. This brought to a 
halt all new field developments and other expansion programs. Some al-
ready started developments, however, were continued,such as the construe-
·. tion of the small refinery J;tt P.a.s Tanura Which was completed in 1940. 
Later, in theautumn of 1943, milita~ necessity led the United 
States govermnent to encourage and cooperate.withAramco in the 
l4l. 
construction of a 50,000 barrels per day refinery at Ras Ranura, as 
well as a l2~inch ·~ubmarine pipeline from Dbahran to Bahrain. The pipe-
line was completed in 'April 1945, and the refinery in December of the 
same year. Thus, company operations were revived again, and production 
was stepped up in l945 to an ave~age of 58,000 barrels per day as com-
pared with 12,000 barrels per day in 1942.* 
The war effects were also felt by the Saudi Arabian govern-
ment through the stoppage of the·:•Pilgrimage to Mecca, by that time the 
major source of income to the government. The Saudi government, therefore, 
began to press the company for loans on future royalties. This made 
Aramco, in 1941, offered the United States government petroleum products 
at reduced prices in lieu of supplying the Saudi government with 6,ooo,ooo 
dollars annually for five years.** The quantities of petroleum products 
offered were l,Boo,ooo barrels of gasoline at 3~ cents per gallon, 
2,66o,ooo barrels diesel fuel at 75 cents per barrel, and 31 400,000 
l42. 
barrel~ fuel oil at 4o cents per barrel.*** This offer, however, was 
never acted upon and eventually, the financial aid to the Saudi government 
was supplied indirectly by the United States government through Britain.**** 
Meanwhile, in 1944, the United States governm~nt proposed to 
build a pipeline from the Arabian oilfields to the Mediterranean, but 
the proposal was met with great opposition from the American independent 
* 34, p. 32 
** 43, p. 118. 
***Ibid. 
****29, p. 306. 
oil producers who :fearedtha.t the project would place them at a competi-
tive disadvantage. Eventually, the proje.ct on these grounds was abandoned. 
HOwever, before the end of 1944, the project was revived again by Axamco 
on a private venture basis4 
5. Develqpments during the pos~r ~ars. 
a- Partici:tp.tion of New Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum in .Ara.mco Con-
cessione 
Following the second world war, and as a result of the great 
expansion in production, in :field activities, and in refining, the 
parent companies of Aramco were :faced again with the problem of :finding 
additional permanent markets :for this huge oil source.. In the meantime, 
New Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum wer~ seeking additional erude· 
supplies :from the Persian Gulf area to meet the increased .demands :for 
their markets. The two companies, therefore, approached Aramco :for the 
purchase of crude oil and, if possible, for the purchase of interest in 
the ownership of that company. Meanwhile, New Jersey Standard and Socony-
Vacuum, representing the Am:erican group iD: the Red Line Agreement, dec,-
lared the diss.olutiori of that agreement, and in December of 1946, formal 
notices to this effect were .delivered to the other groups of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company.* It was natural that this move by New Jersey Standard 
and Socony-Vacuum was protested and greatiy opposed by the other part-
ners of the Iraq Petroleum Company, particularly CFP and Gulbenkian 
·, _______ _,.. ______ ....,._ _ 
who took the matter to cour~.* In the meantime, negotiations between New 
Jersey Standard, Socony.:...va.cuum. and the parents oi' Aramco were initiated 
bei'ore mid-1946 and by December oi' that year an agreement, in principle, 
was reached between the i'our parties whereby New Jersey Standard .and 
Socony-Vacuum would acquire 30 per cent and 10 per cent interests in 
A:ra.mco and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company respectively. By March 
. I 
J.2, the detailed agreement between the i'our companies ws signed. A 
basic provision oi' this agreement provided that in return i'or the inG 
terests acquired, New Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum W.ere committed 
to pay Aramco 76t and 25~ million dollars respectively. Another notable 
provision oi' the agreement provided, because oi' the Red Line Agreement 
question, that ii' the settlement oi' the Red Lirie issue was not in i'avor 
oi' New Jersey Standard and Socony-Vacuum or ii' no settlement was reached 
until March 12, 1951, this agreement would be terminated.** 
As regards the Red Line Agreement question, the groups in the 
Iraq Petroleum Company eventually, during 1948, ai'ter two years oi' nego~ 
tiations, reconciled their interests and reached a compromise by which 
the agreement was cancelled and special arrangements were made i'or the 
sa tisi'action oi' CFP, Bulbenk.ian, and the other parties to the agreement.*** 
b- Dii'i'erences bet'treen the Saudi government and Ara.mco on the gold ex ... 
change rate and prices • 
. As ~oted.earlier (page 
* 43, pp. 102-3. 
** Ibid, p. 123. 
***Ibid, pp. J.04-7. 
) , royal ties to the Saudi government 
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were expressed in gold .shillings per ton (4 gold shillings or its eguive-
lant) • However, the . price of gold proved not to be as stable or uniform 
as it was e:x:Pected by Aramco and other oil companies ... This instability 
in the price of gold gave rise to a controversy between Aramco and the 
gov~~nment concerning the exchange rate at Which.the local currency, 
riyals, was to be exchanged :for dollars. According to the 1939 revised 
concession, Aramco was to make royalty payments in gold pounds sterling 
or in dollars, at its option. The Saudi Arabian government wanted the 
company to make payments on the basis of the local price of gold which 
was as high as 21. dollars per gold so.vereign compared with 8 .. 24 dollars 
per gold sovereign which was the official u .. s .. price :for gold and on 
which Aramco was making its payments to the government. The controversy 
on this issue between the government and the company continued until 
1948 When a compromise at l2 dollars per gqld sovereign was made.* 
In 1951., the International Monetary Fund rate of 8.24 dollars 
per gold sovereign was adopted. 
Another problem between the government and Aramco revolved 
around the pricing arrangements over Aramco's exportse Originally; Aramco's 
owne~s used to buy the oil produced by Aramco at a price which was ap-
proximately 20 per cent below the posted price in the Persian Gulf area.** 
Later, by agreement (1950) between the government arid the company, this 
price was rai~ed to about 2 per cent below the posted price, with· 5 per 
cent extra differential. between stabilized and unstabilized oils.*** 
* 31, Saudi Arabia's section. 
** Ibid. 
· *** 4o, p. 236; Ibid. 
According to press· .reports. an ''incentive discount" of 5 per cent is given, 
but this does not affect all sales. tr * 
A :further problem between the government and the company is 
,centered around the profits on oil transported via Tapline.. The govern-
ment Wa.nts to calculate the profits on oil transported via Tapline on 
the basis of Sidon (Lebanon) sale prices.and not Bas Tanura prices as 
the company is doing at the present time. The difference between the 
two prices is about 75 cents per barrel higher at Sidon than at Bas 
Tanura. The governmen~ and the company arbitrated the dispute, but 
before reaching any decision, and early in 1958, Crown Prince Faisal 
halted the arbitration proceedings and asked that the dispute be settled 
in a friendly way.** 
c- Changes in the concession area. 
Besides all previous developments which took place during the 
postwar years, the area of Aramco concession also underwent some signifi= 
cant changes, all of which were .in the form of relinquishments. Maps 
No.~ 1 and g clearly show· the consequent occurrence of all these changes. 
6. Developments Since 1950. 
a- Mtar:@tion of the 50/50 profit sharing R3-an. 
During the late 1940's Venezuela succeeded in the ad~a-:p .. tion 
of the 50/50 profit sharing plan. About one year later, the Saudi Arabian 
* 31, Saudi Arabia's section. 
** 41, p. 55. 
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government granted the American Pacific Western Oil Corporation {now 
Getty Oil-Co.) an oil concession in the Saudi .Arabian undivided half 
interest in the Saudi Arabian~Kuwait neutral zone at more attractive terms 
than the Aramco concession.* These new developments made Saudi Arabia 
press Aramco for higher revenues. 
In October 1950, the Saudi government issued the country's 
first income tax law providing for a 20 per cent levy on corporation 
profits and a 5 per cent tax on individual incomes. Aramco protested 
vigorously and contended that in.accordance.~ith the concession contract 
it was. exempt from all taxes within the country. In addition to the in-
come tax law, the government made several demands which were, naturally, 
completely unacceptable to the company. ·-
Negotiations between the company and the government were imme-
diately initiated, and on December 3, 1950, the 50/50 agreement, thS 
first of its kind in:sthe area, was signed. 
The new agreement is to be retroactive to January 1, 1950, anQ. 
provided for the right of the Saudi Arabian government to one-half of 
Aramco•s profits after the deduction of expenses,~losses, and "reason~ 
able" depreciation, but not foreign taxes. Government's share in Aramco's 
net profit~ is to be calculated as follows: royalties, plus the 20 per 
cent income tax, plus miscellaneous levies. If the total of all these 
payments is mo:re or less than the 50 per cent of the company' s net pro-
fits, the 20 per cent income tax is to be raised to .lllOre than 20 per cent 
or reduced to less· than 20 per 5!ent so that total payments will not be 
* Thesis, p. ~ o 
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less nor more than the 50 per cent of the company's net profits. 
This agreement also provided that. the Saudi .Arabian government 
is to recieve its payments in any currency recieved from oil sales in 
the same prOiportion as ·such reciepts. 
b- The Onassis deal.* 
On January 201 l9521 an agreement 'WB.S signed between A.S ~ 
Ona.ssis, controlling a large number of tankers, and the Saudi Arabian 
government whereby a tanker company with a minimum of 500,000 deadweight 
tonnage was to be established~ This company was to be given preferential 
rights on all oil cargoes seeking transportation from Saudi Arabia 
ports excepting those which can be transported by tankers owned by 
Aramco or its parents Who were carrying Saudi Arabian oil before December 
3l, l943, on a regular basis. 
According to the agreement the freight rates to be used by 
the .company were those of the London ·Tankers Brokers Board~ The agree-
ment also provided for a fee of 1~ shillings per ton to. be paid to the 
Saudi .Arabian government~ 
The conclusion of this agreement was vigorously opposed and 
protested by Aramco who contended that it vas a violation of the ex-
clusive transportation rights of the concession and that it would raise 
the price of crude. Both the government and the company agreed, however, 
_to refer the dispute to arbitration. In late -l958, the arbitration tri-
bunal in Geneva ruled that the Onassis agreement was in conflict.with 
* 39, p. 236; 6, PP~ 298-99. 
the terms of Aramco's concession.* 
D. The Neutral Zone 
1. Oil concessions in the onshore portion of the zoneQ 
a- The Getty Oil Company concession (formerly Pacific Western Oil Corpo-
ration).** 
This concession is granted on February 20, 1949, by the Saudi 
/ 
Arabian government in her undivided interest in the zone. The basic pro~ 
visions of this concession are as follows: 
Area: 
The ~oncession area covers Saudi Arabia's undivided intere~t 
in the entire area of the neutral zone including islands and 
territorial waters for a distanc'e of siX miles. 
Duration: 
The concession is to last for 6o years from the date of signing. 
Drilling obligations: 
The company is obliged tp complete a total drilling of 5,000 
feet by the end of two years· and 16,000 feet by the end of 3 
years. 
Refining commitments: 
By the time the daily production reaches 75,000 barrels per 
day over a 90-day per~od, the company is committed to build 
* 41, p. 55-
** 4o, p. 209; 29, pp .. 392-3; 19, pp. 214-5 •. 
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a refinery of a capacity of not less than 12,000 barrels per day 
and capable of produ~ing aviatio:q gasoline. 
Oil for ~ocal consumption: 
The company is obliged to supply the government' one year after 
the-construction of the refinery, with 100,000 ga~lons of ~ero­
sene and/or gasoline annually ana free of charge" Instead of 
all these atJJ.Ounts, the Saudi. ,Arabian government may take an 
annual amount of 75,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. The 
government is. entit~ed also to purchase up to 20 per cent:1of 
:Jail types of production for its own use at a 5 per cent dis-
count~ 
Fiscal obligations: 
The company· is connni tted to pay to the government an initial 
lump sum of 9,;500,000 dollars at the signing of the conces= 
sion. It was' also ob~iged to pay an annual minim\.Uil royalty of 
one million dollars for three year's even if the concession was 
cancelled before the end, of the three years~ A royalty of 
55 cents per barrel of oil produced is also provided by the 
concession. The company is also connnitted to allow the govern-
ment to obtain a 25 per cent in the ownership of the company" 
as well as 20 per cent of the net.refining profits. It is 
also provided that all pa,yments are to be made in u.s. dol~ars 
b- The American Independent Oil Company (.Aminoil). * 
* 41, p .. 49; 29, p. 393 .. 
~5~. 
This concession is·granted to .Aminoil ·on June 6, 1948, by the 
Kuwait government inher undivided hal:f..,interest in the neutral zone. 
The baste provisions of the concession are the.:following: 
Area: 
The area of' the concession covers Kuwait's undivided half~ 
.interest in the entire area o~the neutral zone including 
islands and territorial waters ·for a distance of 6 miles. 
• Duration: 
As in the case of Getty Oil concessions, the term of the con-
cession is .bO years. 
Drilling:obliB!tion: 
The company. is committed to f1.nish 4,ooo :feet of drilling by 
:the end of :four years, 16,000 i'eet by the end o:f 10 year~, and 
4o' 000 feet by end of 20 years .. 
Refining commitme~t: 
The cpmpany is obliged to build a refinery when the daily pro~ 
auction reaches 15,000 tons (aboutll1.,250 barrels). The capa-
city of this refinery :is to be 10 percent of production and 
the Shaikh of Kuwait is to recieve 15 per cent interest in the 
ownership of the refinery • 
. Fiscal obligations: 
cThe company is to pay the Government of Kuwait an initial lump 
sum of 7. 25 million dollars, plus a. minimum annual royalty of' 
625,000 dollars whether oil was discovered or not. Royalty is 
:fixed at 34 cents per barrel of oil produced, plus 15 per cent 
interest in the ownership of the :stock capital of the company 
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to be . subscribed by the government. 
2. Oil Concessions in the offshore portion of the zone. 
There are two oil concessions governing oil operations in the 
.offshore portion of the neutral zone. The concession in the Saudi 
interest in the zone is held by the Japan Petroleum Trading Company Ltd. 1 
While the concession in Kuwait's interest in the zone is held by the 
Arabian Oil Company, the operating company in Saudi Arabia's concession. 
It can be said that the two concessions are unique in many 
respects, the most important of which is the requirement that the com~ 
panies are to operate as an integrated oil enterprise ana that the 
sharing in profits is to be extended to all company's operations inside 
and outside the neutral zone. Another notable unique feature of these 
concessions is their departure from the traditional 50/50 profit 
sharing practice_. As will be seen later, under the terms of the two 
concessions both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are entitled to a minimum 
share in profits of 57 per cent. These and. several other unique features 
in the two concessions are presented in the following comparative form 
of discussion: 
Effective dates of concessions: 
The e~~ective date of the concession in case of the PJapan 
Petroleum Tiaa.ing Company is December 10, .1957. In case of 
the Arabian Oil Company concession, the effective date is Ju;Ly 
5, 1958. 
Term of concessions: 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the 1 te:rm. of the concession is 2 or 
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4 years for exploration, plus 4o years after the discovery of 
oil. In the case of Kuwait, the term is 44! years .. 
Area of concessions: 
The area of the two concessions covers the entire undivided 
half-interest of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the offshore 
area of the neutral zone. In both cases:~ the companies are 
to relinquish 20 per cent of the area Within 3 years following 
the commencement of commercial production and 20 per cent 
every 5 years thereafter. 
Government ownership: 
In both concessions, and on the discovery of commercial pro-
duction, the governments of Saudi Arabia and of Kuwait will 
have the right to purchase 10 per cent of the shares of the 
operating companies. 
Drilling and refining obligations: 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the concessionaire must have two 
rigs in continuous operation until the entire area of the conw 
cession is drilled up. The concessionaire is also committed to 
build a refinery When production reaches 30 million barrels 
per day. The capacity of the refinery is to be increased to 
30 per cent of-production when it reaches 75 million barrels 
per day. In the case of Kuwait:~ the concessionaire must com~ 
mence drilling within two years from the effective date of the 
·concession and to continue.drilling to a depth·of 20,000 feet 
or until the discovery of oil. · 
Oil for local consumption~ 
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In both concessions~ the concessionaire is to supply the 
respective ;goverrnnent with a maximum of' 10 per cent of' crude 
Qil and refined products produced. The governments are to 
be allowed a 5 per.cent discount frOl!l the prices for these 
supplies~ The concessionaires are also to provide another 10 
per cent of' crude_and_refined products produced for resale to 
friendly Arab countries • 
. Participation in Management: 
In each of' the concessions,·one sixth of' the board of' dire~tors 
is to be nominated by the respective governmente 
Renewal of' concessions: 
In both concessions, the concessionaire has preference renewal 
over all others except the Saudis in case of' Saudi Arabia, and 
the Kuwaitis in-case of Kuwait. 
Fiscal obligations~ 
Both governments are entitled to 57 ~er cent of the net prof'its 
of the company. Both governments are entitled to a royalty of' 
20 per cent of production inkkind or cash. After the commence-
. . 
ment of commercial production both governments are guaranteed 
a minimum annual royalty of 2i million dollars. In both cases 
the company is to pay an annual rental of' 1~ million dollars 
creditable against royalty when in commercial production. In 
"both cases ·also:.: an .. an,nua.~ i"en:ta.J:. .o:f oneYinilliob: doll.ars Will be 
retroactive to effective date of the concess,ion on the disco-
very of' commercial production* In the case of' Kuwait the com-
pany is to pay an additional 5 million dollars when production 
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reaches 50 million barrels per day~ The tax in case of Saudi 
Arabia's concession is to be calculated on all operations inc= 
luding transportation and marketing:~ even outside Saudi Arabia. 
In the case of' Kuwait the government share of' profits is to be 
calculated separately on oil profits and marketing profits~ 
Minimum receipts on oil prof'its·to be. the greater of': 
a:..- Minin;rom royalty of ~ million dollars per year. 
b- 57% of' oil profits:~ or 
c- '2!Yf, royalty on crude, asphalt:~ and gaspplus 40% of' the 
amount by which oil profit exceeds the 20% royalty. aow-
ever, the minimum reciepts are to be 57i. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Conclusions and prospects 
It is quite apparent from. the foregoing study that, with the 
exception of Iran, there are no~:oil laws in the Persian Gulf Area. 
Instead, oil operations and activities within the Area are governed and 
regulated by means of concession agreements which represent the only 
institutional a~~angement between the governments of the Area and con-
cessionaires. In fact, i~ most of the cases, these concession agree-
ments are connected with intercompany arrangements such as those in 
existence between the partners to the Iraq Petroleum Company, Aramco, 
and the International Consortium, or with treaties such as those between 
the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Bahrain and the British government, or with 
political agreements such as those governing the status of the Kuwait-
Saudi Arabia neutral zone. 
It is also clear from the study that all original concessions 
within the Area covered large areas and were for long periods of time. 
This study also shows that these concessions have undergone many signi~ 
ficant changes in area, in duration, in fiscal obligations and in manage-
ment and ownership, of the operating companies. 
In Iran, the original D'Arcy concession was replaced by the 
1933 revised agreement. Accordingly, the area of the new concessions 
was reduced from about 500,000 to 100,000 square miles and a new basis for 
the assessment of royalty was introduced (4 shillings per ton instead of 
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·16 per cent of the net profits in the original concession). Also accor~ 
ding to the new co~cession, among other provisions, the term of the 
concession was extended for a further 32 years. Was the new concession 
a victory for the Iranian government? or was~:it a victory for the com-
pany? There are different views in answering this question. Some clatm 
that the concession was in favor of the government since the area was 
considerably· reduced and the new basis of royalty, with minimum guaran-
tee, was a considerable advantage to the Persian government i:n times of 
depression.* 
Others claim that the new concession produced nothing but 
disadvantages to the Iranian government.** They base their claim on 
the facts that minimum payments were too low to be of consequence; that 
royalty was payable on oil exported whereas it should have 'been payable 
on actual production; that the government was not given access to the 
company's accounts; that the exemption of the company from import duties 
was unjustified and discriminatory to infant industries; that the com-
pany was exempt from surrendering its foreign exchange to the Iranian 
government; and that the term of the concession was prolonged by 32 years. 
In the opinion of the writer1 Mr. Fatemi went too far in his attack on 
the new concession. In fact some of the provisions of the concessions 
were reasonable and are quite familiar in today' s concessions within the 
Area.. The writer agrees with Mr. Shwad.ran in that the ne.w concession was 
a fair transaction between the Irani~~ ~vernment and the company.*** 
* 12, p. 28. 
** 8, pp. 182-3. 
*** 29, p. 56. 
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Later, following the second world war, some attempts were made. 
to revise the 1933 concession again but all were destined to :failure, 
and :following that, in 1951, the Iranian government nationalized the oil 
industry of the country •. About 2.years later, nationalization failed and 
Dr. Musaddiq, father of nationalization, was arrested and jailed. It 
was a pity that Dr. Musaddiq was declared a traitor by the new govern-
ment of the Shah •. It is a pity.also that this is the kind of democracy 
desired by certain imperialistic powers to prevail in the underdeveloped 
c~untries. In any case, the writer believ~s that nationalization was not 
· the right thing and in fact, none of the countries of the Area is, at 
the present time, in a position to nationalize its national oil indus~ 
try. They lack not only the capital by which they can operate the 
industry, but also the skillful labor, the
1
know hOw, the experience, 
·I 
and most important of all the marketing experience. Indeed, it was the 
lack of the marketing experience coupled with the British pressure 
which hindered the Iranian nationalizatiC>nc .. 
In the opinion of the writer, nationalization of the oil 
industry in Iran was not a complete failure. It was, eventUally, 
recognized by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and by the International 
Consortium. It provided the Iranian government with better terms in 
the Consortium agreement, and most important, it produced the new oil 
law· of' 1957 which. marked the beginning of a new.era in the Iranian Oil 
Concession history. 
As noted earlier (Chapter IV), the new oil law provided for 
the participati~n of the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company, 
in management, and in not less than 30 per'cent in the ownership of 
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. any future concession. It also provided for the supervision of operations 
of oil companies by the National Iranian Oil Company. Indeed, it is the 
first and the only law within the area which provides for increased 
. I 
governmental participation and which defines and describes clearly 
and precisely the relationship between the government, represented by 
the National Iranian Oil Comp-any, and concessionaires. 
We have seen also that following the issuance of the Iranian 
oil law of 1957, three concession agreements were signed all~-,of wh.ich 
·are based on the new law ana· in all of them the government-owned 
National Iranian Oil Company holds 50 per cent in the ownership of the 
operating companies ... Ind.eedthe three concessions represent an extreme 
departure from the now traditional 50/50 profit sharing practice,· since 
under the terms of the three concessions tlie Government of Iran is 
•i. 
entitled to 75 per centof the net profits~· 
In Iraq, the first major development· in oil concessions took 
place in 1931 when the 1925 concession was rev.ised. It appears from the 
new revised.. concession that the revision-was much in favor of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company since it. provided :for relief o:f the company from all 
drilling obligations present or future, and considerably increased the 
concession area f'rom 192 to 32,000squa.re.miles. Tb.e royalty rate 
remained unchanged. 
The second major development occurred in· tb,e Iraqi oil con- -
cessions > :.~: was the ad~·p,tion; in 1952, c)f the 50/50 profit sharing 
. .. 
practice as employed by Saudi Arabia. . In.· tl;tat year a new agreement was 
concluded between the Gover:n:m,ent of Iraq arid the ._Iraq Petroleum Company 
and its affiliates: the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Basra Petroleum 
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Company.· According to that agreement the Iraqi government is entitled 
to 50 per cent of the net profits of the three companies currently 
operating in Iraq •. In addition to that, Iraq is guarant.eed a minimum 
annual royalty and production by each of the companies. 
-
In Saudi Arabia, the l93'4 o~iginal concession vas supplemented, u1 
1939, by another agreement according to Which the original area of 
the concession was enlarged by some 8o,ooo square miles in lieu of a 
lump sum payment, an annual rent and specified other payments and 
an increase in the free gasoline to the government. It seemed that the 
supplemental agreement was the best the Saudi Government could get 
from the free bidding consi4ering the existing conditions a~ that 
· time. 
However, the major operation too!; place in December 1950, 
. . I 
when the 50/50 profit sharing formula was. first introduced into the 
Area by the agreement concluded betwee.n Aramco and the Saudi Arabian 
government~ Kuwait and Bahrain adopted the same practice during l952. 
In 1957 and 1958, both SaUdi Arabia and Kuwait concluded 
agreements vith a Japanese firm called Japan Petroleum Trading Company 
for oil rights in their respective undivided interests in the offshore 
portion of the neutral ~one. We have seen that both agreements have 
several unique features. The most unique feature of the two concessions 
is that the company: is required to carry on operations on an integrated 
basis, that is, the same company should exploit, refine, and market the 
oil to be produced~ None of the existing ¢oncessions within the Area 
has such a unique feature. Another unique '.feature of the two concessions 
is that both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are entitled to 57 per cent of the 
net prof'its to the consiu:ne-r. lev~l, that is:, they share pro:fits with the 
company 'Which are realized from production, refining, and marketing 
inside and outside their respective .countries. In f'act t~e two conces~ 
. . ' 
sions have disturbed the old timers who are now waiting to see how 
successful the Japanese are going. to be~ 
Regarding the future prospects for the existing concessions, 
one may ask: Wi~l the new concessionS in Iran and in the neutral zone 
put the now traditional 50/50 profit sharing principle in jeopardy? 
Will the goverillii.ents of the Area.seek changes in the existing arrange-
ments? ·It seems to the writer that the present conditions surrounding 
the world demand and supply of crude will prevent or rather delay such 
changes. Such conditions are the slackening of the growth in world 
demand, restrictions on oil imp6rts imposed by the United States govern~ 
ment, and the promises of Sahara to become :a big producing area. The 
writer believes that in the long run change is inevitable~ This may be 
•. 
attributed to the fact that the demand for petroleum and petroleum 
products is rising steadily; that; in the long run, the national aspi-
rations of the countries of the Areawill.be more intensified; and that, 
in the long run, the people of the Area vill be more aware of the oil 
business. These factors, I believe, will force the old timers to adjust 
themselves to the existing conditions. 
As regards the prospects for future concessions, it seems that 
they can be best expressed by the following of:ficial oil policy declara~ 
tions by authorities in Iran, in Saudi ·Arabia, and in Kuwait. 
In Iran, Mr~ F. Naf'icy, director of exploration and production 
for the National Iranian Oil Company, has outlined Iran's oil policy as 
f'ollows: 
The Iranian petroleum l.egisla.tion'provides for any re~ 
putable operator, large or small, with' (l) knowhow, (2) money, 
and (3) willingness to take a calculated risk,. to enter into 
an agreement with.National Iranian Oil Company in order to 
explore and/or develop independently, or in partnership with 
National Iranian Oil Company, the petroleum resources of. an 
area commensurate with its ability to spend, while enjoying 
(1) complete security froms·political legislative, fiscal, 
or· other changes in working conditions; (2) f'ull freedom of 
action in its operations; and (3) assurances of a generous 
return on its investment if' successful~* 
In Saudi Arabia, Shaikh Abdulla Tariki1 Director General 
of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs said the folloWing regarding oil 
policr. 
This government will grant freely, in accordance with 
the forthcoming petroleum law, new petroleum concessions 
to any private enterprise of a friendly country Which enter-
prise is reputable, sufficiently experienced, and is finan= 
cially responsible for the task it proposes to assume, and 
which approaches this government throuSh the established 
organizational channels~ Under the ne'\q' petroleum1 conces-
siqns will be granted only after public bids have been made 
and considered.** 
It is reported also that Mr. Tariki said further that, in 
future, 
The Saudi Arabian government Will not accept any offers 
granting it less than 60 per cent of profits; that the 
60/40 division of profits should apply to all phases of the 
integrated _operation; that the amount of crude refined lo-
cally should be no less than 30 per cent of total produc-
tion of the concessionaire company; that the Saudi government 
will claim the right to supervise production and marketing 
pperations. *** 
* 41, .P• 40. 
** 41, p. 55~ 
*** Ibid. 
In the case o:f Kuwait nw declaration o:f o:f:ficial oil policy is 
made except that, "Any decision on a :fu:ture grant o:f an oil concession, 
and its developments, will be made by His Highness the Ruler after due 
consideration o:f all relevant :facts and circumstances. 11* 
Iraq at the present time has no :free areas to be o:f:fered :for 
concession bidding except. the small aJ;"ea recently surrendered by the 
' .. .. . .. . 
Kb.anaqin Oil Company and which is currently being exploited by the 
. . 
government~ However, according to the press reports., negotiations bet-
ween the Iraqi government and Iraq .PetJ;'Oleum ·Company and its affiliates 
are going on centering around the relinquishment o:f parts o:f the company's. 
concession area.** No agreement is reached on the matter as yet~ 
From all o:f the. above,. one can draw the :following conclusions: 
1. No oil laws exist in the Persian G:ul:f Area, with the exception 
! 
o:f Iran. 
2. Oil concessions within the Area underwent many significant changes 
ana modifications particularly the area, duration, and :fiscal 
aspects o:f concessions. 
3. A notable change is the adtq.)p.:ition o:f the 50/5o profit sharing 
practice by all the countries of' the Area .. 
4. Nationalization o:f the. Iranian oil industry was a sincere desire 
:for change and an experience :for both the governments of the 
Area and the oil companies operating there. 
5. A most recent change is· the departure :from the 50/50 :formula 
* 41, p. 47. 
·** 50, p. 15. 
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to the 75/25 and 57/43 formulas now in practice in Iran and the· 
Neutral Zone respectively. 
6; A further most recent development is the sharing -o:f profits bet-
wee~ the governments and the oil companies on an integrated basis 
and the increase~ governmental parti~ipation in management. 
7. Official announcements indicate that future oil policy will 
be based on the integration basis and the increased governmental 
supervision and participation in management. 
8. Finally, it can be said that wii.h all the above mentioned and 
other developments of' recent years over the whole region, the 
old-fashioned oil concession map of the Area, with its few 
big colores areas; is changing rapidly. 
· APPENDIX I 
William Knox D 1~qr Oil Concession in Persia* 
··-· .· 
29 May 1901 
Between the Government of His Imperial Majesty, the Shah of 
Persia, of the one part, and William Knox d'Arcy, of independent means, 
residing in London at No. 42, Grosvenor Square (hereinafter called "The 
C?'hces~ionaire 11 ), o:f the other part; 
The :following by these presents has been agreed on and 
arranged-viz: 
ART.I. The Government o:f His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the 
concessionaire by these presents a special and exclusive privilege to 
search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable :for trade; carry 
away and sell natural gas petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite throughout the 
Whole extent o:f the Persian R:mpire for a term of siXty years as :from the 
date of these presents. 
ARr. 2. This privilege shall comprise the exclusive right o:f laying the 
pipe-lines necessary from the deposits where there may be found one or 
several o:f the said products up to the Persian Gulf, as also the necessary 
dis~ributing branches. It shall also comprise the right o:f constructing 
and maintaining ~11 and any wells,· reservoirs, stations and pump services, 
accumulation services and distributio~ services, :factories and other 
works and arrangements that may be deemed necessary. 
ART. 3. The Imperial Persian Government grants gratuitously to the 
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concessionaire all uncultivated lands belonging to the State Which the 
concessionaire's engineers may deem necessary for the.construction of the 
who~e or any part of the above-mentioned works •. As for cultivated lands, 
belonging to the State, the concessi~naire must purchase them at the fair 
and cUrrent price of the province. 
The Government also grants to the concessionaire the right of 
acquiring ~1 and any other lands or build~ggs necessary for the said 
purpose, with the consent of the proprietors, on such conditions as 
may be arranged between him and them without their being allowed to make 
demands of a nature to surcharge the prices ordinarily current for lands 
situate in their respective localities. 
Holy places with all their dependencies within a raaius of 
200 Persian archines are formally excluded. 
ART. 4. As three petroleum mines situate at Schouster, Kassre-Chirine, 
in the province of Kermanschahan, and Daleki, near Bouchir, are at pre-
sent let to private persons and produce an annual revenue of two thousand 
tomans for the benefit of the Government, it has been agreed that the 
three aforesaid mines shall be comprised in the Deed of Concession in 
conformity with Article 1, on condition that, over and above the 16 
per cent mentioned in Article 10, the concessionnaire shall pay every . 
year the fixed sum of 2,000 (two thousand) tomans to the Imperial Govern-
ment. 
ART. 5. The course of the pipe-lines shall be fixed by the concessionnaire 
and his engineers~ 
ART. 6. Notwithstanding what is above set forth, the privilege granted 
by these presents shall not extend.to the provinces of Azerbadjan, 
' Ghilan, Ma.zendarari, Asdrabad and Khorassan, but on the express condition 
that the Persian Imperial Government shall not grant to any other person 
the right of constructing a pipe-line to the southern rivers or to the 
South Coast of Persia. 
ART. 7. All lands granted by these presents to the concessionnaire or 
that may be acquired by him in the manner provided for in Articles 3 and 
4 of these presents, as also in all products exported, shall be free 
of all imposts and taxes during the term of the present concession. All 
material and apparatuses necessary for the exploration, working and 
development of the deposits and for the construction and development of 
the pipe-lines, shall enter Persia free of all taxes and Custom-House 
dutiese 
ART. 8. The concessionnaire shall immediately send out to Persia and 
at his own cost one or several experts wit~ a view to their exploring the 
region in which there exist, as he believes, the said products, and, in 
the event of the report of the expert being in the opinion of the conces-
sionnaire of a satisfactory nature, the latter shall immediately send to 
Persia and at his own cost all the .technical staff necessary, with the 
working plant .and machinery required for boring and sinking wells and 
ascertaining the value pf the property. 
ART. 9. The Imperial Persian Government authorises the concessionna.ire 
to found one or several companies for. the. working of the concession. 
The names' "statutes 11 and capital of the said companies shall 
be fixed by the concessionnaire, and the directors shall be chosen by 
him on the express condition that, on the formation of each company, the 
concessionna.ire shall give official notice of such formation to the 
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Imperial Government, through the medium of the Imperial Commissioner, 
and shall forward the 11 statutes, 11 vt:!ith information as to the places at 
i 
which such company is to operate •. Such company or companies shall 
enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to the concessionnaire, but 
they must assume all his engagements and responsibilities. 
ART. 10. It shall be stipulated in the contract between the conces-
sionnaire, of the one part, and the company, of the other part, that 
the latter is, within the term of one month as from the date of the for-
mation of the first exploitation company, to pay the Imperial Persian 
Government the sum of 20,000 pounds sterling in cash, and an additional 
sum of 20,000 pounds sterling in paid-up shares of the first company 
founded by virtue of the. foregoing article. It shall also pay the 
said GOvernment annually a sum equal to 16 per cent of the annual net 
profits of any company or companies that may be formed in accordance 
with the said article. 
ART. 11. The said Government shall be free to appoint an Imperial 
Commissioner, who shall be consulted by the concessionnaire and the 
directors of the companies to be formed. He shall supply all and any 
useful information at his disposal, and he shall inform them of the 
best course to be ~opted in the interest of the undertaking. He shall 
establish, by agreement with the concessionnaire, such supervision as 
he may deem expedient to safeguard the interests of the Imperial Govern-
· ment. 
The aforesaid power~ of the Imperial Commissioner shall be 
set forth in the "statutes" of the companies to be created. 
The concessionnaire shall pay the commissioner thus appointed 
' 1.69. 
an annual sum of 1,000 pounds sterling for his services as from the date 
of the formation of the first company. 
· ART. 12. The worf!nen employed in the service of the company shall be 
subject to His Imperial Majesty the Shah,·except _the technical staff, such 
.. ---" 
as the managers, engineers, borers and forement. 
ART. 13. At any place in which it may be proved that the inhabitants 
of the country now obtain petroleum for their own use, the company must 
supply them gratuitously with the quantity of petroleum that they them-
Selves got previously. Such quantity shali be fixed according to. 
their own declarations, subject to the supervision of the local author-
ity. 
ART. 14. The Imperial Government binds itself to take all and any 
necessary measures to secure the safety and the carrying out of the ob-
ject of this concession of the plant and of the apparatuses, of which 
mention is made, for the pu:i'poses of the~rundertaking of the company, and 
to protect the representatives, agents and servants of the company. The 
Imperial Government having thus fulfilled its engagements, the conces-
sionna.ire and the companies created by him shall not have power, under 
any pretext whatever, to claim damages from the Persian Government. 
ART. 15. On the expiration of the term of the present concession, all 
materials, buildings and apparatuses then used by the company for the 
exploitation of its industry shall become the property of the said Govern-
ment, and the company shall have no right to any indemnity in this 
connection. 
ARr. 16. If within the term of two years as from the present date the 
concessionnaire shall not have established the first of the said companies 
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authorised by Article 9 of the present agreement, the present concession 
shall become null and void. 
ART. 17. In the event of there arising between the parties to the 
present concession any dispute or difference in respect of its interpre-
tation or the rights or responsibilities of one or the other of the 
parties therefrom resulting, such dispute or difference shall be sub-
mit~ed to two arbitrators at Teheran, one of whom shall be named by 
each of the parties, and to an umpire who shall be appointed by the 
arbitrators before they proceed to arbitrate. The decision of the 
arbitrators or, in the event of the latter disagreed:rig, that of the 
umpire shall be final. 
ART. ~8 This Act of Concession, made in duplicate, is written in the 
French langtla.ge and translated into Persian: with the same meaning. 
l3ut, in the event of there being any dispute in relation to 
such meaning, the French text shall alone prevail. 
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.APPENDIX II 
Agreement (Jiddah) for Equal Sharing of the Profits: The Satud:h Arab 
Government and Aramco* 
Agreement concluded on 30 December 1950 between the government 
of the Sa'udi Arab Kingdom, hereinafter called 11the Government11 , repre-
sented by His Escellency al-Snaykh 'Abdallah al~ulayman al-Hamdan, 
Minister of Fina.nce,.a.nd The Arabian American Oil Company, hereinafter 
·called 11Aramco, 11 represented by F.A. Davies, its Executive Vice-President 
and Senior·Resident Officer in the Sa'udi Aret.b Kingdom 
Whereas, the Government for a period of many months has been 
seeking additional revenue from Aram9o, has held views different from 
those of Aramco on many long-standing interpretations of Aramco's con-
cession and other agreements, and has made many claims and exactions 
.which Aramco has contested as contrary to Aramco's concessionary rights 
and immunities; and 
Whereas, the Government by letter 20 August 1950 demanded 
amendment of certain conditions of Aramco's concession and other out-
·standirig agreements and on 5 September 1950 submitted some thirteen 
points for discussion; and 
Whereas, the Government on 4 November 1950, and on 27 Decem-
ber 1950 promulgated income taxdecrees providing, among other things, 
b 
* 16 ' pp. 314-7. 
172 • 
for the taxation of business profits within the Sa'udi Arab Kingdom; and 
Whereas, both the Government an~ Aramc6 recognize the necessity 
for resoiving all matters in dis:pute so that Aramco may proceed with the. 
deyelopment of oil resources in areas of Aramco's concession in full 
agreement with and having full cooperation from the Government; 
Now, therefore, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
1.. ·Anything in article 21 in Aramco 1 s concessionary agreement (of 29 
May 1933) notwithstanding, Aramco submits to the income taxes.provided 
in royal decrees No 17/2/28/3321 and·No. 17/2/28/7634 hereto attached · 
for reference, it being underst~od that: 
a·. In no case shall the total of such .taxes and all other taxes, 
royal ties, rentals and exactions of the Government for any year ex,.. 
ceed fifty per cent (50%) of the gross income of Aramco, after such. 
gross income has been reduced by Aramco•s cos't of operation, in...: 
eluding losses and depreciation, and by income taxes, if any,. pay-
able to any foreign country but not reduced by any taxes, royalties, 
rentals, or other exactions of the Government for such year; and 
b. In all other respects Aramco's exemptions and immunities set 
forth in article 21 of the concession agreement shall continue in 
full force and effect. 
2. It is further understood that: 
a. Aramco shall have the option to pay the taxes imposed by s~id 
decrees No. 17/2/28/3321 and No. 17/2/28/7634 in the currencies of· 
the Sa'udi Arab Kingdom or in other currencies in the proportions 
in which Aramco r~ceives such currencies from its sales. 
b. The term 11 exactions of· the Government" as herein used shall 
include, among other things., the amount of all fees and charges. for 
services rendered to Aramco in excess of the-cost of such services 
and all duties on imports by Ara.mco for Ara.mco, for its service organ .. 
izations and for the use and benefit of Aramco employees and of such 
organizations, except duties on food and items imported by Aramco for 
sale in its canteens~ 
3. The Government recognizes the continuing nature of the provisionsoof 
articles l and 2 of this agreement, and agrees that the new arrangement 
described therein constitutes a complete satisfaction of.all outstanding 
claims and demands of the Government with respect both to the past and 
to the :future; the Government agrees that Ara.mco may continue its oper-
ations in accordance with the Aramco concessionary agreements in the 
same manner as in the pas~. 
4. The following are examples of the effect of article 3: 
a. The demands of the Government's letter of 20 August l95b, and 
the Government's points for discussion of 5 September 1950, are 
fully satisfied. 
b. Aramco's practices of using the English ton of 2,240 pounds in 
computation of royalties_, selecting the locations for royalty guaging, 
taking natural salt for use in Aramco's operations, and using crude 
oil, gas, and petroleum products free of royalty in Ara.mco's oper-
ations and facilities in Sa'udi Arabia, are in accordance with the 
terms of the concessionary agreement. 
c. The Government agrees that Aramco may gauge and del~-ver oil to the 
Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company at al-Qaysumah. 
d. The·Jiddah radio agreement of 6 March 1949 is in full force and 
effect. 
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These articles in no way limit the all-inclusive generality of Article 3. 
5. The Government agrees ·that: 
E1. The agreement concluded in the. month of March 1948 to the contrary 
' . ··.notwithstanding all monetary and currency exchanges between Aramco 
and the GOve~ent, including gold equivelants payable by Aramco to 
the Government, shall be at official rates recognized by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund or by any other internationally accepted 
authority in case the International Monetary Frlnd is discontinued 
or no longer quotes exchange rates. 
b. The Government Will make available to Aramco Sa' udi Arab cur-
rencies, including gold; silver, and base metal coins at the 
same rates as they are made available to the public. Aramco shall 
have the right to purchase Sa'udi Arab currencies in the open mar-
ket at current rates. If the Sa 1udi Arab riyal J:ate should rise above 
the cost of minting new riyals plus transportation and insurance 
. ' .. 
charges, .the Government und~rtakes to supply Aramco's riyal require-
ments at cost plus said charges. 
6. The free gasoline arid kerosene that shall be offered the Government 
pursuant to article 8 of the Supplemental Agreement dated 31 May 1939 is 
hereby increased commencing 1 January 195l.to two million six hundred and 
fifty thousand (2,650,000) American gallons of gasoline per annum, all 
in bulk at Ras-al-Tannurah. Aramco agrees further to offer the Govern~ 
ment commencing l January 1951 seven thousand five hundred (7,500) tons 
per annum of road asphalt at Ras-al-Tannurah., the'. ,s.a.id:<~sphalt.::td be 
·:sup:pli:ed 'in: dhmrs:). . · p:ro':v:ided: ,tha'h: Sit:uniS- ·ar.e· ~av~J;J.able at reasonable cost. 
No royalty shall be payable· on crude oil required for the manufacture of 
gasoline, kerosene and asphalt offered free by Aramco and taken by the 
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Government. The costs of' producing the said crude oil and of' manufac-
turing the said free f'asoline, kerosene, and asphalt shall be regarded 
as an expense of' operations and not as an exaction within the meaning 
of' article 2(b) of' this agreement~ It is understood that all the said 
free gasoline, kerosene and asphalt is for the ordinary requirements of' 
the Government and not for sale outside or inside of' Sa'udi Arabia. 
7. Aramco agrees, commencing 1 January 1951, to pay the Government 
seven hundred thousand dollars ($700, 000) per annum -ioward the expenses, 
support and maintenance of' representatives ::of' the Government concerned 
with the administration of' Aramco operations. The said amount of' seven 
hundred thousand dollars ($7001 000) shall be paid in equal installments 
in January, April; July and October of' each year and shall be viewed as 
an expense of' operations and not as an exaction within the meaning 
of' article 2(b) of' this agreement. The. Government accepts Aramco's 
undertaking to pay the said amount of' seven hundred thousand dollars 
($7001 000) per annum as full satisfaction of' all claims and demands 
for expenses, support and maintenance of' ~epresentatives of' the Govern-
ment concerned with the adminstration of' Aramco's operations, including 
all such representatives of' the national, provincial and municipal gov-
ernments, police, guards, guides, soldiers and officials of' the cus-
toms, immigrations and quarantine servies. It is understood that the 
said pa~ent without limiting the generality of' the foregoing, shall be 
in lieu of' all claims for salaries, wages, eXpense, transport, free ser-
vices, residence and construction of' every description, and all pay-
ments and services ·otherwise accruing after 1 January 1951 pursuant to 
article 20 of' Aramco's concessionary agreement. 
8. Aramco confirms its policy .of' conducting its operations in accordance 
with first-class oil field practice and its accounting in accordance 
with generally recognized standards. The Government f'or its part con-
firms the Government 1 s confidence in the management of' Aramco in con-
ducting Aramco 1 s operations~ 
9. This agreement shall become effective on the date hereof' and shall 
remain in f'Ull force and ef'f'ect f'or the duration of' the concessionary 
agreement. 
177. 
.APPENDIX III 
Nationalization Law of the Oil Industry in Iran * 
l. May,l95l 
ART. l. With a view to arranging the enforcement of the xaw of 24th and 
29th Esfand, 1329 (15th and 20th March, 1951), concerning the nationali-
zation of the oil industry throughout Persia, a miXed board composed of 
five Senators and five Deputies elected by either of the two Houses and 
of the Minister of Finance or his Deputy shall be formed. 
ART. 2. The Government is bound to dispossess at once the former Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company under the supervision of the miXed board. If the 
Company refuses to hand over at once on thegrounds of e:x:isting claims 
on the Government, the Government can, by mutual agreement, deposit in 
the Bank Milli Iran or in any other bank up to 25 :per cent of current 
revenue from the oil after deduction of eXploitation eXpenses in orner 
to meet the probably claims of the Company. 
ART. 3. The Government is bound to e:x:amine the rightful claims of the 
Government as well as the rightful claims of the Company under the super-
vision of the mi:x:ed board and to submit its suggestions to the two 
Houses of Parliament in order that the same may be implemented after 
approval by the two Houses. 
ART. 4. Inasmuch as .the nationalisation of the oil industry was also 
approved by the Senate on 29th Esfand (20th March, 1951) and inasmuch 
b 
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as all income from oil and oil_ products are the established property of 
the Persian nation the Goverr.nnent is bound to audit. the Company's accounts 
under the supervision of the mixed board which must also closely super= 
vise exploitation as from the date of the implementation of this law 
until the appointment of an executive body. 
ARr. 5. The mixed board must .draw up1 as soon as possible, the statute 
of the National Oil Company in which provision is to be made for the 
seiiting up of an executive body and a supervisory body .of experts, and 
must submit the sane to the two Rouses for approvaL 
ART. 6. For the gradual replacement of foreign experts by Persian 
experts the mixed board is bound to draw up regulations for sending1 
after competitive examinations, a number of students each year to foreign 
countries to undertake study in the various brances of required know-
ledge and gain experience in oil industries, the said regulations to 
be carried out by the Ministry of Education after the approval of the 
Council of Ministers. The expenses connected with the study of 
such students shall be met out of oil revenues. 
ART. 7. All purchasers of products derived from the wells taken back 
from the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company can in future buy annually 
the same quantity of oil they used bo buy annually from the Company from 
the beginning of. the Christian year 1948 up to 29th Esfand, 1329 (20th 
March, 1951) at a reasonable international price. For any surplus quan-
tity they shall have priority in the event of equal terms of purchase 
being offered. 
ART. 8. The mixed board must finish its work within three months as from 
the date of approval of this law and must submit the report of its 
179. 
activities to the Majlis in accordance with Article 8. In the event o:f 
requiring an extension it must apply7 giving valid reasons, for such 
extension. Whilst, however, the extension is before the two Rouses for 
approval the mixed board can continue its fUnction. 
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